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Abstract 
 
 
Concepts are the building blocks of our cognitive system. Over the years, theories 
of conceptual knowledge have attempted to explain the way in which we acquire and 
subsequently master concepts by relying on different assumptions. Among several 
proposals, theories of Embodied and Grounded Cognition (EGC) submit to the idea that 
our conceptual system is couched in our bodily states and is influenced by the 
environment surrounding us (Barsalou, 2008). Chapter 1 reviews and critically discusses 
the debate on conceptual format as developed in cognitive science. 
One of the major challenges for theories of conceptual knowledge, and for EGC 
theories, is constituted by abstract concepts (ACs) like ethic. Recently, however, some 
proposals within the EGC research field have addressed this criticism, arguing that the 
category of abstract concepts is a multifaced and heterogenous category, encompassing 
exemplars that differ among them with respect of their grounding sources (e.g. Borghi et 
al., 2018). According to the WAT theory (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), for instance, both 
abstract and concrete concepts are grounded in our bodily states and linguistic system, to 
different extents. Specifically, abstract concepts are more influenced by social, cultural 
and linguistic aspects than concrete concepts. Thus, their processing would primary 
involve the activation of the linguistic system, i.e. orofacial muscles and the mouth 
effector. In addition, ACs would be more influenced by cultural and linguistic variability. 
Chapter 2 tackles the issue of abstract concepts from an EG perspective.  
In keeping with recent developments of EGC theories of abstract conceptual 
knowledge, gender can be considered as a special kind of abstract concept. In fact, its 
grounding sources enclose biological and perceptual aspects–related to one’s own sexual 
embodiment–and social and cultural factors. Whereas previous accounts on gender have 
stressed one specific aspect over the other (Eagly & Wood, 2013), nowadays the 
dichotomy opposing sex to gender seems less tenable (Butler, 1990; Hyde et al., 2019). 
Hence, drawing on the description of abstract concepts offered by Multiple 
Representation Views such as the WAT theory, this dissertation defends a queer 
perspective on abstract concepts and gender, that escapes traditional distinctions in order 
to better account for abstract conceptual knowledge. Along these lines, in Chapter 3, I 
present a grounded analysis of the concept of gender, illustrating how it can be considered 
as a queer concept in itself.    
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Queer is by definition whatever is at 
odds with the normal, the legitimate, the 
dominant. There is nothing in particular to 
which it necessarily refers. It is an identity 
without an essence. 'Queer' then, 
demarcates not a positivity but a 
positionality vis-à-vis the normative... 
[Queer] describes a horizon of possibility 
whose precise extent and heterogeneous 
scope cannot in principle be delimited in 
advance. (Halperin, 1995, p. 62) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Writing a doctoral dissertation is hard. During the path you encounter a number of 
obstacles ranging from practical impediments (e.g., you suddenly run out of coffee and the 
stores are closed) to more existential crisis (“why am I doing this?”). In my specific case, 
existential and theoretical dilemmas were very common—dare I say, daily. Writing a 
doctoral dissertation is hard, but is even harder when you cannot communicate to your 
parents and to your grandparents what is the object of your inquiry. The fact is that, when 
I present my work to non-academic, “non-cognitive science” people they are usually 
confused about my definition. Indeed, concepts are to our cognitive system what air is to 
our perceptual world. They are everywhere, and yet we notice them just in case there is 
something “wrong” (e.g., it is windy, or we need to update our concept of money so as to 
include bitcoins).  
Studying concepts is hard, and sometimes you even lose sight of what effectively 
are you studying. Despite the efforts of the last 50 years of research in cognitive science, 
in fact, you cannot precisely measure concepts. They are not like other cognitive abilities. 
Take memory, for instance: you can ask participants to memorize say 50 words, and 
subsequently to list the items they remember. If participant A would name 25 correct words 
from the list, we can conclude that she succeeded in the task, remembering 50% of the total 
list (quite a good result). Alternatively, you can choose to measure visual memory, by 
presenting participants with a set of pictures, then change the set maintaining only half of 
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the previous images, and ask participants to indicate which ones among the newly presented 
pictures they already saw. 
Now, suppose you are interested in investigating the conceptual knowledge of 
participant A of trains. The first problem is: how would you even start your experiment? 
We might want to start by assessing categorical knowledge. Hence, we would prepare a set 
of images showing trains, cars, airplanes and ships, and ask participants to group them 
together in the way they prefer. Supposedly, slightly more than a half of our sample would 
pair trains with trains, cars with cars etc.—but be sure there will be someone that will group 
the items by colors. So, you have your experiment done, and with a bit of luck you can 
publish your research in a scientific journal. But what exactly have you demonstrated? That 
people can pair trains with trains. This result says little if nothing about the conceptual 
representations underlying trains knowledge. I swear I can pair all the metal parts I find in 
Ikea’s boxes without even knowing what purpose they serve, nor even their names, just by 
looking at them (which is reflected by the fact that afterwards I would usually spend one 
hour at least reading the instructions pamphlet, trying to figure out what object should I 
pick first). Looking at the way in which people use objects is insufficient as well. In fact, 
as the tradition of ecological psychology convincingly showed, objects afford certain 
actions by virtue of their physical constitution. A razor wire would easily stave off 
unwanted visitors, but the process through which it will become one of the symbols of 
private property–feature that would certainly take part in the conceptual representation of 
razor wires–occurs at a different level. Given the difficulty entailed in the study of 
conceptual knowledge, scholars contrived several methods aimed at accessing it, among 
which one of the most employed is the feature listing (or free-listing) task. The underlying 
assumption of these kind of tasks is that, by asking participants to name features related to 
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the concept X, they would rely on their semantic knowledge and list everything they know 
about that given concept. Thus, if you ask people to list properties or features of the concept 
train, you would probably end up with a list containing words like “long, speed, travel, 
railway, seats, grey” etc. This is quite a good sketch of what the concept train could look 
like, even though you might want to consider that whether certain features are mentioned 
or not can vary as a function of contexts and of participants. 
The concept of train could have been a good example to mention when explaining 
to my grandfather what am I studying. Unfortunately, the object of my research is 
something even more general than the general category of trains; and yet, it is the mastering 
of the topic of my investigation that makes it possible for us to categorize all the different 
instances of trains into a single category. The study of concepts, and conceptualizations, 
seems in this sense to set a footprint for the understanding of our most basic cognitive 
abilities. But what is a concept indeed? To me, as a researcher interested in theories of 
conceptual representation, it has a very specific and technical meaning. But I noticed that 
people use the notion of concept in everyday language almost automatically, and certainly 
not in the way I do—writing a dissertation makes you hypersensitive. Therefore, I started 
to think that probably I didn’t have any idea of what a concept is, and I asked to a set of 51 
participants (M age= 42; 18 F) to list maximum 15 words they thought were related to 
concept1. To give a hint of the topic of the following discussion, take a look at Figure 1, 
below.  
 
                                                     
1 For further details on the procedure see Part II of this dissertation.  
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Figure 1. Dendrogram resulting from the Cluster Analysis of items that were listed by at least 10% of 
participants for the word concept.  
 
According to these results, a concept is something generally pertaining to the 
domain of mind; among the most prominent features of concept there are in fact reasoning, 
explanation, thought, idea, opinion, and mind. Additionally, a concept is related to meaning 
and generally to topics, but the most interesting part of the orange cluster is the one pairing 
two pivotal notions of this dissertation, namely abstract and concrete2. The green cluster is 
composed of maybe more philosophical definitions of concept, among which notion, theory 
(proponents of Theory-Theory would have exulted) and philosophy. If we look at the 
frequencies, the most frequently listed item was idea (54%), followed by thought (50%), 
and abstract (19%). Even though I was positively surprised to notice that the term abstract 
                                                     
2 Note that the measure on which is based the analysis of these data (that will be extensively discussed in 
Part II) accounts for both within and between participants’ co-occurrences. Hence, the fact that the words 
abstract and concrete are represented as near in the dendrogram entails that they were frequently listed 
together across and within participants.  
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was mentioned by a relevant number of participants, the picture conveyed by the analysis 
of the frequencies seem to retrace a computationalist approach to concepts. Furthermore, 
at a first glance, the great absent of this sketch is also one of the greatest absent of modern 
theories of conceptual representation, until recent developments, namely the body.  
So, besides more technical considerations, apparently we all know what we mean 
by concept. The dendrogram above could in fact explain, with some relevant integrations, 
to my grandfather what is the domain of my research. Nonetheless, scientific literature on 
what concepts are, what they should be, how do they work–and even on whether they do 
really exist or not–is overwhelming. Why did concepts caused such a stir? 
I suspect the reason why concepts represented the field of battle of cognitive 
scientists, philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists has to do with the fact that they 
are ubiquitous, and yet they are ephemeral. Concepts are ubiquitous in that we employ them 
in the most basic functions of our cognition (e.g., when drawing inferences, remembering, 
identifying objects, discussing ideas) but also for much more complicated purposes: think 
for example of the characterization of the concept gift in “archaic societies” developed by 
anthropologist Mauss (1966). Concepts are ephemeral because, as already mentioned, there 
is not a unique manner to test them, to describe them and to measure them. Moreover, they 
change with the passing of time and moving from culture to culture, so it is really difficult 
to get a fixed and universal representation of a given concept. We cannot take a picture of 
a concept, or observe it under a microscope. Every attempt to clarify their nature would 
result in an indirect way of approaching them (note that even neuroimaging studies can be 
considered to start from a “positioned” perspective, and the portrait of concept that I offered 
above is greatly conditioned by the idea that one way to access conceptual content is by 
relying on linguistic descriptions). 
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Concepts, generally speaking, are abstractions of relevant features of things we 
encounter in our everyday life, that are collected and collated into a single instance. This 
instance is what drives us in the multitude of stimuli to which we are constantly exposed. 
Concepts have been subjected to a burdensome workload, so it is no surprising that in the 
end they came out “a bit stretched”: their nature was thoroughly dissected, and their very 
ontological existence questioned. At first they were conceived as definitions, forgetting all 
the experiential domain they rely on. In their journey they were subsequently transformed 
into prototypes, then exemplars, and also into set of theories. To foreshadow the–
momentary–arrival of this journey they were also defined as “multimodal, grounded and 
dynamic representations”. All these accounts greatly contributed to the scientific 
knowledge of our conceptual system, but each of them has its own limitations. The review 
of some of the most relevant theories of conceptual knowledge is the topic of the first 
Chapter of this dissertation.  
If you think that studying concepts is a hard work, because they are ubiquitous and 
ephemeral, studying abstract concepts3 is even harder. In fact, if there is anything more 
problematic and more ‘abstract’ than concepts, this is the category of abstract concepts. It 
is worth noting that abstract concepts have been the sword of Damocles of almost every 
theory of conceptual knowledge, and Embodied and Grounded Theories of cognition 
(which constitute the theoretical framework of this dissertation) made no exception, at least 
until recently. Here a sample of some of the questions animating the debate on abstract 
concepts: what is an abstract concept (the inevitable ontological question)? What is the 
                                                     
3 To spice things up, note that the notion of “abstract concepts” is a theoretical simplification (cf. Barsalou, 
Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018). Indeed, as we will see in the course of this dissertation, a neat distinction 
between abstract and concrete concepts is at least problematic.  
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difference between abstract and concrete concepts (binary comparisons are always in 
vogue, as we will see)? If concepts are embodied, how can we account for abstract concepts 
that are by definition detached from the perceptual world (beware of the a-modal claim)? 
But above all, is it still useful to distinguish the two categories so sharply (finally, a breath 
of fresh air)? To these, and other concerns is devoted the second Chapter of this dissertation.  
The third, and last Chapter is instead an in-depth analysis of a specific abstract 
concept, inspired and supported by the theoretical and experimental considerations 
introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. Specifically, I will address the concept of gender in a 
grounded perspective, showing how when considered as an abstract concept–in the sense 
described in Chapter 2–is it possible to unravel its complexity leaving aside traditional 
dichotomies such as the ones opposing sex/gender, nature/nurture, and abstract/concrete.  
To sum up, the present discussion is aimed at providing partial answers to three 
main questions: (a) what is a concept? (b) what is an abstract concept? (c) what is entangled 
in the concept of gender?  
The reader might know that she will find in the following pages only a selected 
review of literature, and that scientific debate on each of the abovementioned topic is still 
flourishing. Nonetheless, I tried to provide–to the best of my capacities–an account of 
abstract conceptual knowledge and gender informed by most recent developments in the 
frame of embodied and grounded approaches to cognition. With these remarks in mind, I 
hope to walk the reader into the journey of concepts until binary and dichotomous 
constructions will fade away, in light of a more queer conceptualization of abstract concepts 
and gender.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CONCEPTS. A TROUBLED TALE 
 
1.1. Concepts. What Are we Talking About?  
 
Locke, in the seventeenth century, postulated (and rejected) an 
impossible idiom in which each individual object, each stone, each bird and 
branch had an individual name; Funes had once projected an analogous 
idiom, but he had renounced it as being too general, too ambiguous. In 
effect, Funes not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, 
but even every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it. […] He 
was, let us not forget, almost incapable of general, platonic ideas. It was not 
only difficult for him to understand that the generic term dog embraced so 
many unlike specimens of differing sizes and different forms; he was 
disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should 
have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from the front). […] I 
suspect, nevertheless, that he was incapable of thought. To think is to forget 
a difference, to generalize, to abstract. (Borges, 1956, pp. 113–114) 
 
Borges’ popular short story about Ireneo Funes clearly points to the extraordinary 
capability acquired by the protagonist of remembering everything, but it also introduces in 
a fascinating way a central issue in the cognitive sciences, namely categories. In fact, as 
described in the short story, Funes seems to lack of a crucial human ability: forming and 
handling coherent categories. Funes’ world is constituted by a multitude of details and, for 
him, each occurrence of a physical entity results to be different from the following one, as 
the example of the dog shows. In short, he is incapable of categorizing. The process of 
abstraction is exactly what allows us to interact with the world with a limited energy use; 
this process is supported by the implicit knowledge of conceptual categories to which things 
in the world belong. Conceptual categories and their knowledge help us in our everyday 
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life so that we do not need to make new inferences about the function of all the objects that 
we encounter during the day. If we see a design sofa that does not present the typical 
features generally associated with sofa, such as legs, arms and cushions, we are still aware 
of the fact that it is a piece of furniture and that probably its function is to be seated on. As 
a consequence, differently from Funes, we do not feel the need to attach to it a new name.  
Categorization processes have fascinated cognitive scientists, psychologists and 
philosophers for a long time. As Gardner (1985) stresses, one of the main features of 
cognitive sciences is the assumption that, for scientific purposes, human activities must be 
described in terms of representations. In fact, if on the one hand it is relatively easy to 
account for structures and mechanisms of the nervous system in terms of recognizable 
units, on the other hand investigating mental processes or representations seems extremely 
more problematic. A question arising from this perspective relates to the need of cognitive 
scientists to postulate this higher level of explanation for mental processes. Apparently, the 
traditional behaviorist approach according to which only observations of overt behavior are 
relevant is somehow an oversimplified version of cognitive processes. Likewise, the 
content-blind hypothesis, that assumes the existence of a sort of lingua franca of mental 
operations capable of performing symbols manipulations independently of their content, 
appears as an artificial construction detached from physical experience. There must be 
something accounting for the extraordinary human capacity of abstracting peculiarities of 
the external world in order to form general ideas. What is then that constitutes the very core 
of our cognitive processes? Is there a cognitive unit allowing us to interact with the external 
world the way we do? And if that is the case, what is its nature? What is its specific 
structure? What its own function? 
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The most basic units of thought are generally referred to as concepts. Concepts, in 
a renowned definition, are “the glue that holds our mental world together” (Murphy, 2002, 
p. 1). They enable us to navigate into the stream of different experiences with things in the 
world that we see, touch, hear, and smell everyday by keeping together past experiences in 
our mind in order to be prepared to interact with new instances. In Smith and Medin’s 
words (Smith & Medin, 1981, p. 1), concepts “capture the notion that many objects or 
events are alike in some important respects, and hence can be thought about and responded 
to in ways we have already mastered.” This being said, it is not surprising that the debate 
around conceptual knowledge and conceptual representation animated scientific 
discussions since Aristotle.  
Theories on concepts represent one of the most fruitful achievements of cognitive 
sciences, and they are still raising proposals and controversies among scholars coming from 
psychology, philosophy, neurosciences, linguistics, anthropology and artificial 
intelligence.  
In what follows, I will sketch out some of the most influential accounts on concepts. 
This review of the literature is by no means exhaustive, but is intended to present some of 
the major issues that render the study of concepts such an exciting field of research. There 
is a large body of literature that covers the topic of conceptual knowledge both from a 
philosophical (e.g., Margolis & Laurence, 1999, 2015) and from a psychological (e.g., 
Murphy, 2002) point of view, thus my discussion will be limited, and aimed at constructing 
arguments in favor of a specific proposal of concepts representation. I will address four 
distinct theories before presenting the perspective that will be adopted for the rest of this 
dissertation. The rationale behind this choice is that to confront weaknesses and strengths 
of some of the most influential theories of conceptual representation, and finally to argue 
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how embodied and grounded accounts of cognition could resolve much of the controversies 
entailed in the study of concepts. With this in mind, a good place to start for this discussion 
is certainly The Classical Theory; in fact, either directly or indirectly much of the theories 
investigating the structure of concepts can be seen as a reaction to, or developments of, the 
Classical Theory of concepts. What made this theory deserve the label of classical? This 
question, along with the presentation of some of the crucial tenets and objections related to 
the Classical Theory, will be the subject of the next paragraph.    
 
1.2. Is the Pope a Bachelor? The Classical Theory  
 
One of the most pervasive accounts of concepts is what Smith and Medin (1981) 
labelled “The Classical Theory”. The origin of this perspective dates back in ancient Greek 
times, and kept gaining edge until the second half of the twentieth century. Here, I will 
generally outline the main tenets of the theory and then move to the most compelling set of 
arguments that contributed to its partial disclaim. For the sake of this dissertation, I will 
focus on the principal aspects of both claims and objections. I will only report the 
experimental evidence against the Classical Theory that has been firstly recognized as 
challenging for the theory itself, although most of the arguments are still inspiring empirical 
researches. More recent findings will be treated later on in the course of the dissertation, 
because of their ongoing relevance in the matter.   
The basic assumption of the Classical Theory is an “ontological”1 assumption, in 
the sense that it relates to the very nature of concepts: concepts are defined as mental 
                                                     
1 Here, ‘ontological’ is broadly intended both in the sense of “what there is” and in the sense of “what 
features do have things that exist”(cf. Hofweber, 2018). 
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representations having a definitional structure. Importantly, those representations are 
considered as the result of an abstraction process which leads to a summary description. 
This summary description doesn’t need to coincide with the description of a specific entity, 
but it applies to all the entities in the class.  
The second main assumption directly relates to the categorization process. In a 
Classical perspective, the definitions that compose a concept are both necessary and 
sufficient. That is to say that a) every instance of a concept must possess its definitional 
features in order to be considered as an exemplar of the class and b) if an instance possesses 
features which are associated with a given class, then it has to pertain to that class. The 
classic example of the concept BACHELOR (Margolis & Laurence, 1999) clearly 
illustrates these two claims. Following the Classical account, the concept of BACHELOR 
is composed by a set of representations such as UNMARRIED, MALE, ADULT. Thus, for 
something/someone to be considered as a BACHELOR, it is necessary to be an unmarried 
adult male (a); in the same way, it suffices for something/someone to be unmarried, adult 
and male in order to count as a BACHELOR (b). In this vein, an item falls under a given 
category only if it satisfies the defining components of the category, with no in-between 
cases. As a consequence, there are no good or bad members in the category; there is no 
difference between items in the same category, as long as they meet the required defining 
criteria. Note that, by embracing the Classical Theory, we are implicitly assuming that 
concepts are relatively stable representations in the mind, thus no variability between and 
within individuals is here acknowledged. For a concept to have a definitional structure 
means that it is defined by its properties, that bound it in order to be applicable and used 
jointly by individuals. Those properties have to be the same over time and between users, 
otherwise the applicability of the concept is compromised.   
20 
 
 
 
As Margolis and Laurence (1999) emphasized, one of the main reasons why theories 
centered around the idea that concepts have a definitional structure have historically been 
held in great regard is because they have powerful explanatory resources, deriving from 
their theoretical commitments. In fact, the Classical Theory not only offers a clear account 
of what concepts are supposed to be, but it also deals with conceptual acquisition, 
conceptual combination and categorization. Conceptual acquisition logically follows from 
the (a) and (b) criteria. As noted by Margolis and Laurence (1999), by endorsing an 
empiricist version of the Classical Theory, conceptual acquisition can be explained starting 
from perception. Environmental contingencies form the basis for the correlation of basic 
perceptual properties, which are in turn combined by the learner resulting in a complex 
combination of features (the concept). Once the complex concept is formed, the learner 
who encounters the set of relevant perceptual features will know that every instance 
satisfying those features will fall under the concept.  
Although traditionally considered as one of the most complete accounts on 
conceptual knowledge, the Classical Theory has faced numerous attacks from scholars 
coming from different disciplines. Nowadays, its strength is considerably weakened and 
most researchers are reluctant to adopt such a perspective. The dominance of the Classical 
Theory was undermined basically through two different kinds of arguments. First, 
theoretical objections were moved mostly by philosophers, second empirical data coming 
from experimental psychology failed to support the main claims of the theory (although for 
a critical review of the arguments see Smith & Medin, 1981).  
The most compelling theoretical arguments could be collapsed in what is called the 
Plato’s problem (Margolis & Laurence, 1999), and summarized as follows. By sustaining 
an empiricist version of the Classical Theory, we commit ourselves to the assumption that 
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every concept must be defined by a subset of perceptual features, usually called structural 
features. As a matter of facts, many entities in the world are primarily characterized by 
functional features, rather than structural features (e.g., a cup is used to drink something). 
Moreover, some entities are not definable through perceivable features at all (e.g., justice). 
The shortcoming represented by abstract concepts would rule out the possibility of defining 
all concepts, thus the theory would be compromised at its basis.  
Even if we were to put aside the desideratum of perceptibility, the Classical account 
would still result problematic. Here is where Wittgenstein’s (1953) famous argument takes 
stance. Using the example of game, he showed how difficult is to produce the necessary 
and sufficient features of real world categories. By looking into what all kinds of games 
have in common (e.g., board-games, card-games, ball-games etc.) and trying to find a 
definition that encompasses all of them (e.g., are they all amusing? Do they all imply 
winning or losing? Do they all presuppose skills? Or is it luck?), Wittgenstein argued that 
a concept like game can’t be defined in those terms. What he suggested then is that we can 
handle the knowledge of concepts by recognizing similarities and relationships between 
entities which he famously labeled as family resemblances. It has been objected that the 
fact that is so difficult to find defining properties for real world categories doesn’t mean 
that they don’t exist at all, but rather that maybe our means of analysis are not adequate for 
the quest (Smith & Medin, 1981). That could be the case, but as almost 30 years later 
Murphy (2002) puts it:  
 
It is incumbent on someone who believes the classical views to 
explains what the defining features are, and why we can’t easily think of 
them. If our concept of a dog is a definition, why are we so bad at saying 
what it is even when we know the concept? (p. 18) 
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In addition, when available definitions are often subjected to strict counterexamples. 
One of the paradigmatic counterexamples is the one that refers to the concept of 
BACHELOR. According to the aforementioned criteria of definitional properties of the 
concept (UNMARRIED, ADULT, MALE), every entity satisfying those conditions 
necessarily counts as a bachelor. Therefore, the Pope should also be considered as a 
bachelor (Fillmore, 1975, 1982). This is clearly not the case, and as fictitious and 
unreasonable this example could appear, it points out one of the biggest flaws of the 
Classical Theory, namely the disregard of contextual factors (which we will see, play a 
crucial role also in “conceptual fuzziness”).  
As shown in the discussion above, the first tenet of the Classical Theory appeared 
to be more problematic than its elegant formulation initially portrayed. In principle, not all 
concepts can be defined by a set of features. But sometimes, empirical demonstrations 
provide unexpected insights on phenomena that are theoretically considered as implausible. 
Unfortunately, that was not the case for the Classical Theory, as experimental results 
happened to discredit also the second assumption of the Classical view. Given the definition 
of a category, the assumption claims that either an item falls under a certain category, or it 
doesn’t, with no in-between cases. That resulted to be an untenable commitment when 
applied to natural and psychological world. Disagreement between participants asked to 
categorize members of categories (e.g., kitchen utensils, vegetables) appeared to conflict 
with the notion of a clearly bounded category (Hampton, 1979). What was even more 
striking, is that the same individuals changed their category judgments on “borderline-
cases”, such as olives, over time (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). In-between cases 
clearly put in jeopardy the Classical version of category membership, but possibly the most 
critical argument came from Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues. In a wide range of data 
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collection, they identified what was later called “typicality effect”. In sum, they found that 
some exemplars in categories were considered as more typical than others, in the sense that 
they were rated as more typically pertaining to the given category (Rosch, 1975). In 
addition, items that were rated as more typical by one group of participants were also more 
often produced by a different group of participants performing a production task (Mervis, 
Catlin, & Rosch, 1976). Typicality effects have also an impact on the speed in which people 
categorize items. When asked to determine whether an exemplar pertains to a given 
category, participants were faster in responding to a typical probe than they were with 
respect to atypical members (Rosch, 1973; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). That measure 
also correlated with error rates, which were lower for typical items than for atypical ones.  
These kinds of effects proved to be robust evidence, and hardly reconcilable with 
the Classical view, that posits no good or bad examples in the categories. Although some 
proponents have tried to reshape the Classical view in a way that partially deals with 
phenomena of typicality (for an overview see Murphy, 2002), nowadays most of the 
proposals regarding conceptual knowledge are not related to this definitional perspective. 
Nonetheless, its importance is undeniable, and it’s testified by the fact that most of the 
following theories on concepts were partly conceived as responses to the Classical Theory.   
 
1.3. Monotrematous Trouble. The Prototype Theory 
 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the predominance of the Classical Theory 
on concepts was partially weakened by strong empirical evidence emphasizing the 
existence of unclear examples and the fuzziness of categories’ boundaries. This work is 
generally acknowledged to Eleanor Rosh and her colleagues, even though she wasn’t the 
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only one who was not persuaded by the idea that a concept could be sharply defined in 
terms of propositional attributes. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of the 70s, a 
growing number of proposals have been developed as a reaction to the Classical Theory. 
All of these proposals somehow aimed at accounting for what the Classical Theory failed 
to acknowledge, namely the psychological empirical evidence of typicality effects and the 
existence of graded categorical structures. Note that, as in the case of the Classical Theory, 
there is not a single and consistent view that can be precisely named “Prototype Theory”; 
rather, there is a set of proposals sharing a similar perspective. In the case of the theories 
that can be ascribed to the Prototype Theory, they all maintain that a concept is a complex 
representation structured as a function of the probability that its properties also pertain to a 
given category. This mainly implies that (a) concepts don’t necessarily have some 
properties, rather they tend to have them; and (b) if a concept satisfies a sufficient number 
of features associated with a given category, then it falls under that category (even though 
some properties are more crucial than others, because they have different weights). 
Scholars treated and elaborated on the aforementioned assumptions in different ways. Some 
of them stressed the role of statistical processing (see Smith & Medin, 1981), others 
highlighted the role of typical items (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
Nonetheless, the general assumptions underlying this perspective seem to be 
immune to at least some of the objections moved to the Classical Theory. First of all, given 
that the Prototype Theory doesn’t have a definitional approach, the general difficulty of 
finding definitions fitting for all the concepts is avoided. This can be considered as a great 
advantage for the Prototype Theory, and one of the credits for this can be certainly ascribed 
to the resonance of the proposal with Wittgenstein’s argument of family resemblances 
(which inspired and gave name to one of the most influential paper from Rosch and Mervis, 
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1975). In this vein, the ontological commitment of the Classical Theory to definitions is 
resolved by positing that concepts are complex relations interacting with each other is some 
meaningful way.  
Remember the famous game example (Wittgenstein, 1953). In a classical 
perspective, it was extremely difficult to find a definition encompassing all of the possible 
games, given their differences in aims, rules, and intentions. How to conflate, for example, 
card games, board games, ball games and solitaires into the same category? Suppose that 
the proposed definition is “something you play with someone else”. That would work for 
board games and card games for sure, and usually for ball games too. But, as noted 
elsewhere, you can be playing with the ball by yourself throwing it against the wall, and 
also solitaires are by definition played by one person. The same applies to a definition like 
“something that is governed by rules”. Is there a specific rule in throwing a ball against the 
wall? Or in the famous example of ring a ring o’roses (as many other children games)? Not 
to mention that with the advent of technology a great amount of virtual games (such as the 
eGames) made the definition of game even more problematic. The examples could go on 
for some time.  
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s proposal of family resemblance, in a Prototype Theory 
perspective what these items have in common is a set of relationships which allow them to 
be placed under the category of games. Those relationships are not necessary for the item 
to be part of a category, but they are sufficient. So that, for example, it is sufficient that 
playing a solitaire involves some kind of rule (e.g., knowing which card has to be 
discovered firstly) and that the game is generally played for one’s own amusement to let it 
fall under the games category (if the latter encodes rules and amusement as salient features). 
What this perspective entails then, is that a category is represented as a summary 
26 
 
 
 
description encoding the more frequently encountered features of the concepts it 
comprehends. In the category, some features are more salient than others, and those features 
are more likely to appear in the given category rather than in other categories.  
As a consequence, the most salient features acquire a predominant weight, while 
less encountered features weight less in the category representation2. Such a tenet plays a 
crucial role in explaining typicality effects. In fact, prototypical items are defined as those 
members presenting the highest adherence to the structure of the category. Results coming 
from Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) experiments demonstrated how the more prototypical of a 
category an item is rated, the more attributes it has in common with other members of the 
category. Conversely, the less an item is judged as prototypically representing a category, 
the fewer attributes it shares with other members of the category. As it was the case for the 
Classical Theory, the Prototype Theory on concepts gained much of its reliability because 
it did not only offer a clear account on what concepts are supposed to be, but it also dealt 
efficiently with cognitive processes such as categorization, conceptual acquisition and 
conceptual encoding. By introducing the notion of a statistical structure rooted in the weight 
of properties, the Prototype Theory managed to overcome the assumed difficulty of storing 
all the definitions needed in a classical account in order to possess a concept. Here, there is 
no need to store all of the possible pieces of information, but only those considered to be 
statistically relevant for the representation of a category.  
                                                     
2 As Hampton (1993) points out, a prototype is constituted by a set of attributes, that can have different 
weights, corresponding to their “contribution” to the concept’s definition. “Thus, for example, apples may 
have a range of possible colours (that is, values for the attribute colour), each with an associated weight for 
determining ‘appleness’ […] information will thus be included on the permitted variability across category 
members in the value of each attribute. Weights will also vary between attributes […]. For example, the 
weight given to the best value for colour may be greater than the weight given to the best value for size, 
indicating that coulour is more critical in determining the similarity to the prototype.” (p.73).    
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Conceptual acquisition is assumed to rely on perceptual properties recognition, 
much like in the classical perspective. As in the latter, the general idea is that we acquire a 
concept by assembling perceptual and distinguishable features. The main difference in a 
prototypical approach is that the process of conceptual acquisition is treated as a statistical 
process, whose goal is to verify whether certain properties tend to co-occur, not necessarily 
always for all the possible concepts included in the category. Those properties are 
considered to be “statistically prominent” for the concept. This process is directly related 
to the process of categorization, in that the statistically prominent features of a concept are 
compared to those of the category, and in case a sufficient number of features corresponds, 
then the concept is considered to be a member of the category. Rosch (1975) explicitly 
rejected the idea according to which prototypes constitute a particular model of processing, 
representation or learning. Rather, they have to be considered as judgments on degrees of 
typicality, mirroring part of the structure of real-world categories.  
Nevertheless, a great amount of perspectives inspired by her seminal studies 
contributed in many ways to the advancement of theories on concepts. Part of the appeal of 
a prototype inspired theory is its acknowledgment of the fact that it is almost impossible 
for a category to have a clearly bounded structure. This statement, combined with the idea 
of weighted features, justifies by itself the existence of in-between cases (that were a major 
problem for the Classical Theory). For example, an item judged to be highly atypical for a 
category is more similar to exemplars of the contrast category, but can still be considered 
as part of the first category. Moreover, even if standing with the claim that attributes gain 
weight as a function of frequency of occurrence, it is possible to explain why different 
individuals mention different properties for the same concepts (e.g., see Barsalou, 1987). It 
is clear how, by frequently encountering particular exemplars of a given category, an 
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individual will abstract and consider as salient those features that the item displays. This 
will eventually result in judging that exemplar as highly prototypical.  
The prototype approach has constituted the basis for different accounts inspired by 
the notion of concepts as probabilistic structures and relations. Some scholars have stressed 
the importance of exemplars (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978), others that of features (Collins 
& Loftus, 1975; Hampton, 1979; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979), others have highlighted 
the role of dimensions (Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976), and others have favored a holistic 
approach (for an extensive discussion see Smith and Medin, 1981). Even though those 
accounts differ in what they consider essential for the representation of a concept, they all 
share the idea that concepts are processed in a probabilistic fashion, and judgment about 
the belonging of a concept to a category are computed in terms of similarity judgments (see 
Tversky, 1977; Komatsu, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984).    
Although richer than the Classical Theory, also the Prototype Theory has been a 
target of many criticisms. Given its initial explanatory power for empirical findings, we 
will firstly consider the most important empirical-based objections, and then we will move 
to theoretical arguments. Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) claimed that typicality 
effects can be extended to all concepts, and they focused specifically on clearly bounded 
concepts such as “even numbers”, which are supposed to have a precise definitional 
structure. They found that subjects responded to the four well-defined categories they 
presented as they would have presumably responded to “graded” categories such as fruit. 
In particular, some numbers were judged as more prototypical than others for a given 
category (such as “even numbers”) just like an apple is traditionally considered as a more 
prototypical fruit than a tomato. This applied to error rates and to the speed of 
categorization, which are usually considered the most important direct measures of 
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typicality effects. By arguing that if the Prototype Theory can’t distinguish between two 
markedly different categories such as fruit and even numbers, the authors concluded that 
the theory is uninformative of conceptual structure.  
A general argument, partly resonating with the argument raised against the Classical 
Theory, is that it is difficult to think of a prototype that could encompass all the instances 
of a category. Given the extreme variability of exemplars that real-world categories contain, 
the representation of a category in terms of prototypes seems to exclude massive 
information implied in the category. It is not clear how, for example, the prototype of a 
category like “birds” comes to be formed, a category into which different and sometimes 
disjunctive features are comprehended (e.g., big and small, flying and not flying, silent and 
singing; cf. Murphy, 2002). This is also true if we stand with the exemplar proposal, i.e. 
one of the proposals derived by similarity-based accounts. If we were to pick up a 
representative exemplar of the “bird” category, such as a canary, we would be misled in the 
presence of e.g., a penguin. Much in the same vein, it has been noted (Fodor, 1981), that 
some concepts don’t have relative prototypes, and those are generally very specific 
concepts such as “American cities situated on the East Coast just a little south of 
Tennessee”. Moreover, sometimes people possess concepts without having in mind a 
specific set of features that are connected to the concept. 
A related, even though slightly different, argument takes into account the so called 
“complex-concepts”. Accounting for concepts such as pet-fish might seem just a 
philosophical concern, but complex concepts are taken to be representative of one of the 
most extraordinary human abilities, namely the compositionality of thought and its 
creativity. The argument goes like this: according to prototypes-like approaches, prototypes 
of complex concepts are supposed to be inferred from prototypes of their constituent 
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concepts. So that, for example, the prototype of a pet fish (that would presumably be a 
goldfish), is supposed to be the sum of prototypes of fishes and pets. Features included in 
the prototype of fishes are gills, colors and swimming skills, resulting in something like a 
bass. Features relevant for the prototype of pets are for example fur, trained, maybe fluffy 
and affectionate, and usually dogs or cats are among the best prototypical candidates for 
the category of pets. It is then difficult to account for how the prototype of a complex 
concept relates to its constituent parts. On this point, Hampton (1987) introduced an 
interesting variable. He argued that, for some complex concepts (such as pet-fish or 
wooden-spoon) what may be crucial is the experience with those concepts and instances, 
rather than some form of idealized and abstracted representation.  
A problem that both the Classical Theory and the Prototype Theory failed to 
disentangle is related to the relation with non-perceptual entities, the former in the 
definitions of a concept, and the latter in the features that are salient for the formation of a 
prototype. Since talking about features is somehow analogous to talking about definitions, 
in the sense that they are the most important components of both perspectives, the argument 
raised against the Classical Theory applies also to the Prototype Theory. There are no such 
things as prototypical features that can be easily mentioned when thinking about a concept 
such as freedom. Henceforth, abstract concepts seem to be a pitfall for Prototype Theory as 
well as they were for Classical Theory. 
I would like to conclude this paragraph with an exciting example, which shows both 
the inadequacy of a strictly definitional approach and the partial incompleteness of a 
sharply prototypical approach.  
Suppose you are endorsing the Classical Theory on concepts, thus you are 
convinced that the definitional features of a category are both necessary and jointly 
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sufficient for a concept to fall under a given category. Now imagine you see a platypus  (cf. 
Eco, 1997) and you observe some physical properties of the animal, such as the bill and the 
webbed-feet and also, if you are lucky enough, you might attend to a platypus laying eggs. 
Now those three properties together should be sufficient for you to infer the pertaining 
category of the platypus. And, as a matter of facts, those three properties happen to be 
defining properties of e.g., ducks (and birds in general). Going through a process of 
similarity judgments between the properties of the platypus and those of i.e. ducks, you 
might find that the platypus fulfills all of these three defining properties, which are also 
duck-defining properties (much in the same way as the Pope is an unmarried, male adult 
and then possibly a bachelor). You might therefore conclude that a platypus is a duck. This 
is the first scenario that could arise from the endorsement of a Classical perspective on 
concepts; note that this is still an empiricist-based scenario, in which the observer extracts 
perceptual properties in order to categorize the entity considered. But even if we were to 
put aside the empiricist approach within the Classical Theory, we would face some relevant 
problems. In fact, by solely relying on propositional definitions, such as those provided by 
dictionaries, the commitment to the jointly sufficient character of features would still be 
the basis of our misrepresentation of the platypus. As the definition goes, the platypus is, 
among other things, a “small, semiaquatic, egg-laying animal which frequents lakes”. 
Those features are likely to be applicable to a large set of amphibious, such as frogs, toads, 
salamanders etc. Allegedly then, the propositional features encoded in the definition of a 
platypus might lead us to think that a platypus is some kind of frog.  
Clearly, as already discussed in the previous paragraphs, a strict definitional 
approach to concepts is too problematic to be fully embraced. Things are not necessarily 
better when a prototypical or exemplar approach is at stake. In that case, in order to 
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categorize the platypus, you would compare salient features of the platypus with those of 
either a prototypical item of a category or an exemplar of a category (depending on the 
approach). Now, what are the most visually salient features of a platypus? You might note 
that the animal has a dense fur, and a beaver-like shape (then, is it a beaver?). Surprisingly, 
however, you will also note that it has a bill and webbed feet (is it a duck?). According to 
the prototypical view, we might conclude that the platypus is either a highly untypical 
beaver, or a highly untypical duck, and just accept that this animal is another good example 
of an in-between case. Or, we might find ourselves in the exact position of Shaw, who in 
1799 firstly described the platypus as a kind of mammal to which a bill and webbed feet 
were artificially implanted by sewing them to the body of the beaver (cf. Eco, 1997, p. 308). 
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned options seem to be the right one.  
Although in some broad sense the platypus can be considered as some strange kind 
of beaver or duck (here we will rule out the artificial option for the sake of the reasoning), 
the platypus is neither a mammal in the strict sense, nor an oviparous. Unlike a whale, 
which even though perceptually highly atypical is nonetheless classified as a mammal, the 
platypus is classified in the order of Monotremata. Monotremes lay eggs instead of bearing 
live young, and much in the same fashion of marsupials they store their puggles in a pouch. 
What is even more surprising, given that, for example, platypuses have beaks, is that like 
all the other mammals the female of the platypus feeds her puppies with milk. If we were 
to add some more noise in the categorization process, we might want to consider the fact 
that platypuses are venomous animals, which is a very uncommon characteristic for both 
mammals and birds, but not i.e. for a reptile or an insect. Given the misjudgments implied 
in both the proposals we discussed, we might consider the possibility that categorization 
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needs to be implemented differently, both from a purely definitional process, and from a 
feature comparison one.  
As I will discuss in the next paragraph, similarity-based approaches such as the 
Classical Theory or the Prototype Theory have proved to give an incomplete sketch of 
human conceptual system. The case of the platypus suggests that, at least in some cases, 
our concepts should benefit from other forms of knowledge, which do not necessarily or 
not only follow a comparison path.   
 
1.4. Wilma, Apples, and Prime Numbers. The Theory-Theory 
 
As already pointed out, “similarity-based” accounts on categories and concepts 
have partly proven to be insufficient to represent conceptual structure. The main problem 
that these accounts face is related to what is generally called conceptual coherence. In a 
nutshell, “similarity-based” accounts have been criticized for not being able to explain intra 
and inter-concepts relations, and more generally, world and contextual knowledge 
interfering with processes of categorization. As the example of the platypus suggested, 
natural world categories can’t always be thought of only as a set of correlated features. Two 
related lines of criticisms to featural approaches can be summarized as follows. First, even 
if we were to accept the notion of a concept as a set of weighted features, it would not 
always be clear what features are supposed to enter the comparison process, and what 
renders those features eligible for the comparison instead of others. This criticism is known 
as the “feature selection problem” (Jones & Smith, 2002), and has been addressed in the 
developmental literature by appealing to two sets of theoretical assumptions. A more 
general argument against the focus on attributes and features is that concepts, to put it 
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roughly, are conceived as the sum of their constituent components, as already discussed in 
the example of “complex-concepts”. This view somehow rules out the role of goals, 
interests, human activities and contextual factors in the categorization system. As we shall 
see, contextual constraints play instead a pivotal role in the processes of categorization.   
From the beginning of the 80s, in order to account for these theoretical criticisms 
and to deal with experimental evidence showing what was later called “knowledge effect”, 
some scholars have started to investigate the possibility of adopting explanations-based 
accounts on concepts.  
The basic assumption underlying this set of proposals is that concepts are structured 
mental representations, consisting in–and containing–their own relations with other 
concepts. These relations are made coherent by some kind of knowledge (or theory) that 
we master of the world. These proposals have been grouped together under the label of 
“Theory-Theory”, or “Knowledge-Theory”. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example3. The category of apple-or-
prime numbers. At a first sight, we would think that this is a completely incoherent 
category, in that features commonly associated with apples, such as eating, round, maybe 
red, don’t really overlap with features of prime numbers. And yet, a possible pattern of 
coherence might be drawn when taking into account contextual and–let’s say–social 
factors. Imagine that there is a colleague in the math department, Wilma, that has only two 
main interests: prime numbers and apple farming. At this point we might construct and 
accept the category of apple-or-prime numbers as being “topics of conversation with 
Wilma”. The main point of this argument is that, by taking into account knowledge or 
                                                     
3 The example is taken from Murphy and Medin (1985) and it was developed by the authors with the help 
of Lawrence Barsalou. 
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theories we might be able to supply for the lack of information regarding links between 
features in the world, thus enabling us to conceive and explain categories that might seem 
apparently incoherent. This is an important mark for knowledge-based accounts with 
respect to similarity-based accounts, because it elegantly justifies conceptual combination 
and conceptual flexibility. By rejecting the idea that complex concepts are but an overlap 
of salient features, knowledge-based accounts are able to deal with the compositionality of 
thought. In this vein, background knowledge of the world explains why when talking about 
a finger cup we are aware that the object of conversation is not a cup-shaped-finger 
(although in some metaphorical sense it is), but an object specifically designed for sewing.  
Much of the strength of a theory-based approach comes from the reliability of 
experimental evidence documenting the tendency toward a sort of psychological 
essentialism both in children and in adults. Specifically, people tend to form coherent 
beliefs regarding the essence of entities in the world, despite the fact that those entities are 
subjected to massive changes. For example, when told that scientists discovered an animal 
that has internal organs of a skunk but external physical appearance of a raccoon, and that 
she could also give birth to baby skunks, people would be still prone to categorize the 
animal as a skunk, ignoring the fact that she looks like a raccoon (Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989). 
Those kinds of findings have somehow undermined the centrality of similarity and 
typicality in categorical judgments, showing that entities that have undergone substantial 
featural changes, which may lead to consider them as belonging to a different category, are 
still categorized accordingly to their “essence”.  
In another set of studies, Rips (1989) presented participants with creatures or 
artifacts which metamorphosed into something else, e. g., a bird that, after eating 
contaminated vegetation, turns out to acquire insect-like physical characteristics. 
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Participants were asked to decide whether the entity in the “middle” stage between a bird 
and an insect was more similar and more typical to one or the other category, and 
additionally they were also asked to decide whether the entity was actually a bird or an 
insect. Results show that people would judge the animal as more similar to an insect, and 
also more typically related to insects, but they would still consider it a bird. This type of 
“essential knowledge” was found to be part of children’s conceptual system as well. 
Gelman and Wellman (1991), for example, in a set of studies demonstrated that even 
preschool children categorization system might not only rely on phenomenal qualities. 
Children are instead sensible to the fact that the insides of some entities (such as dogs) may 
be more essential to the entity’s identity and functioning with respect to the outsides. This 
evidence, corroborated by other studies on children (Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987), 
was taken as a proof that ontological kinds are more salient than perceptual features in 
categorization, and therefore that theories or knowledge are more crucial in categorizing 
than physical cues. Besides the debate that these studies raise about the supposed innateness 
of concepts, certainly they concurred to the partial dismissal of a strict similarity and 
featural approach to categorization. However, the main criticism that this kind of 
approaches elicited, namely that of assuming an a-priori knowledge driving conceptual 
categorization, led some scholars to revise some aspects of similarity-based accounts. 
Researchers contrasting the ‘theory-based’ approach underscored the importance of 
perceptual learning in the process of extracting relevant regularities from the environment 
(Sloutsky, 2003). Importantly, the way in which an agent comes to select which perceptual 
correspondences are important is conceived as the result of development and learning. 
Sloutsky (2003), for instance, claimed that some perceptual features are “natural attention 
grabbers” (p. 249) due to their own characteristics, while the salience of others might be 
37 
 
 
 
enhanced by the context. In the context of perceptual learning, one aspect might affect 
featural selection, that is diagnosticity: for example (Sloutsky, 2003) if we are presented 
with a red triangle and a red circle, shape is a more perceptually salient feature than color. 
On the contrary, if we are presented with a red triangle and a blue triangle, color would be 
more salient than shape. As a matter of facts, diagnosticity was found to be an important 
component of children categorization processes (Jones & Smith, 2002). Therefore, 
according to this line of research, early in development induction and categorization rely 
on perceptual similarity among entities, whereas conceptual knowledge is a product of 
learning and development (see e.g., Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; for a recent discussion see 
Clapper, 2019).      
Another line of research, independent from strictly knowledge-based accounts, 
showed instead how the coherence of some categories is guaranteed by other salient 
characteristics than just features matching. One of the major contributions of this inquiry 
has been to evidence the role of contextual constraints in categorization. In a seminal paper, 
Barsalou (1983) noticed that unlike common categories such as birds, ad hoc categories 
such as “things to take from one’s home during a fire” appear to violate the correlational 
structure of the environment. That is to say, usually common categories are referred to a 
distinct set of entities sharing some correlates properties (e.g., birds have feathers, bills and 
usually fly) which distinguish them from other categories that don’t share this set of 
properties. Conversely, a category such as “things to take from one’s home during a fire” 
contains heterogeneous members, as “children”, “dog”, “stereo”, which apparently don’t 
share correlational features. This being said, it appeared that people still think about this 
set of entities as a unitary category. Results coming from Barsalou’s experiments showed 
that common categories had an advantage in memory associations with respect to ad hoc 
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categories. What was interesting, however, was that when provided with “relevant 
contexts”, participants would agree more with each other in categorizing items of ad hoc 
categories. This was not the case for common categories, whose items were as available in 
the absence of a relevant context as they were with a context. Bringing the discussion to 
more general terms, Barsalou demonstrated that ad hoc categories exhibit graded 
structures, like common categories. Specifically, they are comprised of members that vary 
in typicality to the same extent of items in common categories. This is taken as evidence of 
the fact that the degree in which a category reflects correlational structure is not central for 
its processing. Both ad hoc and common categories might be well or poorly established in 
memory due to prior processing of their members. Moreover, the traditional emphasis on 
similarity as a determinant of typicality has proven to be insufficient for ad hoc categories: 
Barsalou (1981) suggested that instead, for categories that violate correlational structures 
the relevant dimension accounting for typicality might be the goal the category serves.  
One way to account for typicality phenomena found in ad hoc categories is to 
introduce the notion of ideals (Barsalou, 1985). Ideals are defined as “characteristics that 
exemplars should have if they are to best serve a goal associated with a category” (p. 630). 
In this vein, items appear to be more typical of a category not because they are more similar 
to its prototype, but because their properties are more relevant to the accomplishment of a 
goal. For example, in the category of things to take from one’s home during a fire, finding 
items near the ideal of highest possible value is relevant to the goal of minimizing loss 
(Barsalou, 1985). Therefore, in this case, the property of highest possible value determines 
the graded structure of the category, so that presumably human beings would be better 
exemplars than, for example, furniture.  
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Studies on the graded structure of categories should be also given the credit of 
showing that other factors besides typicality and central tendency are crucial in the 
representation of categories. In particular, this line of research revealed that graded 
structure is a complex and flexible phenomenon, also depending on ideals, frequency of 
instantiation and consequently contexts. To mention one of the most relevant studies, 
Barsalou and Sewell (1984) found that both common taxonomic and goal-derived 
categories showed flexibility and changes in typicality judgments when examined through 
different points of view. When asked to judge the typicality of exemplars in the category 
of birds, for example, American undergraduates reported robin and eagle as typical 
exemplars from the point of view of an average American. When asked to judge typicality 
from the point of view of an average Chinese citizen, on the other hand, they mentioned 
swan and peacock as more typical birds. Studies such as the one briefly described above 
clearly pointed to the extreme flexible character of categorization processes. More 
specifically, they invalidated the notion of a category as a monolithic structure composed 
of invariant properties. Instead, it appeared that categorization is a highly flexible process, 
which dynamically interacts with external contexts and internal motivations.  
As firstly sketched out by Murphy and Medin (1985), the aim of the Theory-Theory 
was to present a possible account of what is the “glue” that holds concepts together. Based 
on this purpose, the authors developed a conceptual theory organized around the notion of 
theory indicating any kind of mental explanations, rather than a complex scientific account 
(although for a more “science” oriented version of the Theory-Theory see Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1999). In the light of this characterization of the theory, the first objection 
generally raised against such kind of “explanation-based accounts” can be partly 
circumvented. The argument usually attacks the Theory-Theory for being circular. In fact, 
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how is it possible for a mental theory (read “explanations”) to explain concepts if the mental 
theory in itself is made out of concepts? The authors faced this argument by claiming that 
mental theories are not supposed to replace concepts; rather that they have to be considered 
as constraining concepts, and additionally concepts and mental theories influence each 
other in a bidirectional way.   
If on the one hand experimental evidence supports an explanation-based account on 
concepts, on the other hand this same evidence shows a potential shortcoming for the same 
theory. As discussed before, one great advantage of the Theory-Theory is that it is able to 
account for the high flexibility of conceptual structures by relying on personal background 
knowledge of the world. This implies that categories are not considered as stable entities 
over time and across different people. It has been objected (Margolis & Laurence, 1999) 
that as a consequence of the fact that different people might have different theories of the 
world, the extension, and consequently the usability, of concepts could be undermined. 
Another criticism directed towards a complete explanation-based account is that the 
information that people possess regarding a given category might be rather inadequate, 
including false beliefs.  
Crucially, however, explanation-based accounts gave rise to the interest in the 
phenomenon of conceptual flexibility (see par. 1.6.4). Moreover, the idea that we are able 
to form coherent categories sometimes even partially circumventing perceptual features 
might be useful for explaining some cognitive phenomena. Murphy (2016), for instance, 
pointed out that we might have specific knowledge of things in the world even without 
necessarily associating them with specific exemplars. For example, we know that mammals 
evolved from ancestor dinosaurs, even though we do not have a clear exemplar in mind. 
The main point of this discussion is that, in order to best investigate conceptual knowledge, 
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one ought not to overlook neither perceptual cues (that clearly drive categorization in some 
relevant respects), nor the role of previously stored knowledge and the context of appliance 
of concepts. We will see in the next paragraph how the dismissal of those aspects turned 
out problematic for some accounts of conceptual knowledge.   
 
1.5. No Cognition Without Computation. Computational Theories  
 
The accounts of conceptual knowledge canvassed in the previous sections focused, 
among other things, on the necessity to find and describe a reliable structure for concepts. 
This structure should have explained cognitive phenomena such as categorization, 
conceptual acquisition, and conceptual processing.  
A slightly different point of observation is reserved to those theories and accounts 
that have been labeled as “Computational Theories of Mind” (CMT). From the beginning 
of the 50s, when studies on Artificial Intelligence blossomed, a number of scholars started 
to be fascinated by the insights that “thinking machines” could have offered in the 
understanding of human cognitive processes. Those researchers went far beyond the simple 
analogy between minds and computers, stating that cognitive processes are, indeed, 
computational processes. In particular, mental processes were deemed as computations 
performed over symbols. In this paragraph, I will be treating CTM as a vast asset of 
proposals, regardless of their specific differences, in order to highlight some of the main 
assumptions linked to conceptual representation. The discussion will be therefore limited 
to models of cognition developed until the early 90s, in order to evidence the historical 
influence they exerted on subsequent theories of cognition, that critically contrasted the 
main assumptions of a-modal theories.     
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Computational theories are nowadays understood as the basis of traditional 
cognitive science. As already mentioned, much of the excitement for this kind of 
approaches came from the development of artificial intelligence, that envisaged insightful 
understandings of the intelligent human behavior. Hence, inspired by the observation of the 
capacity of computers to manipulate information, scholars started to define the mind in 
terms of a system able to perform complex operations with symbols. To illustrate this point, 
consider one of the seminal works of Pylyshyn (1973), in which the author claims that 
cognition must be mediated by something different from both images and words. The 
substance of the argument is the following: there is an infinite number of images to which 
the label “rectangle” applies. That is to say that, an infinite number of instantiations of the 
concept rectangle are possible (e.g., a Lego rectangle, the idealized form of a rectangle, a 
red brick, etc.). When the corresponding word “rectangle” is activated, it cannot be by 
virtue of a direct association between the label and the image, since this would imply an 
infinite number of associations (one for each possible instantiation of the concept). 
Henceforth, there must be something accounting for the very “rectangleness” that enables 
our mental processes to go beyond the single occurrence, and thus operating on the “type” 
rather than on the “tokens”. In Pylyshyn (1973) words:  
 
As long as we recognize that people can go from mental pictures to 
mental words or vice versa, we are forced to conclude that there must be a 
representation (which is more abstract and not available to conscious 
experience) which encompasses both. There must, in other words, be some 
common format or interlingua. (p. 5, italics mine)  
 
This interlingua is composed by symbolic representations, that are intended as the 
output of perceptual processes. In other words, our knowledge, far from being constituted 
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by raw perceptual experiences, is always interpreted by the system in symbolic-syntactic 
terms. In this sense, knowledge is said to be propositional. A notable remark on the last 
statement is that knowledge, in this perspective, is conceived as propositional in that it acts 
as an internal symbols structure (Newell & Simon, 1972), and not as expressible in any 
given language. This point is of crucial importance in different variants of CTM, such as 
the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) defended by Fodor (1998), whose theoretical 
background lays in the Language of Thought Hypothesis (1975).  
To put it roughly, Fodor’s main thesis is that cognitive processes are computational 
processes, and in addition, that those processes are performed on representations. 
Famously, “no computation without representation” (Fodor, 1975, p. 42). The central tenet 
is made on perceptual processing and conceptual acquisition, and it goes like this: the only 
available model for decision making and conceptual acquisition is a computational model, 
which carries out operations of confirmatory explanations on the facts of the world. A 
computational model presupposes, in Fodor’s view, that the organism has access to a 
language in which computations are carried through. This then implies that representations 
are necessary. These representations constitute what is labeled as “the language of 
thought”. And why does this language have to be different from any natural language? The 
answer, in Fodor’s perspective, is that there are numerous non-verbal organisms that, 
anyways, think (although a definition of “thinking” is not provided).  
In this first formulation of the Language of Thought, this special kind of language, 
allowing our minds to perform computational operations, is considered unlearned. Starting 
from the difference between “learning” a language and “knowing” a language, Fodor 
claims that, in order to acquire a first language, e.g. English, we must possess a language 
of thought that is capable of recognizing and integrating syntactic patterns. To disentangle 
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this notion, a computer-based analogy is introduced. Computers have two languages, viz. 
the one of input and output, that is the language allowing them to communicate with the 
environment, and a ‘machine language’, through which they talk to themselves. These two 
languages are mediated by compilers. Typically though, computers don’t need compilers 
for compilers. How is this possible? Fodor (1975) claims that computers are built to use the 
machine language: “the physics of the machine thus guarantees that the sequences of states 
and operations it runs through in the course of its computation respect the semantic 
constraints on formulae in its internal language” (p. 74). This is the rationale behind the 
language of thought, namely it is justified by the organism’s construction itself.  
Framed in these terms, computational processes have no access to the represented 
domain itself, that is, computers do not distinguish whether a symbol represents a cat, a 
number or Donald Trump. It is then necessary for all the semantic distinctions to be 
embedded in syntactic distinctions. Pylyshyn (1980), in line with influential proposals (e.g., 
Newell, 1980) pushed the line further by stating that the physical nature of the device that 
instantiates the computations is not a direct concern for discovering cognitive regularities. 
This kind of approaches has been so pervasive over the years that Philip N. Johnson-Laird, 
in his famous “The Computer and the Mind: an Introduction to Cognitive Science” (1988) 
claimed that one of the main assumptions in cognitive science is that the mind is a symbolic 
system.  
In a very significant argumentation, Fodor (1998) extended the RTM by directly 
dealing with conceptual structures. Specifically, once acknowledged that cognition is 
essentially computation on structured mental representations, he moves to tackle the 
question “What is the structure of the mental representation of DOG?”. That is to say, what 
is the structure of concepts? The answer, is that “on the evidence available, it’s reasonable 
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to suppose that such mental representations have no structure, it’s reasonable to suppose 
that they are atoms.” (p. 22). This thesis became famous as Conceptual Atomism. 
Interestingly, as the author pointed out, this psychological atomism entails that what 
concepts you have is metaphysically and conceptually independent of what epistemic 
capacities you have. Conceptual content, in fact, is simply formed by some sort of mind-
world relation (viz., is constructed in a “causal-nomological way”).  
Conceptual atomism seemed to satisfy the general concern about the systematicity 
and compositionality of thought (and language) that were considered as shortcomings for 
prototype and similarity-based models. In fact, systematicity and compositionality are 
thought to be grounded in the architecture of mental representations: some concepts belong 
to the primitive basis from which more complex mental representations are constructed.  
In keeping with the idea that concepts are symbols, they are supposed to satisfy a 
type/token relation. A condition for this relation is that of not being too strict as to assign a 
different type for any token (remember the example of the rectangle). Hence, people living 
in different environment, cultures and times, should have the same concept of e.g., 
rectangle. This contrasts with empirical evidence reported in the previous paragraph on 
conceptual flexibility (e.g., among others, Barsalou and Sewell, 1984, see paragraph 1.6.4 
of this dissertation).  
Despite their differences, computational theories of mind have largely dominated 
cognitive science until recent times. Although the complexity of computational theories of 
cognition is not reducible to one simple statement, the take-home message, for the purpose 
of this discussion which has strictly expository purposes, is that concepts and meaning are 
generated by abstract and a-modal symbols (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Newell & Simon, 
1981). The mind is here considered as an information-processing device, that operates on 
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the symbols independently of “peripheral” mechanisms such as perception and action. A 
vigorous presentation of this claim is attributed to Fodor, that in 1985 (Fodor, 1985) labeled 
perceptual processes as “dumb” processes, and higher cognitive processes such as thinking 
“smart” processes. Although he recognized that those two sorts of processes must interact 
somewhere, he still claimed that perception is a highly modular and encapsulated process.  
In this perspective then, concepts are represented in mind in a propositional fashion 
(e.g., they are attributes, properties, statements), and are unrelated to the environment and 
to the body itself. In the representation of BIRD, for example, is contained the propositional 
feature “it has feathers”, but not the visual image of feathers, or the tactile information 
regarding their softness. In this sense, concepts are said to be a-modal: they don’t 
encompass any relevant modality-specific information. The a-modal and symbolic 
character of concepts and computation is precisely what led some scholars to reconsider 
this dominant paradigm.  
The celebrated Chinese room thought experiment, proposed by Searle (1980), firstly 
challenged the established idea that machines can answer questions in a human-like 
fashion. Searle’s argument was directed towards what he called “a strong version of AI”, 
that implied that programs were not just psychological tools for the explanation of human 
intelligent behavior, but rather they were the very explanation. The argument is nowadays 
world renowned, hence it will not be presented in this section. For the sake of this 
discussion, it suffices to say that by positing that the mind works as a computer, i.e. 
following a series of syntactic rules and applying them to a stream of symbols, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the computer (or the mind) is just providing 
uninterpreted answers. The parallelism goes further claiming that whatever formal 
principles are introduced in the program running in the computer, those principles are not 
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sufficient for understanding, given that a person can follow formal principle as well as a 
computer without necessarily understand anything, or in Searle’s words:  
 
As long as the program is defined in terms of computational 
operations on purely formally defined elements, what the example suggest 
is that these by themselves have no interesting connection with 
understanding. (p. 4) 
 
Searle assumes that the capacity of understanding e.g. English, is a consequence of 
the fact that we are a specific kind of organisms, with special biological conditions that 
enable us to perceive, act and understand.  
The same line of arguments was taken up and implemented by Harnad ten years 
later (Harnad, 1990). The issue raised by Harnad became famous as “the symbol grounding 
problem”, and the criticality of its strength lays specifically in the acknowledgment that for 
something to be understood in terms of a formal representation, it is necessary to provide 
some sort of “background knowledge”. It is namely necessary to ground symbols. 
Symbolic accounts of concepts posit that words and concepts stand in a nomologic relation, 
that is a relation connecting them according to some lawful rules. But those rules are only 
expressed in the formal syntax of the computational device (the mind, in the specific case), 
thus they are not semantically accessible. The symbol grounding problem refers specifically 
to the necessity to interpret the semantic aspects of symbols. In other words, it concerns the 
meaning, the referents, of symbols. Henceforth, Harnad advanced the example of a person 
who is trying to learn Chinese as second language, provided only with a Chinese/Chinese 
dictionary. What she will obtain as information would only be a circle encompassing 
meaningless symbols connected with meaningless symbol-strings (the definitions). The 
situation is quite the same if we consider the case in which the same person is learning 
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Chinese as first language, but her only source of information is a manual with Chinese 
instructions. It is evident, as Harnad pointed out, that if the definitions respected the sort of 
“right-way” relation Fodor supposed, i.e. a “causal-nomological way”, we wouldn’t need 
the definitions at all to give meaning to the symbols.  
Harnad’s proposal is then a solution that recognizes a hybrid symbolic/non-
symbolic system, in which symbols are grounded in non-symbolic representations. 
Specifically, those non-symbolic representations select aspects from the sensory 
environment, that will be used to construct the symbolic representation expressed e.g., by 
words. For example, the word “horse” is supposed to be grounded in the “projections” that 
seeing a horse caused in our sensory surfaces plus some categorical representations learned 
by experience. The same is true for the word “stripes”. To form the category of zebras we 
might rely on a mechanism of the sort “Zebra” = “horse” + “stripes”, where both horse and 
stripes are grounded in the representations described above, and as a consequence zebra 
inherits this grounding. As a note, Harnad was very careful in specifying that perceptual 
experience may not be sufficient for the construction or processing of a concept; in fact, as 
a caveat on this example he argued that some kind of logical connective such as “not”, 
“all”, “and” etc. might be needed. 
Remarkably, the key question that the whole symbol grounding issue (from Searle 
to Harnad) triggered is about how and when can symbols be things in the world, and under 
what conditions cognition is possibly embodied.   
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1.6. How to Avoid Quixotic Dead Ends4. Embodied and Grounded Theories  
 
Given the importance of computationalist and representationalist theories of mind, 
they were longwindedly retained as the standard approach in the study of cognitive 
phenomena. While their importance in the advancement of cognitive science is undeniable, 
arguments such as the symbol grounding problem undermined the dominance of these 
traditional approaches. As a result, a growing number of researchers from the beginning of 
the ’90s started to distance themselves from strictly computationalist approaches. They 
began, instead, to investigate cognition in its broader sense and specifically from a situated 
point of view. In accordance with Searle’s and Harnad’s suggestions, and in line with 
phenomenological continental philosophy, some scholars reintroduced a “factor” in the 
study of human cognition that was implicitly underestimated for a long time, i.e. the body5.  
In this perspective, the world is no longer considered as independent with respect 
to the knower, rather it acquires its meaning also due to the knower’s specific means of 
interpreting it. These means are not limited to the knower’s higher cognitive abilities, but 
include her characteristic body, her perceptual processes and her actions.  
Embodied cognition is therefore intended as a current of thought and a research 
program aimed at challenging the traditional perspective on mind, by acknowledging the 
contribution of body in cognitive processes. Embodied approaches to cognition encompass 
                                                     
4 Cf. Barsalou (2016a).  
5 Historical antecedents of embodied cognition programmes, challenging the traditionalist view of 
cognition are considered to be Gibson’s ecological approach to psychology (Gibson, 1979) and 
connectionism (e.g., Smolensky, 1988). For the sake of brevity, I will not treat these lines of research in this 
dissertation, although for insights on how Gibsonian psychology and connectionism influenced and paved 
the way to embodied approaches to cognition see, among others, Shapiro (2011) and Chemero (2009). 
Philosophical commitments stressing the role of subjective experiences in the emerging of knowledge can be 
traced back to phenomenological tradition (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1945), to which embodied approaches are 
clearly in debt (see Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991 for an early discussion on the philosophical 
background inherited specifically by enactive approaches to cognition). 
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a wide and expansive set of research programs, sometimes different among each other 
(Wilson, 2002; Matheson & Barsalou, 2018); however, the basic assumption is that 
cognition is highly dependent upon physical features of the human body. In a seminal work, 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) suggested that in order to overcome the classic 
distinction between realism (i.e., the world has pre-given properties, cognitive processes 
are aimed at interpreting them) and idealism (i.e., the cognitive system projects its own 
world) we need to study cognition as embodied action. In this sense, cognition is intended 
as embodied because: a. it depends upon the kind of experience conveyed by the fact that 
having a specific kind of body implies, and b. the sensorimotor capacities allowed by our 
bodily structures are themselves embedded in a biological, psychological and cultural 
context. Cognition is furthermore intended as action because sensorimotor processes, 
perception and action are inseparable from our lived experiences. Hence, knowledge 
emerges through the structural coupling of world, brain and body.  
According to Shapiro (2011), three main themes are especially prominent in the 
works of embodied perspectives of cognition: 
  
1. Conceptualization: the properties of an organism’s body limit or 
constrain the concepts an organism can acquire. That is, the concepts 
on which an organism relies to understand its surrounding world 
depend on the kind of body that it has, so that were organisms to 
differ with respect to their bodies, they would differ as well in how 
they understand the world.  
2. Replacement: An organism’s body in interaction with its 
environment replaces the need for representational processes thought 
to have been at the core of cognition. […] 
3. Constitution: The body or world plays a constitutive rather than 
merely causal role in cognitive processing. (p. 4) 
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As this list suggests, embodied approaches to cognition explicitly reject the 
conception of the human mind as a computer; in particular, what is specifically dismissed 
is the idea of cognition as just computation over abstract symbols. Although the three 
themes are clearly intertwined, I will specifically cope with the first one, given its relevance 
for the purpose of this dissertation.  
Before moving to analyze what concepts look like in an embodied perspective, some 
caveats are needed. We have been discussing how embodied cognitive science challenged 
traditional cognitive science, particularly focusing on the refusal of computationalism and 
representationalism. As a matter of fact, some variants of embodied cognition are partly 
compatible with the idea of cognitive processes as computations, and some others are 
cautious in completely dismissing constructs such as representations in the explaining of 
cognitive processes. A first distinction among cognitive scientists embracing an embodied 
approach can thus be drawn on the basis of their more or less “radical” engagement with 
the notion of representation. The scientific debate concerning the need to employ the notion 
of representation in explaining cognitive processes is still flourishing, and exceeds the 
purpose of this dissertation (for an extended discussion on the theme, see e.g., Chemero, 
2009).  
A second caveat pertains the extension of the label embodied itself. So far, I’ve been 
using the label embodied to introduce what has become the alternative to the traditional 
paradigm in the study of mind and cognition; I have put the accent on the centrality of 
bodily processes in constraining and constituting cognition to show the shift of perspective 
entailed in these approaches at a general level. Indeed, over the last 30 years, researchers 
have stressed different versions of embodiment. Hence, in addition to the label embodied, 
cognition has been defined grounded, situated, enacted and extended to different extents. 
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Each of these labels conveys a particular sense according to which cognition is embodied, 
but they all converge on the idea that cognitive processes are not bounded to abstract 
symbols manipulation.  
With the term enacted is generally intended the notion according to which 
perceptual activity is an explorative process, coupled with sensorimotor abilities and some 
forms of knowledge mediated by experience (Varela et al., 1991; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). 
The thesis of extended cognition, initially put forward by Clark and Chalmers (1998), posits 
that cognition is not wholly contained in our mind and brain. The authors developed an 
account of cognition that incorporate external devices (e.g., artifacts) in the mechanisms 
underlying cognitive processes; henceforth, cognition is said to be distributed in our brain, 
body and external devices, which function as complementary tools for our cognitive 
processes by enhancing them.  
The last two notions of groundedness and situatedness will be treated together in 
this framework, given their importance in the following of this dissertation. Although they 
are different in what they aim to stress, I believe their implications are nowadays mostly 
shared by the majority of scholars endorsing an embodied–and I would say, grounded–
approach to cognition. According to the description proposed by some researchers (e.g., 
Fischer, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2011), cognitive processes are grounded in that they are 
constrained by some physical laws, including also laws specifically related to the very 
construction of our sensorimotor systems, but widely encompassing characteristics of the 
lived environment. The situatedness of cognitive phenomena is, on the other hand, 
precisely related to the relevance of contextual factors in shaping cognitive abilities. As I 
will show in the following of this dissertation, the implications of this conceptions of 
cognition are crucial in the explanation provided by embodied and grounded theories of 
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cognition to themes such as conceptual knowledge, conceptual flexibility and abstract 
concepts.  
Now that the main tenets of embodied cognition have been introduced, we can start 
to delve deeper in this area of research, keeping in mind that it is composed by a multitude 
of approaches; I will particularly favor throughout this dissertation an embodied, grounded 
and situated approach to cognitive phenomena. Hence, from this moment on I will use the 
label embodied, grounded and situated interchangeably, unless specified, to account for the 
critical intertwinement of sensorimotor, physical, social and cultural information in 
cognitive processes.  
 
1.6.1. Of monkeys, neurons and simulations. One of the key-concepts in 
embodied and grounded theories of cognition (from now on EGC) is that of simulation. As 
acknowledged elsewhere (Borghi, 2011), the term simulation encompassed different 
aspects in the debate of EG theories of cognition, some of them more centered on the neural 
underpinnings of cognition, and others related more broadly to the relationship body-
environment. For the purposes of the following discussion, however, it might be useful to 
take a step back to the historical antecedent of the concept of simulation, and present a brief 
overview of the findings in cognitive neuroscience that contributed to underline the 
centrality of bodily processes in higher forms of cognition. The neuroscientific basis 
inspiring the notion of simulation is the systematic study of the most anterior region of the 
ventral premotor cortex of macaques (F5), that led in the late 90s to the discovery of the 
mirror neurons system. While previous understandings of the functional role of F5 focused 
on its capability of programming and executing actions, it has been demonstrated that it 
also serves much complex cognitive abilities. Umiltà and colleagues (Umiltà et al., 2008), 
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for instance, recorded the activity of hand-related neurons in area F5 and in the primary 
motor cortex areas of monkey trained to grasp objects with two different gripping tools (a 
normal plier or a reverse plier). In doing so, they intended to disentangle whether the neural 
activity they registered was directly related to the hand action or if it was connected with 
the accomplishment of a task. Their results showed that all neurons in F5 area fired when 
the plier was closed on the object, both when the hand was closed and when it was open. 
These data suggested that previously considered strictly motor neurons are in fact part of a 
neural circuit supporting higher cognitive capacities, such as the encoding of goal directed 
actions. But the importance of F5 area is not limited to these cases. Indeed, area F5 
incorporates other two types of neurons, both visuomotor, where the first class has been 
proven to respond to the size and shape of particular objects, even in absence of a possible 
action to be performed (Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 1998; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2000). 
The second class, instead, comprises a circuit of neurons that have been labelled “mirror 
neurons”. Mirror neurons are a special class of visuomotor neurons firstly observed in 
monkeys’ premotor cortex, which fire both when monkeys perform an action and when 
they are just observing others performing an action (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, 
& Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Given the revolutionary potential in the study of how the mind 
works, research on mirror neurons has been extended to humans, providing exciting results. 
In fact, results coming from neuroimaging studies and transcranical magnetic stimulation 
evidenced how observing actions activated in humans a brain area that was indicated as the 
homolog of monkeys mirror neuron system (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; 
Gallese, Eagle, & Migone, 2007; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Thus, neurophysiological 
and neuroimaging studies indirectly suggested the existence of a mirror neurons system in 
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humans, that would be central not only in the understanding of actions, but could also have 
an adaptive role supporting language development and comprehension (Fadiga, Craighero, 
Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002). 
An essential point raised by the large amount of literature on mirror neuron system 
(MNS) is therefore the need to “cut across the widely endorsed dichotomy between distinct 
semantic and pragmatic cognitive domains” (Gallese, 2009, p. 494). In this perspective, 
meaning–being it the goal of an action, or language comprehension–is the result of situated 
interactions of the agents with the world. For instance, MNS has been hypothesized to be 
the neural underpinning of processes of embodied simulation. Embodied simulation is often 
referred to as an unconscious process (but see Decety & Grèzes, 2006), supported by MNS, 
that predicts actions (Gallese, 2009). Furthermore, Gallese (2008) proposed that embodied 
simulation mechanisms involving the activation of motor system, among which the MNS, 
are at the basis of language comprehension. In this perspective, mirror neuron system 
activation is considered the underlying process of embodied simulation that occur both at 
the content level of words (i.e. their meaning) and at the phono-articulatory level. The claim 
is that a particular class of neurons, originally evolved for sensorimotor integration, 
subsequently adapted to new purposes such as language processing, while still maintaining 
their original functions (see also the notion of “neural reuse” in Anderson, 2010). A slightly 
different approach to simulation focused less precisely on the role of action and prediction 
purported by simulations. Instead, those approaches put the accent on the body-
environment interaction tout court, contending that to simulate is to re-enact situations, 
internal and perceptual states as well as affective ones related to the referent of the 
interaction. In a classic definition from Barsalou (2008a), simulation is defined as  
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The reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states 
acquired during experience with the world, body and mind. As an experience 
occurs (e.g. easing into a chair), the brain captures states across the 
modalities and integrates them with a multimodal representation stored in 
memory (e.g. how a chair looks and feels, the action of sitting, introspections 
of comfort and relaxation). Later, when knowledge is needed to represent a 
category (e.g. chair), multimodal representations captured during 
experiences with its instances are reactivated to simulate how the brain 
represented perception, action and introspection associated with it. (pp. 618-
619)  
 
Over the last three decades, theories of embodied and grounded cognition centered 
on simulation-based approaches have been assessed through a wide variety of experimental 
studies. Because simulation has proven to be a powerful explanatory tool in cognition, it 
has been explored through several tasks. Researches within the EGC panorama focused on 
the role of simulations in categorization, perception and language processing. The idea that 
action and cognition interact in a manner that is causally relevant has gained experimental 
credit thanks to the large amount of studies that EG theories fueled such as those initially 
performed by Tucker and Ellis (Tucker & Ellis, 1998; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & 
Ellis, 2001).  
According to the authors, the representation of a visual object encompasses 
encodings of possible action-relevant properties of that object, together with descriptions 
of its visual properties. In a set of experiments, for example, (Tucker and Ellis, 1998) 
participants were presented with pictures of objects and were asked to judge whether the 
pictures were displayed in a normal or inverted vertical position. In addition, the objects 
were portrayed in one of two horizontal positions, where the horizontal orientation 
determined the optimal hand to use for grasping the objects. Participants responded by 
pressing a right or a left key. Despite the fact that the horizontal orientation of the objects 
constituted an irrelevant feature for the task being performed, participants were faster and 
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more accurate in their responses when the hand of response corresponded to the horizontal 
orientation of the object. For instance, if a cup was presented with its handle on the right 
side, participants were faster and more accurate when responding with the right key.  
This kind of evidence convinced the authors that object processing might involve 
activations related to the actions usually performed with the objects in an “automatic” 
fashion. Motor information is thus considered to be a central feature in the conceptual 
representation of manipulable objects, and this claim has been further investigated in 
neuroimaging studies. Evidence from fMRI studies indicates that the cortical networks 
involved when perceiving objects, and specifically tools, have a consistent overlap with 
regions that are active when actually manipulating objects (for a review see Lewis, 2006; 
for a neuropsychological approach see Humphreys & Forde, 2001). The coupling between 
action and perception is also attested by studies demonstrating that task-related intentions 
affect the perception of stimuli. For example, when asked to reach objects with or without 
a baton, people tended to rate as more distant the objects when they could just use their 
hands, while they perceived the objects as closer when they had the tool. The evaluations 
were instead equals when they were not required to reach objects (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 
2005), suggesting that the intention to grasp the object directly influences the perceived 
spatial representation.     
More relevant for this discussion is the claim that as categorization and perception 
are embodied, so is language.  
 
1.6.2. Embodied and grounded accounts of language. Following Smith (1989), 
and the majority of literature produced over the years on concepts, we shall distinguish two 
levels of analysis in the study of conceptual knowledge. The first one is the metaphysical 
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level, which pertains to how the world is, while the second is the epistemological level, 
investigating how we know, infer and believe the world is. These two levels of analysis 
have been traditionally addressed by different disciplines, namely philosophy and 
psychology; and yet, it seems that theories of concepts have always struggled in defining 
boundaries between the two levels, as demonstrated by the general disagreement they 
produced both among scholars within the same discipline, and among scholars with 
different scientific backgrounds.  
Much of the confusion comes from the fact that concepts fulfill several main 
functions (see Rey, 1983) among which metaphysical, linguistic and epistemological 
functions. Before moving forward in the analysis of concepts and language in EGC 
theories, we need to clarify which level we are going to explore and why. In doing so, let’s 
step back for a moment and recall two of the proposals we have presented in the previous 
paragraphs, the Classical Theory and the Prototype Theory.  
The Classical Theory is a metaphysically oriented account of concepts, in that it 
defines specifically what concepts are, subsequently defining the way of knowing concepts 
according to their own structure; concepts are definitions, and to possess a concept is to 
master its definition. The Prototype Theory goes in the opposite direction, and we can say 
is somehow epistemologically oriented; we master concepts because we are able to 
compare and collapse relevant features of an object, and concepts are sets of relevant 
features. It is clear that none of the aforementioned accounts can provide a complete theory 
of concepts, in that they both miss some crucial aspects of conceptual knowledge: on the 
one hand the fact that concepts are not entities on their own, that is to say that there is 
always an interpreter making sense of concepts. On the other hand, even though certainly 
features are relevant, conceptual knowledge still maintains some kind of stability as a 
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structure: as much variability as there exist in conceptual representations, some of them 
seem to be more stable than others.  
I think one way to disentangle the question whether it is plausible to rely just on the 
metaphysical level or on the epistemological level is to call into account language. In fact, 
as Rey (1983) puts it “the most efficient way of representing concepts seems to be by way 
of language, which fact is well explored by people when they use language systematically 
to express the content of their cognitive states.” (p. 242). Language and linguistic 
competence, in fact, seems to guarantee the correct functioning of all the basic functions of 
concepts (e.g., inter and intra-personal stability, linguistic functions and epistemological 
functions) except from the metaphysical one. But to study concepts only from a 
metaphysical point of view is to study them in isolation, viz. without considering the fact 
that if we are studying concepts is because we are certain kind of agents, with a specific 
kind of body and a specific cognitive structure.  
Therefore, although surely some concepts might be pre-linguistic or don’t need 
linguistic descriptions to be employed, from now on we will consider concepts and the 
linguistic labels they are represented by as the same entity. This is not to take a purely 
epistemological stance, rather it is to acknowledge the fact that as much as we can strive to 
understand what is a concept in its own, we can never separate its true essence from our 
ability to interpret that true essence—after all, we will never know what is like to be a 
concept (cf. Nagel, 1974). And probably, this sharp distinction wouldn’t be useful either, 
given that what really counts is that we employ concepts in our everyday life to perform 
tasks, to communicate ideas etc. and not just to discuss of their own essence sitting on a 
comfortable armchair in an ivory tower. Now that we made clear why we will refer to 
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language in our study of concepts, we can move to the core of EGC theories of language 
processing.  
According to classical theories of semantic information and language processing, 
the meaning of a word is independent from sensory and motor systems. Language was 
thought to be propositional, and symbolic (Levelt, 1989). Classical theories of semantics 
mainly focused on the process enabling the comprehension of words, rather than on the 
content of meaning. In this framework, meaning is arbitrarily linked to its linguistic 
representation, i.e. the referent of a word in the external world doesn’t have a necessary 
relation with the linguistic form represented in the internal system as a symbol. Since 
language was considered to be a symbolic and computational process, traditional theories 
of meaning were particularly interested in explaining what are the processes supporting the 
translation from external sensory inputs to symbols upon which computations were 
performed. Pylyshyn (1985), for example, proposed the notion of transduction, serving the 
purpose of transforming sensorial signals into symbols that may eventually be manipulated 
by the system.  
Other accounts specifically addressed the organizational principles underlying the 
construction of meaning, positing that the meaning of a word is constituted by its relation 
with semantically related words (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 
1998). Thus, the meaning of e.g. the word “book” is determined by its spatial and semantic 
proximity with words such as “pages”, “reading”, “paper” etc. Clearly, the symbol 
grounding problem affects both distributional theories of meaning and more traditional 
symbolist accounts, for it posits the question of how symbols gain significance in the first 
place. To put it roughly, representationalist theories of meaning hold that words represent 
their referents in the sensorial world, i.e. they stand for the objects they refer to, without 
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incorporating any relevant feature of things in the world. As already discussed, these 
representations were considered to be amodal, for the only condition that they needed to 
satisfy was to be suited to be manipulated by the computational system. That is to say, what 
counted was their form, rather than their actual content.  
EGC accounts on linguistic processing, instead, stressed the importance of the 
content of linguistic forms, which was closely related to their elaboration mechanisms. 
According to embodied and grounded theories of language, semantic coherence is 
guaranteed by the fact that the content of words is constituted by the reenactment of 
experiences connected with the referent of the word itself. Therefore, somehow, the form 
of the representation of the referent matches its content. The notion to which EGC theories 
appeal to explain how language is understood is that of simulation. In line with the 
definition provided in the previous paragraph, we can conceive the meaning of words in an 
embodied perspective as the online or offline retrieval of perceptual, sensory and internal 
features experienced during the encounters of words referents. Following this claim, the 
meaning of the word “book” would hence be grounded in past experiences with different 
instances of books, and would encompass aspects specifically related to its perceptual and 
physical properties as well as sensations derived from the interaction with the object. The 
major tenet of EGC accounts of language processing is that when hearing or reading a word 
such as “book”, neural patterns that are usually active when interacting with the object itself 
are active as if we were actually to perform some action with the object, thus creating a 
simulation of the same interaction. Those simulations are multimodal simulations, i.e. they 
are dependent and comprised of specific modalities: for example, in the understanding of a 
word like “chair”, our visual system, our motor system and our tactile system are employed 
in the retrieval of the concept (Barsalou, 1999).  
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The multimodal aspect characteristic of embodied simulations seems thus to be 
immune to the symbol grounding problem, because it directly relates the “external world” 
with the “internal world”, without the need to interpret any kind of symbol. Note that, 
simulation processes are thought to happen unconsciously, and they can occur both in 
presence of the referent and in its absence. The last point explains why we are able to give 
meaning to things in the world even when we are not perceiving them, and also for the fact 
that we can talk about things we have never experienced. In brief, simulations allow for 
more or less high forms of abstraction.  
Let’s consider in turn language and language like structures from a classical and 
computational perspective and from an embodied and grounded perspective of concepts. 
According to classical and computational accounts, language and syntactic structures are 
crucial in that they represent the very essence of concepts (the definitions in the Classical 
Theory) or the means through which concepts are interpreted by the cognitive system (the 
mental lingua franca in CTM). Embodied and grounded theories of cognition, partially 
reverse the pattern: in this frame, concepts and language are co-determined and mutually 
influenced. We can say that, at least in part, there seems to be a juxtaposition of linguistic 
expressions and concepts in that, as we will discuss soon, the same experience is re-enacted 
in order to e.g. use a hammer and understanding what the “hammer” word means. 
For the purpose of this discussion, one point is noteworthy: while in traditional 
symbolic accounts of language processing meaning arises from the syntactic combination 
of abstract and a-modal symbols arbitrarily related to their significant, in EGC theories of 
language it emerges from the very interaction with the referent in the world. It is also worth 
noting that the notion of meaning in this context is not an uncontroversial one. Barsalou 
and colleagues (1993), for instance, resorted to the Fregean (Frege, 1975) distinction 
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between sense and reference to critically discuss what meaning and concepts are. They 
contended that, traditionally, cognitive science intended meanings as senses, that could be 
roughly characterized as modes of presentation of a given reference (e.g., the formal 
symbols describing entities in CTM). In Barsalou et al. (1993)’s perspective, instead, both 
reference (i.e. the physical object indicated by the sense) and the sense (the mode of 
presentation) constitute meaning. They are specifically interested in determining the role 
of concepts in the constitution of meanings, and in differentiating the two notions. The idea 
is that concepts (as presented in this early account) can work as senses in determining the 
reference of a word because they are tailored to different situations, but can also establish 
domains of reference in specific contexts. For instance, once the terms of a specific 
utterance are established (e.g., “you should know something about gassing your car”, p. 
32), one can easily compute the reference of subsequent expressions that could have several 
referents (e.g., “most gas stations check your air when you request a full service”, where 
air and full service could have been referred to very different entities in the world). The 
main point, as I understand it, is here to reject a strictly “mentalistic” conception of 
meaning, such as the one portrayed by a-modal theories of cognition—note that the 
structure of this argument partly resonates with the famous Harnad’s critique. Recent 
accounts of meaning in the EGC area, however, have engaged in “internalistic” tenets. 
Buccino and colleagues (2016), for instance, have claimed that meaning could be explained 
by relying on recent findings in cognitive neuroscience, that stressed the importance of 
MNS in language comprehension. In this perspective, we understand language because we 
are able to neurally simulate internal experiences connected with the referents of the 
utterances. Importantly, according to Buccino et al. (2016), those experiences have 
commonalities allowing different individuals to understand each other: those 
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commonalities rest upon a shared biological and neural constitution. Therefore, the 
experience of grasping a cup is constituted also by one’s physical asset (e.g., the effectors) 
and one’s neural structures implicated in controlling those effectors. While the contribution 
of sensorimotor brain areas in the processing language is nowadays acknowledged as 
crucial (see next paragraph), I am not favoring this specific account of meaning. Indeed, 
besides our specie-specific capacity to understand each other through shared embodied 
mechanisms, I suspect meaning is not exhausted by the neural activation of brain category-
specific areas. In this sense, as partly suggested by Barsalou et al. (1993) and as I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, we might appeal to a more “externalist” view of meaning than the one 
purported by Buccino and colleagues (e.g., Putnam, 1973). To revive Putnam’s claim that 
meanings “ain’t in the head”, we could say that neither are they only in the brain. Rather, 
they emerge from the interaction that we, as agents equipped with specific sensorimotor 
and neural assets, engage with the environment (being that physical, social, linguistic or 
cultural).   
In what follows, I will sketch out some of the most influential accounts of language 
processing, advanced in the framework of embodied and grounded research on cognition. 
The importance of explaining language processing in this frame is twofold. First, it is 
related to most basic assumption of embodied and grounded cognition, that sees higher and 
lower cognitive processes as strictly related. Second, explaining how humans understand 
language, and how they are able to interpret meaning is necessary in order to account for 
conceptual knowledge.  
While classical theories of cognition make a clear distinction between high and low 
cognitive processes, EGC theories contend that cognition should be considered and studied 
in its whole; thus, if perceptual and sensorimotor processes were deemed as secondary by 
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traditional cognitive science, EGC holds that they are as crucial as reasoning, speaking and 
remembering. Taking a leap forward, theories of embodied and grounded cognition argue 
that language is grounded and embodied in sensorimotor processes. This claim has taken 
many forms over the years, and it has been extensively scrutinized by both linguists (e. g., 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1990; Gibbs, 2006) and psychologists. To give a hint 
about how language embodiment has been treated by scholars, we can start by drawing a 
distinction between semantic theories according to their being more or less bounded to 
sensorimotor systems. Meteyard et al. (2012), proposed a classification of theories of 
language with respect to their “stronger” or “weaker” adherence to embodiment.  
Strong versions of linguistic embodiment claim that semantic systems use the same 
neural and sensorimotor information that is employed in performing actions. Gallese and 
Lakoff (2005), for example, claim that the understanding of concrete or action concepts 
(e.g., “to grasp”) requires sensorimotor simulations; because sensorimotor simulations 
happens in the brain, as evidence from neuroscientific researches suggested, sensorimotor 
system is deemed as necessary in the understanding of concepts. Evidence supporting this 
position comes both from behavioral studies and from direct observation of brains’ areas 
activated during language comprehension. Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), for instance, 
asked participants to judge whether sentences they were presented with were meaningful 
or not (Experiment 1). The authors manipulated the ‘direction’ of sensible sentences so that 
half of them implied a direction towards the body and the other half a direction far from 
the body (e.g., “Open the drawer” vs. “Close the drawer”). Participants responded by using 
a button box with three different keys: one near the body, the other half way and the third 
far from the body. Results showed that the interaction between sentence direction (towards 
the body vs. away from the body) and response direction (near the body vs. far from the 
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body) was significant. Glenberg and Kaschak referred to this interaction as action sentence 
compatibility effect (ACE), and proposed that the execution of a motor action is facilitated 
by the understanding of sentences implying a movement compatible with the action itself.  
Behavioral findings in support of the role of sensorimotor simulation during 
language comprehension accumulated over time, and started to thoroughly investigate the 
engagement of sensorimotor system (e. g., Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; Kaschak 
& Borreggine, 2008; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Taylor & Zwaan, 
2009; for reviews see among others Scorolli, 2014; Buccino et al., 2016). Evidence in favor 
of this version of embodiment has been provided in imaging and neuropsychological 
literatures as well. Neuro-imaging techniques, for instance, showed that the processing of 
linguistic stimuli concerning actions or effectors activates effector-specific sections of the 
pre-motor and motor cortical area (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Tettamanti et 
al., 2005). Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) also provided converging evidence for 
the relation between language processing and action: in a famous study, Pulvermüller and 
colleagues (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) compared RTs of words 
referring to leg actions (e.g., to kick) with those of words referring to movements involving 
arms and hand related actions (e.g., to pick) in a lexical decision task. TMS was applied 
both to arm motor areas and to leg motor areas. The stimulation of arm related motor areas 
led to faster arm than leg word responses; on the contrary, leg related words were responded 
to faster when TMS was applied to leg areas. Similar activations were also found when the 
linguistic stimuli were composed of nouns referring to concrete objects, especially 
manipulable objects (e. g., Chao & Martin, 2000; Buccino, Sato, Cattaneo, Rodà, & Riggio, 
2009; Makris, Hadar, & Yarrow, 2011), in line with the literature on affordances (Tucker 
& Ellis, 2004). To summarize, the embodied cognition hypothesis is corroborated by a large 
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amount of data, coming from different research areas (for reviews see e. g., Barsalou, 
Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Boulenger et al., 2006; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2005, 2018). Although this evidence is not 
without criticisms (see Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) it is nowadays clear that the 
sensorimotor system and the linguistic system are closely related. 
Forms of “weak” embodiment are those that presuppose that the meaning of words 
is constituted, to some extent, by sensory-motor information. The most famous of these 
proposals is certainly the Perceptual Symbol Systems, developed by Barsalou (1999; 2003; 
2008). In Barsalou’s formulation, perceptual symbols are generated by the perceptual input 
systems, and are defined as schematic representations of perceptual instances (the things in 
the world) which stand in a non-arbitrary relation with them. They are non-arbitrary in that 
they are similar to the objects they represent. How is this similarity implemented? 
According to Barsalou (2003), multimodal and unconscious states of perceptual systems 
are neurally specified (viz. are activated) when understanding or retrieving a given word. 
Barsalou (2008b) refers to these multimodal and unconscious states as simulators. 
Simulators are conceived as distributed, modal representations derived from the experience 
with category instances, and neurally realized by populations of conjunctive neurons which 
capture and integrate neural patterns that are active during the same experiencing. Hence, 
simulators are intended as types, that once being established for a given category, are able 
to extract small subsets of their content as specific simulations.  
Forms of “weaker” embodiment (or “secondary embodiment”, following the 
taxonomy proposed by Meteyard et al., 2012) are those still relying on a-modal symbols 
with respect to the format of semantic representations; in these kind of proposals, the 
semantic system is independent from sensory and motor information, but directly 
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associated with it (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). To 
illustrate, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) argued that although evidence coming from 
neuroimaging, electrophysiological and neuropsychological areas seem to support an 
embodied version of conceptualization and language processing, at a closer inspection they 
don’t seem to imply the rejection of a disembodied hypothesis.  
The main argument is that, in order to completely endorse the embodied claim, one 
has firstly to provide compelling evidence that the activation of sensory-motor areas is not 
‘merely’ a by-product of lexical processing. For example, the authors suggested an analogy 
with the automatic activation of phonologically related words in lexical processing; no one 
would admit that the meaning of a concept is comprised of words that are phonologically 
related to the concept (e.g., hammock-hammer). Nonetheless, studies investigating speech 
production showed that when participants are asked to name a picture while attending at 
distractors pictures, they are faster in naming pictures when the preceding distracting 
picture represented an item that is phonologically related to the target picture (Morsella & 
Miozzo, 2002; Navarrete & Costa, 2005).  
What the analogy with the phonological retrieving processing is suggesting, is that 
sensory motor information could be activated by semantic elaboration as a sort of 
‘Pavlovian’ reflex, but that it would not be constitutive of conceptual content. Henceforth, 
the authors proposed an hypothesis that they labeled “Grounding by Interaction 
Hypothesis”, according to which concepts and meanings would be represented 
symbolically at an abstract level, that interacts with sensory modalities when instances of 
concepts are elaborated. The sensorimotor information, however, would not be a 
constitutive part of the semantic content of concepts. To further corroborate their argument, 
the authors reported a list of neuropsychological findings concerning apraxia (an 
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impairment in using objects that is not explained by basic sensorimotor impairments). 
According to these results, patients can suffer an impairment for using objects while 
maintaining the semantic knowledge for the object intact (i.e. they are still able to name the 
objects, and they can also recognize pantomimes for these objects). Mahon and Caramazza 
thus conclude that a strong form of embodiment is not supported by these data, since they 
show that motor processes are not necessary in order to recognize and name an object. In a 
nutshell, semantic content is supposed to be stored at some abstract, amodal level which is 
connected to sensory and modal areas that become active once the concept has been 
instatiated. Although the embodied perspective on conceptualization is still a matter of 
debate among cognitive scientists–as portrayed by the short review just presented–even 
more skeptical scholars endorse a position that posits a relevant role for sensorimotor 
processes in conceptual knowledge.  
 
1.6.3. What concepts look, feel, sound, taste and smell like? Despite differences 
in the centrality recognized to sensorimotor and perceptual systems, EGC accounts of 
conceptual knowledge share the idea that concepts are grounded in our bodily systems. 
Conceptual knowledge is traditionally considered to be the basis of our semantic memory, 
and thus shedding light on the mechanisms supporting semantic competence should reveal 
important insights regarding our way to comprehend and master things in the world. This 
being said, we already expounded on how embodied and grounded theories deal with 
semantic competence and linguistic processing. In order to support an embodied approach 
of concepts one has firstly to demonstrate that sensorimotor features are systematically 
activated when accessing conceptual knowledge, and therefore generally when accessing 
semantic knowledge. Evidence is growing suggesting that all object categories elicit 
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specific patterns of neural activity that mediate perception of objects themselves. This is 
not only true when people see objects, but also when they are asked to name them, to answer 
to written questions about objects or to imagine them (Martin & Chao, 2001).  
The scientific literature partly reviewed in the previous section concerning language 
processing (e.g., among others Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005) proves 
that brain modal areas are automatically activated in the elaboration of language, and thus 
in the retrieving of conceptual knowledge. If that is the case, the other way around, we 
should need perceptual and sensorimotor features in order to access our semantic 
knowledge. This claim has been explored via behavioral tasks by relying on the assumption 
that simulations are a necessary component of conceptual knowledge. For example, if 
concepts related to different modalities are retrieved and comprehended through the 
activation of their specific modality, then switching between two modalities when verifying 
consecutive properties should take longer than not switching modalities.  
This hypothesis was addressed in a set of studies (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 
2003, 2004) using properties associated with different modalities (e.g., vision, audition). 
The authors asked participants to verify if the predication of the property was congruent 
with the object (e.g., microwave-beeping; eggplant-purple) and the principal manipulation 
was whether the modalities of two consecutive properties were the same or different (as in 
the case of microwave-beeping; eggplant-purple). In case they differ, the authors 
hypothesized that the cognitive cost of shifting attention from one modality to another (then 
employing for example auditory vs. visual simulations) should lead to an increase in 
reaction times. Their results showed that switching modalities entails a cost, and together 
with other studies on switching costs (Marques, 2006; Vermeulen, Niedenthal, & Luminet, 
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2007) they suggested that sensorimotor simulations are not just epiphenomenal activations, 
rather they underlie conceptual processing.  
Multimodal simulations then appear to be the basis of our conceptual structure. To 
date, scholars scrutinized all the sensory domains in order to verify if perceptual 
simulations support conceptualization. In a set of studies, Solomon and Barsalou (2001, 
2004) investigated the perceptual domain of vision. They intended to test if a task such as 
the property verification task could have been influenced by the active simulation of a 
specific shape (Solomon & Barsalou, 2001) or by the simulation of the size (Solomon & 
Barsalou 2004). In the first study, they found that verifying the property mane for pony 
were easier for participants when this couple was preceded by the couple mane-horse, but 
not when it was preceded by mane-lion. The authors interpreted these results as evidence 
that simulations of a detailed shape (e.g., the shape of the mane of a horse, and not of a 
mane of a lion) was activated during the task, thus facilitating congruent responses.  
To further disentangle whether the facilitation occurred precisely due to the re-
enactment of perceptual features related to the shape, Solomon and Barsalou (2004) added 
two more variables. Besides perceptual influence they considered also linguistic 
associations and expectancy (regarding e.g., the polysemy of words). Using a similar 
property-verification task, results show that the “perceptual” variable explained the most 
of variance. Specifically, the dimension of size massively impacted the property-
verification task: the bigger were the properties to verify, the longer were RTs. Inspired by 
the evidence that perceptual variable affect conceptualization, Wu and Barsalou (2009) 
hypothesized that hidden properties would have been more difficult to produce for items 
mentioned in isolation than for items with modifiers that could elicit the simulation of these 
hidden properties. Therefore, to manipulate perceptual properties they manipulated the 
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variable of occlusion: a group of participants produced properties for items in isolation, that 
were considered as having occluded properties, e.g. roots and dirt for lawn are considered 
to be hidden properties. Another group of participants produced properties for nouns with 
modifiers such as rolled-up lawn, where roots and dirt would be unoccluded (evident) 
properties. If the simulation account is correct, then the rate of “internal” (or occluded) 
properties produced by participants should have been affected by the presence or absence 
of the modifiers. Indeed, across all three experiments hidden properties resulted to be more 
accessible when the target was comprised of a modifier than when it was presented in 
isolation. Therefore, overall, the experiments suggest that people construct simulations 
when producing properties: the image of a rolled-up lawn, for example, can more plausibly 
reveal roots and hidden dirt than the simple image of a lawn, and in fact nouns with 
modifiers generated more hidden properties than simple nouns.  
Is this perceptual influence on categorization only limited to the visual sensory 
modality? Given the predominance of sight and vision-related language in our cognitive 
experiences (see e.g., San Roque et al., 2014 for a cross-linguistic comparison) it could be 
argued that simulations are active for visual experiences due to the predominance of the 
sense of sight in experiential phenomena. Contrarily to this expectation, González and 
colleagues (2006) investigated the sense of smell using fMRI. They asked participants to 
silently read words with a strong olfactory association (e.g., cinnamon, vanilla, menthol) 
and words with neutral or weaker olfactive associated meaning. Their results show that 
odor words activated automatically olfactory brain regions, supporting the claim that 
semantic knowledge relies on perceptual systems. A similar hypothesis was tested by 
Simmons and colleagues (2005) for the gustatory system: they presented participants either 
with pictures of food items or with food-related words in a neuroimaging study. They found 
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an activation of gustatory and reward brain areas that simulated reactions to real eating 
experiences. These results were corroborated by Papies (2013) with a behavioral task. In 
her study, Papies contrasted features production for tempting and non-tempting food; if 
concepts are represented as simulations, tempting food should elicit more features referring 
to eating simulations than non-tempting food (for instance, cookies should prompt more 
eating simulations than rice). As expected, participants produced 53% of eating simulations 
for tempting food, while they only produced 23% of eating simulations for neutral items, 
such as rice. Consistently, a study by Fernandino and colleagues (2015) explored the 
cortical representation of word meanings related to five different sensory modalities: sound, 
color, visual motion and shape. Participants were requested to perform a semantic 
categorization task while fMRI data were acquired. Their results show that among the five 
modalities of interest represented by the stimuli, four elicited brain activity in the related 
sensory-motor areas.  
 
1.6.4. Concepts are flexible representations. Cognition, as portrayed by 
proponents of the embodied and grounded theories and their applications, is based on 
modality specific systems, bodily actions, and physical environment. As a consequence of 
this intertwinement, concepts are conceived as emerging from distributed systems. Think 
for example of the concept of “bird”: in an EGC perspective, brain areas processing 
modality-specific properties of birds (e.g., auditory regions processing the sound of a bird 
singing, visual regions encoding the shape and color of the bird) store conceptual 
knowledge related to birds, together with brain areas processing relevant actions or 
affective states. Hence, properties representing “birds” are distributed across several neural 
systems relevant for actions, perception and internal states, allowing for the emergence of 
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the concept “bird”. Importantly concepts are thought of as flexible representations, re-
enacting relevant information about a given category in a specific situation (Kiefer & 
Barsalou, 2013). It is worth noting that the term representation in this debate refers to a 
specific, context-dependent and situated instantiation of a concept required or prompted by 
the task, rather than an a-modal symbol (cf. Connell & Lynott, 2014a). One of the main 
critiques moved to EG accounts of cognition is, in fact, that of being anchored to the 
cognitivist paradigm, in making implicit or explicit reference to the notion of representation 
for explaining cognitive processes (O’Reagan and Nöe, 2001). However, some scholars 
(e.g., Barsalou, 2016b; Connell & Lynott, 2014a) maintain that the construct of 
representation, when correctly interpreted, can still offer explanatory potential. Barsalou 
(2016b) for instance, claimed that:  
 
1. There is no permanent static representation of hammers in long-term 
memory, built from a-modal symbols, that is loaded into working 
memory identically across different occasions. 
2. The representation that does reside in long-term memory results from 
superimposed effects of associative learning distributed across 
relevant sensorimotor systems, with the resultant network changing 
constantly after every learning episode (and overlapping 
considerably with networks of other categories). 
3. When this distributed network is accessed, it produces one of 
infinitely many hammers representations dynamically.  
4. These representations serve temporary representational functions by 
providing useful inferences in specific situations. (p. 85) 
 
But what is it meant by “situation”, “context” and “context-dependent”, and which 
are the implications for conceptual coherence and communicability of the supposed 
flexibility of concepts?  
Conceptual flexibility has been widely investigated even before the “embodied 
turn”, and the very fact that concepts can be influenced by context–thus undermining the 
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notion of concepts as entities having a fixed structure–animated the scientific debate for a 
long time. As already discussed in paragraph 1.4, in fact, a large body of experimental 
studies demonstrated that contextual factors play a pivotal role in the conceptualization of 
certain categories (cf. Barsalou 1981; Barsalou & Sewell, 1984; Barclay et al., 1974). More 
recently, embodied and grounded approaches to cognition have emphasized how 
conceptual access and processing varies with context, highlighting the deep interconnection 
between conceptual knowledge and context at different levels. The simplest way to test this 
hypothesis in experimental settings was to manipulate tasks conditions. Findings coming 
from the investigation of the so-called “modality switch effect” (already discussed in the 
previous paragraph), for instance, showed that the modality in which stimuli are presented 
to participants affects conceptual activation, even in studies that did not require direct 
conceptual processing (Van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008). Analogously, 
contingent changes in bodily sensations conveyed by bodily posture (Dijkstra, Kaschak, & 
Zwaan, 2007; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010) or direct 
perceptual stimulation have an impact on subsequent judgement and categorization tasks6. 
For instance, Connell, Lynott and Dreyer (2012) stimulated the haptic system via tactile 
vibration while having participants comparing small and manipulable objects vs. large and 
non manipulable objects. Their results showed that the comparison was facilitated for small 
objects while that was not the case for big ones. The first direct neurocognitive investigation 
of conceptual flexibility comes from a study by Hoening and colleagues (2008), that 
                                                     
6 Recently, Matheson and Barsalou (2018) identified phenomena falling under these circumstances as 
evidence for a “new” embodied hypothesis, to be added to the previous ones formalized by Shapiro (2011). 
They labelled this perspective the influence hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the state of the body 
influences cognition, and importantly this influence is bi-directional. Therefore, not only the posture can 
influence one’s own perceptions and categorizations, but for instance voluntarily imagining events can 
improve behavioral performances (e.g., Bernardi, De Buglio, Trimarchi, Chielli, & Bricolo, 2013).   
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explored through fMRI and ERPs the degree to which modality-specific brain areas flexibly 
concur to conceptual processing. Based on previous findings that identified category-
related brain areas activations (e.g., Chao & Martin, 2000; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; 
Martin & Chao, 2001), the authors investigated the activation of visual areas (traditionally 
found to be active in the processing of natural kinds) and motion-sensitive/motor areas 
(relevant for the processing of artifacts). In a semantic-fit task, they provided participants 
with either visual or action related features, and subsequently presented them with target 
words indicating natural objects or artifacts. Crucially, they hypothesized that since visual 
properties are less relevant for artifacts with respect to functional properties, when 
presented with a non-dominant feature to verify, brain activity should be increased. For 
example, if participants are requested to verify whether the probe “elongated” is 
semantically related to “knife”, they should exhibit higher brain activity than when they are 
presented with the pair “to cut/knife”. Their results showed that semantic category strongly 
interacted with the type of attribute previously presented, in RTs, fMRI data, and 
electrophysiological results: participants were slower in verify the semantic fitness of 
action-related attributes compared to natural features with natural objects. Moreover, they 
reported cross-over interactions between semantic category (natural kind vs. artifact) and 
attribute type (visual feature vs. action-related feature) in modality-specific brain areas such 
as the posterior inferior/middle temporal, ventral premotor and posterior parietal cortex. 
Importantly, those interactions were shown to emerge as early as 116 ms after word onset, 
ruling out the possibility that the activation of sensorimotor brain areas is only a 
consequence of conceptual processing. In their words (Hoening et al., 2008):  
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The observed cross-over interactions between category and attribute 
type clearly show that the functional activation in sensory, motion, and 
motor regions critically depends both on task-requirements (verification of 
visual vs. action-related attribute probes) and relevance of the required 
conceptual feature for a particular category. (pp. 1808-1809)  
 
Further neurocognitive evidence speaking in favor of a plastic modulation of 
conceptual system is attested by a study from Kiefer and colleagues (Kiefer, Sim, Liebich, 
Hauk, & Tanaka, 2007), that evidenced how even by simply training participants 
interactions with novel categories under different training conditions (e.g., by stressing 
perceptual features on the one hand, and functional or action-related features on the other 
hand) the same object is differentially processed depending on the sensory-motor 
interactions during knowledge acquisition. In the training session of the study, participants 
either mimed a gesticulation toward the detail feature of the novel object or pointed to it. 
Subsequently, the authors measured the brain activity of participants during a 
categorization task. Interestingly, the pantomime group was the only one exhibiting early 
activation in frontal motor regions and later activation in occipito-parietal visual-motor 
regions, whereas in the pointing training group none of these effects was observed. The 
authors discussed their results as supporting the idea that action information contributes to 
conceptual processing depending on the specific learning experience with concepts (see 
also Kiefer & Martens, 2010).  
This brief overview evidenced how contingent task (and context) related constraints 
affect conceptual processing and representation (for reviews see Lebois, Wilson‐
Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). But are those effects 
limited to recently encoded information, such in the case of prime paradigms, or does 
previous stored knowledge also impacts conceptual tasks in a relevant manner? Recent 
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findings showed that relevant knowledge of specific actions to be performed with objects 
affects categorical judgements even though the actions evoked by the objects were 
irrelevant for the categorization purposes (Kalénine, Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi, & 
Buxbaum, 2014). In the same vein, having interacted with an object primarily through one 
sensory-modality or another in the course of life, has an influence on subsequent cognitive 
tasks. Connell and Lynott (2014b), for instance, keeping psycholinguistic variables 
constant (e.g., length, word frequency, orthographical and phonological neighbors), 
investigated the effects of semantic variables on lexical decision and reading-aloud tasks. 
Specifically, the semantic variables they considered were auditory and visual strength 
ratings. Their results showed that the degree to which a concept is visually experienced 
facilitates lexical decision performances, whereas reading-aloud performances benefits of 
the strength of both visual and auditory experience with concepts. Along these lines, 
Connell and Lynott (2014a), in discussing evidence in favor of a more flexible conception 
of conceptual system, suggested that we cannot represent the same concept twice, in that 
even though perceptual and linguistic constraints would be exactly replicated on two 
separate occasions, the representation of the concept could not be the same, given that the 
retrieving experience and the time itself would contribute to the changing of the concept 
(for a stronger version of this claim see also Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). Based on these 
considerations, one might argue that the process of communication is inevitably doomed to 
fail, since we would never be able to share concepts not only with our community, but also 
with past versions of ourselves. However, Connell and Lynott (2014a) elegantly dismissed 
this potential criticism by explaining that variability does not necessarily entail instability: 
in particular, language constitutes an important source for coherence, even though it is 
completely reasonable to assume that when communicating our ideas e.g. to our friends, 
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we are not always referring to the very same entities. Moreover, often words and utterances 
are embedded in a situational and non-verbal context which facilitates the communication 
(c.f. the example of “Fire!”, pp. 400-401). It should be noted that, when all of those aspects 
are missing (i.e. there is no completely adherence between my concept and the concept of 
my friend, even though we use the same word to denote it and there is nothing in the 
physical or contextual environment that anchors the concept to relevant experience), we 
can still negotiate the meanings of concepts through communication and discursive 
practices. 
 
1.7. Preliminary Conclusions. Against “Black Holes in Conceptual Space” 
 
The presentation of competing theories of concepts displayed so far disclosed how 
controversial has always been the research regarding conceptual knowledge. Indeed, as 
Barsalou pointed out (2016a) “it is difficult to think of a domain characterized by so many 
different views and so much disagreement” (p. 1122). Nonetheless, over the past 20 years 
empirical evidence of grounding and embodiment increased dramatically, changing the 
traditional assumptions of cognitive science. Among these assumptions, the one positing a 
strict separation between higher cognitive processes and sensorimotor or perceptual 
systems seems nowadays completely outdated. In this framework, concepts and conceptual 
mastering pertain both to our higher cognitive abilities (such as memory, reasoning and 
inference) and to our sensorimotor processes. Moreover, although a precise 
characterization of concepts would possibly never be reached, EG theories of cognition 
provide some interesting means to tackle the issue of conceptual representation. With 
respect to strictly representational and computational accounts, for instance, they seem to 
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overcome the problem posited by what have been labeled “black holes in the conceptual 
space” (cf. Barsalou, 2016a, p. 1127). Specifically, recent proponents of a-modal concepts 
failed to define what exactly a-modal concepts are and how should they work—except for 
the assumption that they should be something different from multimodal concepts. And yet, 
as Barsalou acknowledges, a-modal related claims are still attracting a conspicuous number 
of scholars. 
Stemming from the arguments and the discussion depicted so far, the notion of 
grounding is introduced in this debate as a means to account for conceptual knowledge. 
Inspired by Harnad’s symbol grounding critique to RCTM, some scholars embracing the 
embodied stance stressed the importance of the coupling of body and environment in the 
constitution of human knowledge. In this perspective, not only sensorimotor and biological 
constraints affect our cognition, but also the very fact of being human agents embedded in 
a specific physical and social context. The notion of grounding has thus a broader extension 
than the one of embodiment,  nonetheless acknowledging the importance of the latter in 
human cognition. As Barslaou (2016) puts it, grounding refers both to a new way of 
studying cognition (i.e. refusing traditional approaches that study cognitive processes in 
isolation), and to the purpose of “establishing specific accounts of how cognitive processes 
in the brain utilize the modalities, the body, and the environment.” (p. 1129). Concepts are, 
in this sense, grounded in our bodily mechanisms and in our specific neural architecture, 
but also constrained and influenced by context-specific aspects. This definition of concepts 
appears, with no doubt, less elegant than some of the previous characterizations; at the same 
time, however, by not positing an a priori construct that explains all the functions of 
concepts, it seems a more scientifically fruitful tool. This point has been addressed for 
example by Barsalou and colleagues (Barsalou et al., 2003): 
81 
 
 
 
 
In the approach we take here, nothing is explicitly called a concept. 
Instead our goal is to articulate specific mechanisms that produce conceptual 
processing. […] The difficulty of defining concepts raises the issue of 
whether it is a useful scientific construct. Perhaps no discrete entity or event 
constitute a concept. Perhaps conceptual functioning emerges from a 
complex configuration of mechanisms in both the world and the brain. (p. 
83)     
 
What are these mechanisms that explain conceptual functioning? According to 
Barsalou (2016, p.1134), “a concept utilizes neural resources that represent features in 
modality-specific systems, together with various kinds of abstract features.”. This last claim 
leads us to one of the two most insidious objections moved to EG theories of concepts. 
Specifically, what are we talking about when talking about “abstract features”? 
Historically, explaining any form of abstraction has been a major problem for theories of 
embodied and grounded cognition, given their high reliance on perception and action. In 
particular, accounting for the representation of abstract concepts such as beauty or freedom 
has been deemed as a shortcoming for EGC theories, together with the accuse of being 
reductionist theories7. In the next Chapter, I will deal with abstract concepts and words 
(ACWs), being their representation, processing and status the central theme of this 
dissertation. Following the structure of this Chapter, I will present proposals within the 
embodied and grounded panorama that strived to account in a grounded perspective for 
abstract concepts, and I will partly discuss their limitations. I will lastly review Multiple 
Representations Views (MRVs) of conceptual knowledge, arguing that they are the best 
                                                     
7 The debate concerning the alleged reductionist claim entailed by the embodied and grounded perspective 
on concepts relates to the fact that some scholars are critical in accepting the neural activations triggered by 
words as the only constituent of conceptual knowledge. This debate, although extremely interesting and 
complex, exceeds the purposes of this dissertation. For a careful discussion on the term grounding and its 
implications for theories of conceptual knowledge though, see Leshinskaya and Caramazza (2016) and the 
response of Barsalou (2016a) in a special issue of Psychonomic Bulletin and Review dedicated to the theme.  
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candidates to explain conceptual functioning and acquisition. The core of the following 
Chapter will be the presentation of the WAT (Words As social Tools) theory, proposed by 
Borghi and colleagues in the frame of MRVs. I will discuss relevant tenets on abstract 
concepts that are entailed in this proposal, in order to show how a theory that is couched in 
the EG tradition can account for abstract concepts. Afterwards, I will present some 
considerations regarding possible future strategies to adopt in the inquiry of ACWs.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ABSTRACTION, ABSTRACTNESS, AND BEYOND 
 
2.1. Abstract Concepts. Opening The Pandora’s Box 
 
Intuitively, we all know what the terms “abstract” and “abstraction” mean. We use 
these terms in everyday interactions without paying special attention to their meanings, for 
example when describing something vague. The word “abstract” has been also used to 
denote artistic movements such as the abstract expressionism exemplified by Jackson 
Pollock, that were said to be unrelated to objects in the real world. Therefore, “abstract” 
seems to indicate something detached from the physical reality, something that is difficult 
to grasp, even mentally. It is thus not surprise that Embodied and Grounded approach to 
cognition struggled so much in framing abstract thought.  
Maybe, in this discussion it might be helpful to step back for a moment and consider 
the origin of the word “abstract”. As a matter of fact, the word abstract gains its meaning 
from the Latin verb ABSTRÀHĔRE1, which is formed by the two components ABS + 
TRÀHO, where TRÀHO means “to draw, to pull” and the prefix AB(S) refers generally to 
the meaning of “away, from”. Consequently, the etymology of the word conveys a precise 
meaning, which is not vague as it appeared in the first place. The conceptual core of the 
word is constituted by the verb TRÀHĔRE, that refers to the movement of pulling 
                                                     
1 Retrieved from https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/abstraction powered by Oxford.  
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something from somewhere to somewhere else. This is particularly exemplificative of the 
mechanism of abstraction. Rooted in the term, is the idea of extracting some general 
features from instantiations, which is also the core function of concepts (see Chapter 1). In 
this sense, all concepts are forms of abstraction in that they respond to the need of our 
cognitive processes to store relevant information from the environment in a coherent way, 
in order to use it when needed. What is then the difference between abstract and concrete 
concepts, as depicted by cognitive science and philosophy? Specifically, why abstract 
concepts are so difficult to explain for simulation-based theories?  
In order to carefully investigate what is at stake when dealing with abstract 
concepts, a first distinction we can draw is the one between abstraction and abstractness, 
proposed by Borghi & Binkofski (2014). As noted before, in fact, the authors acknowledge 
the fact that in order to form categories and concepts we need to extract characteristics from 
the perceptual world, and then to unify them by the mean of words. Borrowing their own 
example, the concept of dog–although it is a concrete concept in the traditional sense–can 
be considered as involving a certain degree of abstraction. In fact, the word dog stands for 
a number of exemplars of the category that are very different one from another (think of a 
chihuahua and a Siberian husky; they are not so similar after all), but that somehow share 
characteristics that make it possible for them to be part of the general category of dogs. In 
this sense, i.e. in representing a higher level of knowledge such as taxonomic 
classifications, the concept of dog is said to have a high level of abstraction. Abstractness, 
on the other hand, specifically refers to the property of a concept of being detached from 
physical reality. Consider for example this triplet of words: lust, pride and avarice. Clearly, 
they are not positioned at the extremes of a taxonomy (maybe they can be ordered 
hierarchically as capital sins), and they are not directly linked to any specific physical 
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experience. Rather, their meaning applies to a wide range of situations, and additionally 
their range of appliance to situations is susceptible of changes over time and across cultures. 
Medieval bestiaries, for example, used to represent sins and virtues through drawings of 
beasts, which allegorically (and symbolically) represented the concepts of sins and virtues. 
Therefore, by the means of tales or descriptions of beasts’ behavior, it was easier to convey 
meanings that were otherwise too abstract and complex. An illustrative example of this 
shortcut is provided by the allegory of the three beasts in Dante’s Inferno (Canto 1), where 
lust, pride and avarice are represented as a lynx, a lion and a she-wolf. Why are these kinds 
of concepts difficult to define, so difficult that we often needed creative ways to explain 
them? In Borghi & Binkofski’s perspective (2014) this has to do with the fact that the 
abstractness of a concept is determined by its lack of a concrete, manipulable and single 
referent. To illustrate, while dog maintains a degree of abstraction, we can still touch, hear, 
and also smell a dog (being that a chihuahua or a Siberian Husky); on the contrary, we 
cannot touch, hear or smell pride or lust. We can maybe physically experience their 
consequences, but their referents remain abstract.  
This aspect of physical and perceptual detachment from the experiential world 
constituted the heart of the problem in explaining abstract concepts that EG theories strived 
to face in the last decades. Indeed, if concepts are multimodal simulations tied to 
sensorimotor and perceptual states (see Chapter 1), it is easy to see how abstract concepts, 
lacking physical referents, can portray a pitfall for multimodal theories of conceptual 
knowledge. Nonetheless, scholars embracing an embodied and grounded perspective on 
cognition advanced several proposals aimed at explaining how abstract thought and abstract 
knowledge emerge from the interaction between our minds and the physical world. In the 
following sections, I will outline some of these seminal accounts of EGC theories on 
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abstract concepts, with the purpose of addressing their strengths and weaknesses. In the 
central section, I will instead focus on a specific set of proposals, namely “Multiple 
Representation Views” (MRVs), claiming that at the state of the art they seem the best 
candidate for unraveling the complexity of abstract concepts. Specifically, I will describe 
and discuss in detail the WAT (Words As social Tools) proposal, showing how it can 
explain abstract concepts in a grounded perspective. The last section of the Chapter is 
dedicated to some of the most interesting issues posed by MRVs, and to their relevance for 
the future understanding of abstract conceptual knowledge.  
The discussion on abstract concepts will be developed following the criterion 
introduced in Chapter 1: I will follow a path from theories embracing a fully embodied 
perspective on abstract concepts, to theories proposing a partial disembodiment of abstract 
concepts. Ultimately, I will focus on a specific view (the WAT proposal) that takes a 
slightly different stance in this debate.  
 
2.2. Abstract Concepts are Embodied 
 
2.2.1. Love is a journey. Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In this section I am going 
to describe proposals that defended a full embodiment of abstract concepts. Over the years, 
evidence in support of these accounts piled up, especially due to linguistic and experimental 
studies. As these first two sentences demonstrate, metaphors are pervasive constructs in our 
everyday language. Sometimes, we employ metaphorical language without even knowing 
we are using a rhetoric figure. This observation led George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
(1980) to reconsider the role of metaphors, from simple rhetoric artifacts to constitutive of 
human thought.  
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Starting from the study of English common expressions, the authors identified 
several metaphorical structures underlying conceptualization. Unsurprisingly, most of the 
metaphors the authors investigated were used to describe abstract concepts. Take for 
example the opening sentence of this paragraph: I used the expression “defended” in 
relation to theoretical proposals. But ultimately, “to defend” is often (almost always) 
referred to wars. Lakoff and Johnson described this specific structure with the metaphor 
“an argument is a war”, precisely because they noted the recursive pattern of this semantic 
borrowing. The second sentence instead refers to what the authors identified as the 
metaphor of “more is up”; thus, accumulating evidence (which is an abstract notion) is 
mapped spatially as something growing vertically (a situation we often encounter in our 
everyday experience).  
The basic idea underlying their proposal is that, since some concepts are too 
complex to be immediately understood (usually abstract concepts, that they call topics), we 
need to ground them in more concrete concepts (vehicles). This process is reflected in 
linguistic structures, that in this perspective provide a direct window of access to conceptual 
structures. What is interesting in this approach is that, in order to understand abstract 
concepts, we need to rely on more concrete, experiential concepts. As a second step, this 
grounding process is encoded in linguistic structures, conveying specific meanings. 
Therefore, even though through a process of indirect encoding, in this frame abstract 
concepts appear to be embodied (Gibbs 2006). Other examples taken from their book are 
the metaphor of “love as a journey”, which is exemplified by expressions such as “our 
relationship has come to an end” or “their marriage has hit a dead-end street”. 
In detail, Lakoff (1987) claimed that there are some basic conceptual metaphors that 
are central to human cognition. Among those, “more is up; less is down” is particularly 
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useful in the understanding of how abstract concepts are considered to be embodied. 
Linguistic expressions entailing this type of metaphor are really common, e.g., prices are 
said to “rise” and financial resources can be “low”. Lakoff suggested that the metaphor of 
verticality for describing quantity is formed through empirical observation. Consider a 
basic example such as pouring water in a glass. The more water is added, the more the glass 
will be filled with the liquid, until the water will reach the edge of the glass. Therefore, the 
metaphor collapsing quantity into verticality is based on the observation of a correlational 
structure between these two domains, one of which is directly related to our experience. 
This last point allows us to comprehend even more abstract notions, such as financial issues 
that might not be as intuitive otherwise. 
Verticality is commonly employed as a source domain to refer to other abstract 
entities or concepts, such in the case of “up is happy and down is sad” or “up is good and 
down is bad”. On the latter, Meier and colleagues (2007) performed a study in which 
participants were asked to memorize locations of pictures that were god-related, devil-
related or neutral. Crucially, pictures were presented either in a high or low location of the 
screen. Their results show that participants tended to remember god-like pictures at a higher 
location with respect to neutral pictures, and devil-like pictures at a lower location with 
respect to neutral ones. Overall, those results point to the existence of a metaphorical 
mapping that links divinity concepts such as God and Devil (which are highly abstract 
concepts) to the domain of space that, in being more concrete, can support reasoning about 
more abstract categories. An abstract domain that greatly fascinated scholars is the domain 
of time, which has been also investigated in the light of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
Because time is not perceivable through our senses–again, we can experience consequences 
of time, but not a minute passing–our linguistic system has evolved to represent the 
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category of time in different ways. One of the most common options is to map the domain 
of time into the most perceivable domain of space. As complex as it might appear in these 
terms, our experience is full of linguistic expressions encoding this kind of relation: just to 
give a hint, consider the world-wide famous song “Don’t look back in anger” from Oasis, 
which specifically suggests Sally not to regret anything from her past. Therefore, in the 
Western society, the past is metaphorically conceptualized as something behind us, while 
the future is understood as something in front of us, mostly because it is unknown.  
To test whether the general assumption related to the conceptual metaphor of space-
time was generalizable to non-western societies with a different system of values, Núñez 
and Sweetser (2006) investigated gestures in the Aymara population. The main 
characteristic of this population is that with respect to the majority of western societies, 
their spatial mapping of time is reversed: hence, the future is “behind the ego” and the past 
is “in front of the ego”. The analysis of linguistic and gestural patterns revealed that this 
time-construction was not limited to linguistic expressions, but it was also encoded in 
gestures participants produced when narrating stories. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) 
also focused on the spatial relations conveyed by time; they manipulated the movements of 
dots on a screen and the displacement and duration of that movement in an experiment 
where participants were asked to estimate the duration of the movements. Their findings 
show that judgments on time duration were influenced by the spatial distance the dots 
covered. 
Overall, these results suggest that metaphorical thinking plays an important role in 
grounding abstract concepts, providing the speakers some useful links between abstract 
domains and more perceivable ones. Importantly, those patterns affect our cognition at a 
deep level, as attested by experimental studies such as the ones described above.  
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2.2.2. Grasping ideas. Abstract concepts and action. The Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, as sketched out in the previous paragraph, provided interesting insights concerning 
the mechanisms responsible for the grounding of abstract concepts and language. 
Nonetheless, this form of grounding seems to be somehow a “secondary” step in the 
comprehension of abstract entities, in that it is mediated by perceptual experiences and only 
afterwards encoded in linguistic expressions. On the other hand, evidence supporting a 
direct embodiment of abstract language has been observed in relation to action sentences. 
Indeed, the action compatibility effect (ACE) described in the first Chapter has been proved 
to occur not only in sentences involving concrete objects. In the same study by Glenberg 
& Kaschak (2002) the authors reported a facilitation for responses whose direction was 
compatible with the direction of sentences presented to participants also for abstract 
meanings.  
Specifically, sentences expressing abstract transfer elicited faster responses when 
the button to press was compatible with the direction of the transfer. For example, a 
sentence like “Liz told you the story” facilitated responses towards oneself, just like a 
sentence like “Jane handed you the ball”, which has a clear manipulable object-referent. 
These results were further replicated and extended in a study by Glenberg and colleagues 
(2008) that implemented the original study by measuring motor system modulation through 
TMS in the reading of transfer sentences. Their results show that larger MEPs (motor 
system modulation) for the transfer sentences compared to the no-transfer sentences. 
Therefore, overall, during language comprehension motor areas of the brain are 
differentially activated according with the linguistic content. Crucially, the size of the 
sentence type effect resulted to be comparable for sentences that describe concrete and 
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abstract transfer. Hence, the authors interpreted these results as evidence that the motor 
system is modulated during comprehension of both concrete and abstract language.  
It is worth noting that the aforementioned studies directly investigated the motor 
activity connected both with concrete and abstract meaning. Glenberg and colleagues 
(2008) explained their findings by referring to what they called “action schema” that in 
their perspective is developed during infancy: infants learn to represent concrete transfer 
through the motor system (e.g., throwing a ball, handing a napkin) and subsequently they 
generalize this schema to more abstract domains. While this explanation is certainly 
interesting, and can clarify their results, it is important to point out that the sentences 
presented were specifically related to hand movements or to transfer meaning. Therefore, 
the generalization of the findings to the more general abstract domain resulted problematic. 
 
2.3. Abstract Concepts and the Role of Emotions 
 
Besides classical accounts on abstract concepts such as the ones reviewed in the 
first Chapter–among which only some of them expressly dealt with abstract thought–one 
research branch particularly focused on abstract meaning, viz. psycholinguistics. Two 
seminal proposals in this panorama are the Dual Coding Theory, DCT, advanced by Paivio 
(1986, 1991) and the Contextual Availability Theory, CAT, (Schwanenflugel, Akin, & Luh, 
1992; Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988)2. Both these proposals were aimed 
at explaining the concreteness effect, namely the advantage in terms of reaction times (RTs) 
that happened to be specific for concrete terms with respect to abstract terms.  
                                                     
2 For an in-depth discussion of these proposals see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014. 
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On the one hand, according to the DCT abstract and concrete terms differ in the 
richness of their representation, due to their being stored and represented in different 
systems. Concrete words are thought to be represented in two independent, functionally 
related systems: logogen and imagen. The first is a verbal and linguistic system, the second 
is an iconic and non-verbal system. Abstract words, instead, are only represented in the first 
one of these two systems. Therefore, the advantage in RTs found during the processing of 
concrete words over abstract words is the result of the fact that concrete words can exploit 
a major amount of information.  
In the light of the model proposed by the CAT, conversely, abstract and concrete 
words rely on the same system, i.e. the verbal system. They are processed and stored 
through the same process of linguistic and semantic associations, and the concreteness 
effect is explained by positing that concrete words possess stronger and more linguistic and 
semantic associations than abstract words. Specifically, concrete words entail more 
contextual associations with respect to abstract words, and this render their access easier 
and faster than for abstract words.  
Despite the importance assigned to variables such as “abstractness” and 
“concreteness” in studies investigating word processing, the evidence is not undisputed 
(Barca, Burani, & Arduino, 2002). Moreover, in line with more grounded approaches to 
cognitive processes, it has been objected that words are best described in terms of their 
emotional valence instead of referring solely to dimensions such as abstractness and 
concreteness (cf. Matheson & Barsalou, 2018). A line of research, for example, stressed 
how experiments conducted in order to investigate the concreteness effect failed to take 
into account the emotional valence of words. In this vein, it has been proposed that abstract 
words are more emotionally connotated than concrete ones, and that the role of emotions 
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in the initial acquisition and subsequent processing of abstract terms is to provide a sort of 
bootstrapping mechanism. As Kousta and colleagues (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, & 
Andrews, 2011; 2009) pointed out by analyzing a large dataset of words, when imageability 
and contextual availability (which are two psycholinguistic variables typically associated 
with concreteness) were kept constant, emotional valence resulted to be a negative predictor 
for concreteness: the more a word was rated as concrete, the less it was emotionally 
connotated, and conversely, the more a word was rated as abstract, the higher was its 
emotional valence. Moreover, once critical psycholinguistic variables were controlled, the 
typical concreteness effect disappeared and instead the authors reported an “abstractness 
effect”, which they interpreted in the light of the emotional characterization of abstract 
words.  
The proposal advanced by Vigliocco and colleagues (2009) to explain abstract 
words and concepts can thus be summarized in this way: (a) there are two main sources of 
information that can be exploited for the acquisition of words, namely an experiential based 
source, and a linguistic one; (b) differences between concrete and abstract words are the 
result of the different proportion of information they rely on; (c) specifically, concrete 
words are anchored in the sensory-motor and experiential system to a greater extent than 
abstract words, which instead are more anchored to the linguistic and affective system, both 
in their acquisition and in their subsequent semantic representation. Although this proposal 
is appealing, in that it spells out not only the role of sensory-motor system, but also the role 
of other internal grounding mechanisms such as affection and emotion, it is not 
uncontroversial. Criticisms related to this specific accounts and evidence for a neat 
distinction between emotional and abstract concepts are presented below, and in the next 
chapter.  
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2.3.1. Grounding abstraction and emotions in language3. While there is clear 
evidence that emotion words activate a simulation, the debate on whether emotional words 
can be considered as a particular kind of abstract words or not is still open. The growing of 
scientific literature on emotional words has contributed to enlarge the discussion, by 
supplying contentious evidence. 
According to some scholars, emotional concepts can be considered as a means 
leading the acquisition of more abstract concepts, since they represent the first concepts 
acquired without the mediation of a specific and single concrete referent. Their results 
show, among other, that abstract words are processed faster than concrete ones; this is 
explained by the authors on the basis of a greater affective connotation of abstract words 
compared to concrete nouns. Emotional valence was proved to modulate processing: words 
judged to have positive or negative emotional connotation were processed faster than words 
with an emotionally neutral meaning. Crucially, abstract words tended to be rated as highly 
emotionally valenced. In a recent study, Ponari et al.  (Ponari, Norbury, & Vigliocco, 2018) 
asked adults to evaluate the age of acquisition of abstract and concrete words, including 
positive, negative and neutral emotional words. They found out that positive and negative 
abstract words were acquired earlier than neutral ones, and that both abstract and concrete 
positive words tended to be acquired earlier than other words. In a further lexical decision 
task they asked children aged 6 to 12 to discriminate positive, negative and neutral abstract 
and concrete words. Results showed that accuracy increased with age and valence 
                                                     
3 This paragraph is part of an essay published in 2017: (Mazzuca, Barca, & Borghi, 2017) “The peculiarity 
of emotional words” which is available at Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia via 
https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2017.0010/767 
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interacted with age for abstract but not for concrete nouns: children aged 8-9, the age in 
which abstract vocabulary increases, were more accurate with positive abstract words 
compared to neutral words. Overall, studies like the aforementioned ones insist on the idea 
that emotional aspects characterize all abstract concepts and that emotional words are a 
subset of abstract words and concepts.  
Other studies have instead claimed that emotional concepts are to be considered as 
a clearly distinctive kind of concepts compared both to concrete and to abstract ones. In 
their studies, Altarriba et al. (1999) have demonstrated that emotional concepts are recalled 
more accurately than concrete and abstract ones, and that they are rated differently with 
respect of psycholinguistic criteria such as concreteness, imageability and contextual 
availability. The results obtained by Setti and Caramelli (2005) using a rating and a 
definitions production task, also suggest that the conceptual knowledge related to emotional 
concepts is markedly different from that related to both concrete and abstract ones.  
Mazzuca and Borghi (2019) also compared concrete, abstract and emotional words. 
Participants had to perform a lexical decision task followed by a word recognition task; 
responses were given pressing a pedal while holding a key with the hand or with the mouth. 
In the lexical decision task response times with concrete and emotive words did not differ, 
while responses to abstract concepts were slower. The analysis on accuracy in the 
recognition task revealed that responses to abstract words were more accurate than those to 
emotive words and in tendency more accurate than those to concrete ones. The interaction 
between the effector involved (hand, mouth) and kind of words showed that the recognition 
was facilitated with the mouth with abstract and emotive words, while it was facilitated 
with the hand with concrete words. The results of this study in both the lexical decision and 
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the word recognition task are clearly difficult to reconcile with the view according to which 
abstract concepts and emotional concepts can be assimilated.  
Crucially for a perspective that emphasizes the role of the body in cognition, another 
recent study has shown that emotion related sentences are rated as associated with the 
mouth and with other bodily effectors. Ghio and colleagues (2013) asked participants to 
rate the association to the mouth, the hand/arm and the leg/foot of sentences related to 
mental states (e.g., “she remembers the past”), to emotions (e.g., “she shows her 
disappointment”) and to mathematics (e.g., “she determines the sum”). Ratings for the 
mouth scale indicated that emotional sentences were significantly more associated to mouth 
actions than were either mental states and mathematical sentences; ratings for the hand 
scale revealed that mathematical sentences and emotional sentences were significantly 
more associated to hand actions than were mental states utterances. Considering the leg 
scale, emotional sentences were significantly more associated with leg actions than the 
other two kind of sentences. These results support the idea that emotions are grounded in 
bodily states more than different kinds of abstract concepts (mental concepts and numbers), 
including embodied multi-modal representations.  
As highlighted by this brief overview of the literature, interpreting data on 
emotional words is still a controversial matter. Considering the complexity of the 
theoretical and empirical evidence about emotion related words, emotional concepts 
represent a peculiar and intriguing case. Moving from an embodied and grounded approach, 
we will here contend that emotional concepts hold a special status with respect to concrete 
and to purely abstract ones.  
On the one hand, their direct involvement of the body could render them similar to 
concrete concepts, albeit concrete concepts (with some exceptions, as concrete concepts 
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referring to food) usually activate neural areas related to the actions performed with 
manipulable objects (e.g., hand or arms), while emotional concepts elicit a more general 
bodily activation. On the other hand, there are reasons that can lead to include emotional 
concepts and words in the semantic domain of abstract concepts. Like abstract concepts, 
emotional concepts are characterized by a high intra- and interpersonal variability 
connected to the assignment of meaning: since they lack of a single and concrete referent, 
they are more subjected to vary across people and spaces than concrete concepts. There are 
other similarities between emotion and abstract concepts that can be taken into account. An 
important similarity concerns the fact that, similarly to abstract concepts, emotional ones 
seem to strongly involve not only the hand/arm but also the mouth motor system (Ghio et 
al., 2013). Different mechanisms can subtend this activation of the mouth. The first cause 
underlying the mouth activation could be the fact that emotions involve our body in its 
wholeness.  
A second mechanism is the activation of linguistically conveyed information. This 
mechanism, that in our view is highly critical for abstract words, is not so crucial for 
emotional concepts, but it might play some role especially for more abstract emotional 
terms. Even though basic emotional words like “anger” and “fear” activate a clear bodily 
pattern, suggesting that they are experienced and stored in conceptual knowledge as 
complex and multiple representations, other kinds of emotional words are indeed more 
abstract and not so clearly bounded. For these concepts, similarly to what happens with 
abstract words the mouth activation could be due to the activation of linguistically 
conveyed information, contributing to shape and delimit the meaning of some emotion 
concepts. Consider for example a term like “love” and how language can contribute in 
contextualizing its meaning. It is reasonable to think that the first experience with “love” 
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of a child –i.e. the love of her/his mother–is considerably different from the subsequent 
experiences with that feeling. With the growing of experiences and linguistic competences, 
the child will presumably learn that the feeling that relates her/his parents, or the affection 
for her/his dog, are all occurrences that can be collected under the linguistic label of “love”, 
even though they have different hues. Anyway, the importance of language in delimiting 
their meaning and their association with the mouth is not sufficient to completely embrace 
a vision of emotional terms as part of abstract ones. Certainly, language may play a role in 
the conceptualization of emotional words, by providing a frame in which to ground all the 
emotional experiences, but the activation of the mouth effector can have other implications, 
for example it could be a consequence of the more general bodily activation.  
In sum: we propose to reconsider the relation between concrete and abstract 
concepts, viewing it not as a dichotomy, but as a continuum, in which concepts are 
organized and represented at a different level of abstractness, and in which emotion 
concepts represent a peculiar kind of concepts. In line with the suggestion of the Words As 
social Tools proposal (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2017), multimodal 
representations are involved both in the comprehension of a concrete term, and in the 
comprehension of an abstract one. Words should be considered as social tools, that is, as 
having a performative aspect, as being useful tools to use in order to operate distinctions in 
the environment, and to cooperate in the society. According to this proposal linguistic 
explanations provided by competent speakers could be the basis of the acquiring of abstract 
meanings, helping to glue the linguistic label to the experience. If concrete concepts 
activate mostly the sensorimotor system and abstract concepts rely heavily also on 
linguistic and social experience, what happens with emotional concepts? We propose that 
embodied words first of all activate an embodied simulation, leading to re-enact the original 
99 
 
 
 
emotional experience. However, also social and linguistically conveyed information can 
contribute to shape emotion concepts, especially more complex and sophisticated emotions 
like “shame”. As the studies mentioned in the previous paragraphs show, emotional words 
and sentences seem to activate both the hand and arms areas and the mouth; the mouth 
activation can be either a byproduct of the whole bodily activation or can be due to the 
activation of the linguistic system. In conclusion, emotional terms seem to be the 
intermediate level between concrete ones and abstract ones, sharing properties of both, but 
at the same time maintaining a peculiar status, and being irreducible to both the categories.  
 
2.4. Language and Situated Simulations. Evidence in Conceptual Processing 
 
The Language and Situated Simulation Theory (LASS) is not directly concerned 
with abstract words or concepts. Rather, Barsalou and colleagues (2008) propose an 
account of conceptual processing that includes two systems, namely the linguistic system–
specifically the system that processes linguistic forms, not the one representing linguistic 
meaning–and the situated simulation system. The basic assumption is that multiple systems 
underlie knowledge in the brain, and specifically the two aforementioned systems engage 
in a dynamic interaction supporting the representation of concepts4. Crucially, they are 
neither incapsulated nor modular, but they stand in a continuous relation: to illustrate, the 
authors propose that the two systems are both active in linguistic tasks, but linguistic forms 
would be activated earlier than sensorimotor simulations. Hence, the linguistic system 
                                                     
4 For a different but related approach on language contribution to conceptual knowledge see e.g. Louwerse, 
2008; 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010 that proposed a hybrid approach combining grounded simulations 
and distributional knowledge gained from recursive linguistic patterns (SI, Symbol Interdependency 
Hypothesis).  
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would peak earlier than the simulation system, also serving as a support for the activation 
of the latter (see Figure 2 for a graphic representation of this process). This last point is 
explained by the fact that information that is salient during the encoding would be 
preferentially activated if it is also present during the retrieval. Therefore, given that 
linguistic forms (note, not meanings) convey patterns of linguistic information, such as co-
occurrences, the linguistic system is primary activated in their encoding and retrieving. 
Nonetheless, once recognized, the word would prime embodied simulations that permit 
conceptual access. Therefore, words would act as “pointers” to situated conceptual 
representations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Graphic representation of the contribution of both linguistic and simulation systems in terms of 
time course in conceptual processing (Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008) 
 
One central point in the discussion of the activation of linguistic forms is the nature 
of the task being performed. In fact, as the authors pointed out, if the simple retrieval of 
linguistic forms and associated statistical information is sufficient for the performance, no 
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deeper conceptual information would be activated. Note that, in the LASS perspective, deep 
access to semantic content is only guaranteed by the activation of situated simulations, 
while linguistic retrieving and processing is considered to be a “heuristic” form which can 
be effective only in certain contexts and tasks. On this point, the authors recognize that 
their view is incompatible with symbolic theories of meaning because conceptual content 
about properties and relations resides in simulations rather than in linguistic forms 
(contrarily to a-modal theories of meaning, see Chapter 1).  
In order to investigate the relative contribution of linguistic and simulation systems, 
Simmons and colleagues (2008) performed an fMRI study in which participants were asked 
firstly to silently generate properties for a set of words, and after a week to complete a 
word-association and a situation-generation task. The aim of the study was to address the 
specific time course of the activation of linguistic neural areas and modal simulation areas, 
and also to verify if there was a difference in terms of activation patterns depending on the 
task. Their results show that word association elicited the activation of brain regions 
implicated in language processing (e.g., Broca’s area and medial inferior frontal gyrus), 
while generating situations activated brain regions previously found to be engaged in 
mental imagery, episodic memory, and locations processing (e.g., cuneus, precuneus and 
posterior cingulate gyrus). As for the time course, the authors posited that the property-
generation task could have been divided into two time-sections: the earlier half (first 7.5 s.) 
and the final half (last 7.5 s.). In accordance with their hypotheses, i.e. that there would 
have been statistically greater likelihoods of words associations during the first 7.5 half of 
each trial vs. greater simulations likelihoods in the last 7.5 s. of the trial, areas related to 
simulations were not significantly active in the first half of time course.  
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In detail, significant overlap was found between early property generation and word 
association, and between late property generation and situation generation (p. 116). The 
authors interpreted their findings in the frame of LASS Theory, evidencing how in line with 
its predictions both linguistic associations and situated simulation underlie conceptual 
processing with the former occurring earlier. These results seem to conflict with previous 
evidence (e.g., Pulvermüller et al., 2005, that indicated that motor simulations are active 
within 200 ms of word onset); Simmons and colleagues explain this potential inconsistency 
by appealing to the role of the executive system. Specifically, they claim that when selective 
attention is focused on a given system as source of information, this system leads the 
responses while the relevant simulation is activated but not targeted. In the case of the 
experiment reported in the study, the authors suggest that since the cues of the tasks 
presented were words, the executive processing focused selectively on the linguistic 
system. In addition, since participants were to respond with words in many of the tasks, 
this factor may have further oriented selective attention towards the linguistic system 
(remember that in the case of e.g., Pulvermüller et al., 2005 the task was a lexical decision 
task).  
Therefore, the authors conclude, conceptual processing is supported by both 
linguistic processing and situated simulations to different extents. Depending on the 
conditions (e.g., tasks, purposes) conceptual elaboration might prominently rely on the 
linguistic system or on the situated simulation system, or on both of them. This step is 
important in theories of conceptual knowledge, because in the frame of embodied and 
grounded cognition it acknowledges the importance of language as a means to access 
conceptual knowledge, without positing the existence of an amodal and symbolic system. 
Given the stress posited on the distinction between the two systems that are at stake during 
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conceptual processing one might wonder if abstract and concrete concepts are differentially 
represented and processed, according to the LASS. After all, the other seminal proposal 
that clearly distinguished between a “verbal and linguistic” and “iconic and non-linguistic” 
system is the DCT proposed by Paivio, which assigned to abstract and concrete concepts 
distinct systems.  
Indeed, in the LASS, specific claims regarding the representation of abstract 
concepts and words are presented in relation to the DCT. In fact, according to the authors, 
although this view seems largely compatible with Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory, the LASS 
theory maintains that for abstract concepts simulations are also necessary. Remember that 
in Paivio’s view abstract words would only rely on the logogen system, roughly 
correspondent to the linguistic system mentioned by Barsalou and colleagues. In addition, 
while for DCT both the linguistic and the non-linguistic system imply deep processing, in 
the LASS deep conceptual processing only occurs in the simulation system. Consequently, 
by positing that in order to access conceptual representation the situated simulation system 
ought to be activated, and that linguistic system only provide support for shallower tasks, 
the authors claim that both concrete and abstract concepts are comprised of dynamic 
situated simulations.  
Evidence from a deep processing task (Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, & 
Barsalou, 2013) showed that abstract concepts elicited situated simulations in the same way 
concrete concepts did. Using a new paradigm, that they called “match-mismatch” task, the 
authors asked in an fMRI experiment participants to deeply think to the meaning of four 
concepts (i.e. convince, arithmetic, rolling and red) and to judge if the word applied to the 
situation depicted in the following scene. Among the four concepts the authors chose, they 
included convince and arithmetic as abstract concepts, predicting that they would have 
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elicited specific patterns of activation: precisely, convince was thought to be associated 
with brain regions connected with mental state inferences, social cognition and affective 
processing, while the representation of arithmetic would have been supported by brain 
regions related to numerical knowledge. Additionally, in the final part of the experiment, 
participants performed a functional localizer task, aimed at identifying specific regions 
underlying the understanding of all the four concepts. For instance, regarding the two 
abstract concepts, participants were instructed to think about what people in the visual 
scene could be thinking (convince/thought), and to count the number of individual entities 
in the scene (arithmetic/numeric cognition). To summarize their main findings, abstract 
concepts were found to activate distributed patterns in brain areas representing relevant 
non-linguistic content (just as concrete concepts). As the authors pointed out (p. 930) “brain 
regions implicated in mentalizing and social cognition were active when participants 
processed the meaning of convince, whereas brain regions implicated in numerical 
cognition were active when participants processed the meaning of arithmetic”.  
Importantly, no activation for abstract concepts in the left hemisphere language 
areas was observed. Interpreted in the LASS framework, this finding suggests that when 
the task is a deep-processing one, linguistic areas traditionally related to abstract concepts 
are not crucial; rather, abstract concepts activate neural patterns that are linked to their 
semantic meaning (e.g., social interactive for convince), just as concrete concepts do. In 
this sense, abstract and concrete concepts appear to recruit the same “representational” 
system, namely a situated simulation one. The difference between the two classes of 
concepts could be identified in their “content”. Crucially, in this study the authors 
evidenced how even abstract concepts, when studied in isolation and not as a general 
category, engage different systems and activate different patterns of brain areas. This is 
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pivotal in the study of abstract concepts, in that it suggests that different abstract concepts 
have unique semantic content, which is reflected in specific patterns of activation; notably, 
however, these differences are only evident when abstract concepts are studied and 
processed as embedded in a context. This last point leads us to the next proposal, which is 
closely related to the LASS, but specifically addresses the content and the specificity of 
abstract concepts.  
 
2.4.1. Similar but not identical: differences in content of abstract and concrete 
concepts. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the LASS theory proposes that 
abstract and concrete concepts share underlying mechanisms of retrieval and processing, 
namely the activation of situated simulations system and linguistic system, depending on a 
series of factors among which the task being performed and the conditions of processing 
(e.g., in-context vs. isolated). One might therefore ask whether abstract and concrete 
concepts differ at all, hence challenging the classic distinction between abstract and 
concrete domains. In this respect, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) advanced some 
appealing hypotheses. First of all, they contended that both abstract and concrete concepts 
are tied to situations. In line with studies on contextual availability (see par. 1.4.6), the 
authors claimed that meanings are never understood in isolation, but rather in the context 
of interactions with the environment and through the interpretation of relevant situations. 
This is true for abstract concepts−for which is not surprising given their complexity−as well 
as for concrete concepts: in fact, as Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings noted (2005, p. 134) it 
is not sufficient to know the constituent physical parts of the category of HAMMERS in 
order to completely master the category.  
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For instance, knowing that a hammer is constituted by a head and a handle says 
nothing about when the object is suitable for usage, or for what purposes it is needed. 
Indeed, we gain a sufficient amount of knowledge of the category HAMMERS through the 
observation of their usage in relevant settings and situations: in this way, we know that 
hammers are usually employed with nails and panels, and that their purpose is generally to 
fix things. Situational context is even more crucial for abstract concepts. Drawing on the 
semantic analysis proposed by Barsalou (1999) of the concept of TRUE, the authors claim 
that the representation of abstract concepts resorts to complex situational configurations, 
encompassing a variety of agents and mental events. This last caveat introduces the second 
hypothesis proposed by Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, which is also the crucial tenet they 
made on abstract concepts. In their perspective, what differentiates abstract from concrete 
concepts is the type of situations they evoke: concrete concepts are embedded in 
background situations widely related to objects, while abstract concepts are more tied to 
events and introspective states.  
As a consequence, the representation of the two classes of concepts differs 
(Hypothesis 3), in that abstract concepts are more complex, and their representation is 
widely distributed among different situations. Specifically, while for representing the 
concept of HAMMER the focus is spatially circumscribed to its parts and its relevant 
setting of appliance, for the representation of TRUE we must rely on different and not 
bounded situations and events. The last point of the argument concerns the role of 
simulations in abstract meanings representation, which as we already discussed in the frame 
of LASS is thought to be part of the conceptual processing also for abstract entities; in this 
proposal, in addition to the already developed claims regarding conceptual access and 
simulation, the introduction of the introspective dimension is crucial in the explaining of 
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abstract concepts. To sum up, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings do not discard the embodied 
claim on abstract concepts (namely, that abstract concepts are grounded in perceptual and 
sensorimotor states as concrete concepts are), but propose different foci for abstract and 
concrete concepts.  
To test their hypotheses, the authors used a classic property generation task in which 
they analyzed the content of three abstract, three concrete and three intermediate concepts. 
Their results offered support for the hypotheses proposed; overall participants generated a 
large amount of properties related to background situations and contexts. Importantly, a 
significant interaction was found between concept type (abstract, concrete and 
intermediate) and general coding category (what kind of properties was elicited), indicating 
that abstract concepts tended to elicit settings/events and introspective situations (i. e. the 
mental state of someone in a specific situation: affective and emotional aspects as well as 
evaluations or cognitive operations consciously recognized), while concrete concepts 
focused on entities’ properties. In general, findings from Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 
show that the content of concrete concepts is mostly related to locations and entities’ 
properties, while abstract concepts mostly rely on social interactions and introspections 
(such as beliefs), but they are both rooted in situational contexts. Those findings are 
consistent with a similar study by Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005), that extended the 
results just discussed to a larger set of abstract and concrete words. In their study, Wiemer-
Hastings and Xu not only asked participants to produce properties for 36 items with six 
different levels of abstraction, but they also asked them to mention contexts in which the 
items usually appear, and situations related to the specific item. In line with Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings’ findings, the authors reported that for abstract concepts less intrinsic 
properties and more subjective or relational features were generated with respect to 
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concrete concepts. Crucially however, as the authors stressed, those differences were 
qualitative and not quantitative: both abstract and concrete concepts, in fact, elicited a high 
proportion of situational contents, but they differed in terms of semantic associations they 
elicited.   
 
2.5. On the Path of Dis-embodiment and Back. Dove’s Proposals 
 
Up to this moment, we focused on proposals of abstract knowledge explicitly or 
implicitly rejecting an a-modal conception of cognitive processes, in line with the tradition 
of embodied and grounded cognition theories. In fact, the revolution constituted by 
grounded accounts of cognition made a clear statement regarding symbolic and a-modal 
theories of meaning: concepts are multimodal representations tied to perceptual and 
motoric processes, and thus they cannot be a-modal. But if there was something that could 
undermine such an open claim−supported by a tantalizing body of evidence−this was 
precisely the nature of abstract concepts. Given the problems that abstract concepts posit 
with respect to multimodal and simulation-based theory of cognition, some scholars started 
to reconsider the possibility that some forms of a-modal knowledge might be implied in the 
acquisition and processing of abstract concepts.  
Specifically, in a seminal essay Dove (2009) argued for what he called 
“representational pluralism”. After reviewing much of the evidence that spoke in favor of 
simulation-based conception of knowledge, he argued that proponents of perceptual 
symbols (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) have failed to demonstrate what benefits multimodality 
confers to the representation of abstract concepts. The standard argument on which his 
critique relies on concerns the fact that most of the strength of EG accounts came from 
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studies involving highly imageable and concrete concepts. Therefore, Dove claimed that 
some abstract concepts employ a-modal representations. The heart of Dove’s initial 
proposal is that concepts are couched in two different types of representations, namely 
modal and a-modal (roughly correspondent to perceptual and non-perceptual). While he is 
clear on this point, he also points out that his proposal is compatible with both Fodorian-
mentalese stances and perspectives more focused on distributed neural networks (p. 413).  
To unravel what Dove meant when he revived the notion of a-modal 
representations, that have been EG researchers’ mare for a long time, Dove (2011) appeals 
to a central topic of both this dissertation and the debate in cognitive science, namely 
language. In this essay, Dove partly revised his initial thesis, and defines language as a 
“representational system” that enhances our cognitive abilities by furnishing a context-free 
and arbitrary system. Importantly, this symbol system is independent from other embodied 
systems (i.e. perceptual, sensorimotor, simulations) but it interacts with them.  
An important caveat that Dove made in this argumentation is worth noting. 
Linguistic competence, as sketched out by Dove, is intended as the acquired sensorimotor 
skill of simulating linguistic experiences. These simulations are not dependent on a-modal 
symbol systems but are contained in a system apt at generating perceptual symbols. One 
might therefore ask, where are a-modal symbols hidden in this perspective? In Dove’s 
formulation, language itself is an internalized a-modal symbol system, resting on an 
embodied substrate. Natural language is, in this perspective, a form of “dis-embodied” 
cognition5. In Dove’s words (2011) a mental symbol is “dis-embodied” if (a) it is embodied 
                                                     
5 The term “dis-embodied” is here employed differently from other forms of disembodied cognition, in that 
it still emphasizes a dependency from the embodied and sensory-motor systems. Nonetheless, Dove is not 
alone in suggesting a critical detachment from the embodied tradition. Mahon and Caramazza (2008), for 
example, claimed that the evidence in support of EG theories of cognition does not unequivocally exclude 
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but (b) this embodiment is arbitrarily related to its semantic content. In this sense, abstract 
concepts can be explained by considering them as “dis-embodied” symbols, in that they 
require some forms of ungrounded knowledge that can be provided by linguistic 
competence. The role of language in this account is therefore twofold: first, it engages 
sensorimotor simulations (much in the same vein of LASS framework), and second it elicits 
and prompts symbolically mediated associations such as words, phrases and sentences. 
Dove’s proposal is certainly appealing, for at least two reasons: first, he acknowledges the 
importance of language not as a mere communicative vehicle but rather as an embodied 
system that extends our cognitive abilities. Second, even though by the means of a-modal 
symbols, he successfully threatened the parsimony6 argument, therefore opening the way 
for “Multiple Representations” perspectives on conceptual knowledge.  
To conclude this schematic sum of Dove’s perspective, I think one point he made 
more recently deserves attention. The idea that language is not simply a communicative 
tool, resonates with the proposal I am going to present in the next paragraph (the WAT 
theory), although with some important differences. Hence, it needs to be examined a little 
                                                     
forms of disembodied cognition. In their presentation of the Grounding by Interaction Hypothesis, they 
argued that “there is a level of conceptual representation that is ‘abstract’ and ‘symbolic’ and which is not 
exhausted by information that is represented in the sensory and motor systems” (p. 68). In this perspective, 
knowledge of the things in the world would emerge from the interaction between the symbolic level and 
sensory-motor systems. Abstract concepts would be particularly representative of this tenet, because no 
significant motor or sensory feature correlates with their instantiations. In a successive essay (Leshinskaya & 
Caramazza, 2016), non-sensory motor concepts (i.e. abstract concepts) are said to be localized in multiple 
content-selective brain partitions sharing participation in computations for common goals, and therefore the 
brain region activated would depend on the kind of concept included in the stimuli. Crucially, those brain 
regions are considered as non-sensorimotor regions.  
6 The parsimony argument can be intended as a reformulation of the Occam’s razor principle; if interpreted 
in the frame of the debate on conceptual knowledge, as Dove (2009; p. 416) pointed out, there has been a 
tendency in preferring one explanation (i.e. perceptual representations) over a combination of two possible 
explanations (i.e. perceptual and a-modal representations). While I am not favoring the a-modal stance taken 
by Dove in this essay, I believe in line with Dove’s suggestions that positing only one level of explanation as 
constitutive of conceptual knowledge is somehow reductive. After all, in Dove’s words (p. 417) “parsimony 
considerations come into play primarily when other things are equal”, and I will discuss in the following 
sections of this dissertation how and why we do not need to posit equality for abstract and concrete concepts.   
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bit more in depth. In a recent paper (Dove, 2018) Dove has emphasized how extant accounts 
of conceptual knowledge treated language either as just another experiential source of 
information−hence denying its specificity of conveying structural properties−or offering a 
conception of language which employs a-modal symbols⎯hence an intrinsically 
incompatible conception with EGC accounts. What Dove proposes is instead to reconsider 
the role of language as an extrinsic symbolic system, that augments our cognitive abilities. 
In this perspective, language is considered as having all the properties traditionally ascribed 
to a-modal symbol systems, namely computational and combinatorial features, but it serves 
embodied agents in that it scaffolds grounded conceptual knowledge. Specifically, 
language is here intended as a neuroenhancement tool, that by the mean of its structural 
properties creates a new set of perceptual objects and targets for action. As a cognitive tool, 
the role of language is said to be flexible, context-sensitive and experience-dependent. 
Importantly, in this light, language is central for concrete concepts but is crucial for abstract 
concepts. In line with compelling evidence showing how abstract concepts are represented 
differently from concrete ones in the brain, Dove (in press) advocates for a conception of 
language as a symbolic medium grounded in sensorimotor systems. This specificity of 
language partly explains the differences that neuroimaging studies report in the realization 
of abstract and concrete concepts: the activity of linguistic system in this sense would be 
crucial for abstract and not for concrete concepts. Language is therefore considered as a 
pivotal component of our conceptual system.  
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2.6. Words are social Tools. The Importance of Language as Embodied Experience  
 
In Dove’s first formulation, linguistic competence is considered to be a form of 
“ungrounded” knowledge, supporting the processing and representation of abstract 
concepts. The LASS proposal, instead, holds that the linguistic system acts as a pointer to 
deep semantic and conceptual knowledge constituted by simulations. Others have claimed 
that language can serve as a shortcut to the embodied relations in the world, without being 
necessarily embodied itself (Louwerse, 2008, 2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). While 
those proposals have a great explanatory potential, they partly overlooked at one crucial 
characteristic of language, namely its intrinsic social component.  
To put it roughly, and quite incontrovertibly, language is a symbolic system. Words 
are symbols, in a Peircean sense, in that they stand for their referents in the world engaging 
with them in a conventional relationship (Short, 2007). Furthermore, language is a system 
in the most trivial sense, because it is organized around a set of rules, and those criteria 
need to be met in order for an agent to interpret the message. But both the notion of symbols 
and that of system are insufficient to describe the essence of language specificity. Language 
has a normative character, i.e. it rests upon some norms that need to be respected for a 
linguistic event to be realized: if I want to refer to the bird outside my window, I will utter 
the word “bird” and not “fish”, because “bird” is precisely the word that is used to describe 
the entity I am referring to. If I want to tell my mom that I ate a soup, I need to use the past 
tense and not the present continuous, or my mom won’t understand that I already ate the 
soup. Crucially, the symbolic and systematic nature of language, and its normativity are all 
features shared by the community of speakers. These characteristics could are all 
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constitutive of language, along with another central feature, namely its being a social 
practice.  
Without speakers interpreting linguistic messages, language would make no sense 
at all. Consider the following example: as cognitive scientists we frequently use 
programming languages, such as R (R Core Team, 2018), which allow us to compute 
statistical analyses and to graphically represent our outcomes. R is defined as an 
“environment” that can be easily implemented by users around the world through the 
addition of updated packages. It is organized around a computer language as a coherent 
system, so it has its own set of rules. Elementary commands are either expressions or 
assignments, and the entities R creates and manipulates are referred to as objects; they can 
be variables, arrays of numbers, character strings and functions. R has its own syntax, that 
should be respected in order to be “understood” by the software. For instance, if I want to 
create the most basic data structure, composed by a list of values such as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 I will 
use the simplest function “stating an assignment”, which is c (), in the following way: >x 
<- c (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). This is one of the basic functions of R, and as it is clear from the line, 
the label I assigned to the “vector”, i.e. “x”, comes first; then R needs to know what I want 
to create (what manipulation should be done), and ultimately the “object” of the 
manipulation (in this case my list of numbers). Of course, this is the lower level of 
programming, but complex statistical operations are carried in R through specific functions, 
assigning values and setting relevant parameters.  
The point of this example is that although R is an environment, and has its own 
syntax and rules, it needs to be interpreted from an agent in order to be useful. Remember 
Harnad’s Symbol Grounding Problem (Harnad, 1990)? Besides perceptual and experiential 
grounding, which in EG perspectives is crucial in the understanding of language, in cases 
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such as R language symbols need to be grounded in social practices (specifically, in this 
case they relate to scientific purposes). Even though the output of my analysis maintains its 
formal sense, being it correct and in turn interpretable and manipulable by the software, 
what really counts is that I will be using the set of numbers and values for my hypothesis 
to be tested. In a software like R, a specific syntax and specific symbols are tools that allow 
us to perform complex operations such as mathematical and statistical ones. In addition, 
they augment our cognitive processes, adding layers to our knowledge. Natural language is 
somehow similar, in that it rests upon a series of rules that would be useless without a social 
community using them. The famous Chomsky sentence “Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously”, for example, has been taken as an example of how, even when we cannot ground 
meanings in experiential and perceptual world, we still grasp the sense of the sentence. 
Shallice and Cooper (2013), for instance, proposed a parallelism between the recursive 
character of language and the possible computational system involved in the representation 
of abstract concepts. But are recursive patterns and role-fulfilling properties sufficient for 
describing language and abstract concepts? As the example of R’s language portrayed, 
these two features are not enough, neither for a computer-based language. A possible 
explanation is that natural language is social both in a teleological and in a constitutive 
sense. It is social in its scopes, because we use language to communicate with people, 
expressing needs, feelings and so on. Moreover, it also has a social constitutive part, 
because it is created by a community of speakers and it evolves along with the community’s 
demands–think for example of all the neologisms emerged from the human interaction with 
technology, e.g. social networks.  
Borghi and Cimatti (2009), for example, claimed that an exhaustive theory of 
language should incorporate not only the individual grounded experience, but also the 
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collective human embodied experience of being coupled with and embedded in a social 
context. The objection they moved to theories strictly based on the mirror neurons system 
relies on the acknowledgement of language as a “normative thing”. Specifically, they 
argued, while in a healthy brain mirror neurons are always thought to be activated by 
specific situations (e.g., the observer and the actor engaging in some form of relation), in a 
normative context there is not such a logical relation. Language constitutes such a context, 
in which it can be used only following some rules, that can also be violated. While in the 
first case there is no exception to the rules of neurological resonance (again, positing that 
the brains are healthy), in the case of language violations happen very often. This is also 
due to the fact that mirror neurons responses are automatic processes, while language is a 
conscious event. Therefore, the authors claimed that thorough embodied theory of language 
should account for: (a) an embodied theory of human individual experience; (b) an 
embodied theory of collective human experience intertwined with mirror neuron system; 
(c) an embodied theory of language as a social fact, and (d) a theory explaining how the 
very fact that language is a social practice affects individual cognition. 
The last point is particularly important, according to Borghi and Cimatti, to provide 
a compelling embodied explanation of abstract words meanings. Their claim is that, while 
for concrete words the individual grounding is more relevant, for abstract meaning the 
interaction with a more collective form of grounding would be crucial. The authors 
endorsed an embodied and grounded perspective on conceptual knowledge, but their tenets 
somehow extended traditional EG accounts by considering the importance of social 
practices. They claimed that abstract meaning is embodied, such as concrete meaning is, 
but it is embodied in the sense of a particular bodily experience mediated by linguistic 
social tools that are words or gestures. 
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The discussion above constitutes the initial formulation of what is referred to as 
WAT (Words As social Tools) theory. The proposal evolved over time, but a clear 
formulation can be found in Borghi and Binkofski’s (2014) book (cf. pp. 20-21). Besides 
the first claim (abstract concepts are embodied as concrete concepts are) which I will refer 
to as the “embodied claim”, the second central tenet regards the contribution of language 
in abstract concepts and words representation. Specifically, the authors claim that for 
abstract concepts language is more crucial than for concrete concepts, for at least two 
reasons: first, experiences with abstract concepts vary consistently more than experiences 
with concrete concepts (remember the example of capital sins and dogs in the first 
paragraph). For this reason, language may contribute to keep all those different experiences 
together, thus guaranteeing mental coherence. The second explanation concerns the 
modality of acquisition of abstract and concrete concepts. Since abstract concepts do no 
refer to single and concrete referents as concrete concepts do, we often learn abstract 
concepts via linguistic explanations rather than through direct perceptual experience. In 
support of this second hypothesis, considered as a psycholinguistic variable, Modality of 
Acquisition (MOA) has been found to be negatively correlated with traditionally employed 
variables such as Imageabililty (-.64) and Concreteness (-.47) in a study by Wauters and 
colleagues (2003). The authors analyzed a set of texts from elementary school, and they 
found that MOA mean ratings, ranging from the lower values representing perceptual 
modality of acquisition to higher values representing linguistic modality of acquisition, 
increased over texts used in successive grades of elementary school. In other words, more 
advanced texts contained a higher proportion of words learned mainly trough linguistic 
explanations (e.g., century) with respect to initial texts. The relation underlying these 
psycholinguistic variables shows that abstractness and MOA might be positively 
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correlated, availing the idea that abstract words are related to linguistic information to a 
greater extent than concrete words.  
The importance of language in the acquisition and processing of abstract concepts 
and words meanings (ACWs) has two main consequences, as sketched out by Borghi and 
Binkofski (2014). On the one hand, the fact that they partly differ in their modality of 
acquisition from concrete concepts might entail that ACWs are processed and represented 
differently in the brain from CCWs (concrete concepts and meanings). By way of 
explanation, while both concrete and abstract concepts are supposed to activate 
sensorimotor brain regions (see the “embodied claim”), abstract concepts should activate 
consistently linguistic areas. On the other hand, given their heavy reliance on language, and 
their intrinsic variability both interpersonally and intra-personally, ACWs may resent more 
of linguistic variability.  
To conclude this introductory presentation of the WAT theory, it is worth going 
back to what the acronym stands for, and present some preliminary considerations. The 
authors advanced the idea that words are social tools, and in line with their suggestions 
they operate socially in two different but related ways. First, acquiring abstract words, as 
partially described before, often requires the presence of others. In the example of Borghi 
and Binkofski (p. 23) the difference that there is between the acquisition of a verb such as 
“to pass” and e.g., “to think” is that in the first case the meaning of the verb can be inferred 
solely by the means of observation, while in the latter this is not the case. Therefore, in the 
interpretation of the authors, the crucial social dimension of ACWs is not constituted by 
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their content, but rather by the mechanisms of acquisition they rely upon7. To sum up, in 
the words of Borghi and Cimatti (2009) 
 
[…] They [words] are social entities, whose value is external to us, as it 
lies in the social set of rules that regulates them. […] Think of a word as a 
tool, for example a hammer. My hand is different from yours, maybe I have 
a prosthesis, but if I want to hammer a nail in the wall I only have to follow 
the same rule: that is, the use of the hammer is the same despite the 
individual differences of our hands. In the very same way a social word does 
standardize the different concepts of our own minds.  
 
2.7. On the need for Multiple Representations Views. Evidence in Support of the 
WAT  
 
Recent perspectives on conceptual knowledge all converge in the idea that concepts 
are grounded in sensorimotor, perceptual systems and in emotional, internal and social 
states; furthermore, there is a growing attention in re-considering symbolic representations 
derived from linguistic experience as bootstrapping mechanisms helping our cognitive 
systems. Those new proposals are often referred to as Hybrid Accounts (Bolognesi & Steen, 
2018), or Multiple Representations Views (Borghi, Barca, Binkofski, & Tummolini, 
2018a), for they aim at acknowledging the relative contribution of both embodied processes 
such as perception and action, and other mechanisms that might be relevant for human 
conceptual processing and acquisition. Multiple Representations Views (MRVs), therefore, 
seem particularly suitable for explaining abstract concepts: they do not posit a single 
                                                     
7 Note that Borghi and Binkofski specify that the socially mediated way of acquiring abstract concepts is not 
limited to direct social interactions with people. Rather, this mechanism is extendible to all of the 
technological supports we might employ when unsure of the definitions of some words (e.g. books, Internet 
etc.). I will elaborate on this stance later on in this dissertation, with a particular attention to specific forms of 
social cognition. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that in the WAT proposal social phenomena such as 
asking to experts when insecure about the meaning of words are crucial features of abstract words acquisition, 
and may have an impact in their subsequent processing (see also Prinz, 2002, 2012).  
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underlying mechanism for all concepts, and can benefit from the empirical support coming 
from both simulation-based research and e.g., distributional approaches to language 
comprehension. Among those proposals, in the following of this dissertation I will 
specifically endorse the WAT theory. To this aim, I will present the central tenets of the 
theory, as recently developed (Borghi, Barca, Binkofski, Castelfranchi, et al., 2018; Borghi, 
Barca, Binkofski, & Tummolini, 2018b) along with empirical evidence supporting the main 
claims of the WAT theory.  
As already pointed out, the proposal heavily relies on embodied and grounded (EG) 
approaches to cognition, hence concepts are generally considered as multimodal 
representations tied to perceptual experience. The novelty of the WAT theory, however, is 
constituted by a precise characterization of abstract concepts, which are described in 
positive terms instead of referring to them just in opposition with concrete concepts. In this 
regard, the four main tenets of the theory concern: (a) the acquisition, (b) the brain 
representation and the consequent entailments of the specificity of abstract concepts from 
a sensorimotor (c) and cross-cultural perspective (d). I will address the (a), (c) and (d) points 
in turn in the following as they are pivotal in for the argumentation of this dissertation8.  
 
2.7.1. Abstract concepts and the role of social and linguistic experience. 
Consider a trivial example such as the following one: a child, that we will call Martha, is 
presented for the first time with a toy train, and she starts to play with it. After a while, she 
                                                     
8 I will not discuss the point (b) concerning the brain representation of abstract concepts in detail. For the 
purposes of this discussion, it suffices to say that evidence coming from fMRI and PET studies converges in 
evidencing a strong activation of language processing network areas in the elaboration of abstract concepts 
with respect to concrete ones. For a review of differential brain representations of abstract and concrete 
concepts see Borghi et al., 2018 (for metanalyses see Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Wang, Conder, 
Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010).  
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might want to know what exactly is the object she is playing with. Her mom says: “It’s a 
train!”. One week later, Martha and her mother are going to visit Martha’s grandmother, 
that lives outside the city. They are in the train station, and Martha is staring at the high-
speed train that will bring them to the small town her grandma lives in. Her mom, seeing 
Martha’s excitement, says: “Look Martha, that’s a train, just as the one you were playing 
with!”. Martha recognizes the object: in fact, although the dimensions and the shape of the 
high-speed train are possibly different from her red toy train, they still are somehow 
perceptually similar. They both have wagons, they travel on railways, and their functions 
are allegedly similar. Therefore, once at grandmother’s home, while watching an old 
western movie Martha identifies the coal train on the tv screen as a train —even though it 
is slightly different both from her toy and from the vehicle that brought her to her grandma’s 
place.  
Now let’s follow Martha during her stay at her grandmother’s house. At dinner, 
Martha is given two pieces of pie, just like her cousin. There is one piece of pie left in the 
plate, and Martha is particularly hungry that night. Thus, without asking for permission she 
grabs the last piece of pie. Her grandmother notices the action, and scolds Martha: “Martha, 
that’s unfair! There is only one piece of pie left and two of you. Why would you eat it 
alone? Share it with your cousin.”. The day after, the whole family is at the zoo. In front of 
the primates section, Martha’s mother seems unusually sad. Suddenly she whispers “I just 
feel bad for these animals. I think it’s unfair that they are locked in cages just for our 
amusement.”. On the way back home, in the car, Martha would like to sit in the front seat, 
but her mother insists she sits in the backseats with her so Martha’s cousin sits in the front 
seat. Martha is upset, and can’t see the reason why her cousin deserved the privileged seat, 
and she screams “That’s unfair!”.  
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In few words, she learnt how to use the label “unfair” by merging together different 
situations, that share some underlying commonalities. She realized that for something to be 
defined as unfair, some inequality needs to be implicated. More importantly, in order to 
correctly apply the label to different situations, the clarifications made both by her 
grandmother and by her mother are crucial: they contribute to define and re-define the range 
of appliance of the label “unfair” in two different ways. On the one hand, they act in a 
“bottom-top” way, by aggregating different instantiations of the concept to be collapsed 
under one label; on the other hand, they serve a “top-bottom” function, in that Martha will 
know from now on that a situation in which there is only one thing left and two agents 
interested becomes unfair if one of the two agents take the object for herself.  
It is clear that both in the case of the train and in the case of “unfairness” linguistic 
inputs play a role. Nonetheless, as illustrated by the examples, in the case of the train the 
role of language can be mainly referential (or indexical), while in the case of “unfairness” 
it plays a constitutive role in shaping the boundaries of the concept itself. This is partly due 
to the fact that often when learning a concrete concept the referent of the concept is 
physically present, while this is not the case for abstract concepts (think for example of a 
concept such as “ethic”). Moreover, typically abstract concepts are more complex than 
concrete ones. Gleitman and colleagues (2005), for instance, referred to abstract words as 
“hard words”. In their perspective, children acquire first concrete concepts, that are “easier” 
words by relating them to things in the world. Subsequently, when they accumulated a 
sufficient amount of easy words, more sophisticated forms of lexical knowledge emerge 
from the interaction between the established knowledge and the linguistic knowledge 
thereby allowing the acquisition of “hard words” (i.e. abstract concepts).  
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The syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis is based on the idea that syntax and sematic 
acquisition are interwoven and that they furnish the child with multiple cues for language 
acquisition. Evidence coming from developmental studies such as the one performed by 
Bergelson & Swingley (2013) shows indeed that the acquisition of abstract and concrete 
words differs both ontogenetically and diachronically. In an eye-tracking study where 
parents and children were shown videos of events, and parents named the events, the 
authors reported a different pattern of results related to both the age of children and the type 
of concepts involved. Specifically, before the age of 10 months children did not show an 
understanding of more abstract concepts (e.g., “kiss”) while they did for more concrete 
items (e.g., “banana”). After the threshold of 10 months, instead, children started to 
recognize more abstract entities.  
Comparing these results with a corpus of video showing parents-infants 
interactions, the authors found that concrete words were frequently produced in 
concomitance with their referents (e.g., “look, a banana!” when a banana was part of the 
scene). On the contrary, abstract words were not frequently corroborated by their referent 
(e.g., say “kiss” when there was no kissing scene). Bergelson and Swingley interpreted 
these results in the same direction of Gleitman and colleagues, claiming that abstract 
vocabulary would emerge later in life, because the connection between the use of those 
words in discourses and their referent is more difficult to establish only by the means of 
observation (as in the case of CCWs). These hypotheses are not entirely new, as Gillette 
and colleagues (1999) already reported that rather than the grammatical difference between 
verbs and nouns, what best predicted the early acquisition of words was instead their being 
imageable and observable. Thus, for example, a verb such as “kiss” was acquired earlier 
compared to a noun like “idea”. As a matter of facts, studies investigating constructs such 
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as Age of Acquisition (AoA) (Barca et al., 2002) and Modality of Acquisition (Wauters et 
al., 2003) of words evidenced that AoA and concreteness are negatively correlated: thus, 
concrete words appear to be learnt earlier than abstract ones. Furthermore, as already 
discussed, MoA and concreteness are also negatively correlated, showing that more abstract 
terms are mainly acquired via linguistic explanations (note that MoA and AoA are 
positively correlated, although the two measures do not overlap) (see Borghi et al., 2018 
for a review).  
Crucially, the role of linguistic inputs in the acquisition and consolidation of 
abstract concepts is not limited to early infancy. In two studies mimicking the acquisition 
of novel words (abstract and concrete) in a sample of adult participants Borghi and 
colleagues (Borghi, Flumini, Cimatti, Marocco, & Scorolli, 2011; Granito, Scorolli, & 
Borghi, 2015) presented participants either with novel objects to be manipulated or with 
groups of interacting objects. First they were required to form categories, and then they 
were taught the nouns referring to the novel category. Results showed that when performing 
a subsequent property verification task on both categories, responses with the mouth (using 
a microphone) were comparatively faster with abstract than with concrete words, while 
responses with the hand were facilitated more with concrete than with abstract words 
(Borghi et al. 2011). In a second study, participants who were taught the novel noun earlier 
were facilitated in mouth responses, confirming an association between acquisition of the 
linguistic label and engagement of the mouth motor system (Granito et al., 2015). Overall, 
participants who were significantly more affected by the linguistic training were the ones 
that initially performed worse with abstract concepts, thus supporting the centrality of 
linguistic information in consolidating them.  
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Recently, Borghi and colleagues proposed two possible explanations to frame their 
hypotheses and the evidence supporting them. In their view, the formation of abstract 
concepts relies on two previously established abilities: on the one hand, the capacity to 
construct flexible categories as in the case of ad hoc categories (Barsalou, 1982; 1985; see 
Chapter 1). In this perspective, collecting under the same label heterogeneous referents as 
in the case of abstract meaning would provide conceptual coherence even in the absence of 
perceptual similarity—as in the case of concrete concepts. The second explanation refers 
to the mastering of social abilities such as joint attention and joint actions, that might be 
crucial especially in the first years of life to co-construct conceptual knowledge.  
 
2.7.2. Abstract concepts and the engagement of mouth-effector. As emerged in 
the previous paragraph, abstract concepts and meanings tend to be acquired mainly via 
linguistic inputs. Ratings provided by adults confirmed this prediction, showing that 
abstract concepts are generally associated with the mouth effector, while concrete concepts 
usually are related to the hand or other effectors eliciting action patterns. Ghio and 
colleagues (2013), for example, asked 96 participants to rate a set of more than 200 
sentences across several categories covering an hypothetical continuum of abstractness. 
Crucially, in the “concrete” component were included ratings for hand/leg and mouth 
relations, while in the more “abstract” component ratings were collected for relations with 
emotions, mental-states and mathematics. In a second rating study with the same stimuli, 
evaluations were also collected for typical psycholinguistic dimensions such as 
concreteness, contextual availability and familiarity. Results showed that abstract sentences 
with different semantic components (e.g., mental states, emotions and mathematics 
sentences) were judged as differentially involving body parts. Specifically, mental states 
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meanings (e.g., “she discerns the opinion”; “she determines the fate”; “she pretend an 
interest”) were significantly associated with the mouth-effector, while emotion-related 
sentences resulted to involve leg, mouth and hand to the same extent. Mathematical 
sentences were in turn judged as associated primarily with hand, in line with the hypotheses 
of EGC and mathematical competence. In keeping with EG perspectives on numerical 
competence, in fact, the habit of finger counting–which has a pivotal role in numbers 
acquisition–is understood as the embodied scaffold allowing for higher forms of 
abstraction, such as number processing. A growing number of studies confirms this 
association (Fischer & Brugger, 2011; Fischer, Kaufmann, & Domahs, 2012; Tschentscher, 
Hauk, Fischer, & Pulvermüller, 2012; Wood & Fischer, 2008); in this sense, the study from 
Ghio and colleagues makes no exception, demonstrating that not only this association is 
embodied because it is re-enacted automatically in behavioral tasks, but participants also 
considered mathematical concepts as more related to the hand effector.  
A similar pattern of results, stressing the composite nature of the category of 
abstract concepts, is reported in a recent study by Villani et al. (2019). In an extended rating 
study in which more than 300 Italian participants rated a set of 425 abstract nouns, the 
authors included 15 dimensions to be evaluated. Besides traditional psycholinguistic 
parameters such as concreteness, abstractness, imageability, contextual availability, 
modality of acquisition and age of acquisition, ACs were subjected to ratings concerning 
dimensions as engagement with the five sensorial modality (smell, touch, vision, taste and 
hearing) along with direct relation with both mouth and hand. Moreover, the authors 
investigated also distinctive components of abstract concepts grounding through the 
addition of social metacognition, interoception and social valence.  
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Correlations among the included variables showed that abstractness positively 
correlated with social metacognition (r=.5), modality of acquisition and metacognition 
(r=.4), confirming the (a) tenet of the WAT proposal (i.e. abstract concepts strongly rely 
on sociality and linguistic inputs). Quite compellingly, in addition abstractness was found 
to be positively correlated with mouth-effector (r=.14), while concreteness held a negative 
correlation with the mouth (r=-.14) but a positive correlation with the hand-effector (r=.29). 
This pattern of results is in line with the assumption that abstract concepts elicit mouth-
related areas, as advanced in the (c) point of the WAT theory. It is also worth noting that 
in the subsequent Principal Component Analysis depicting the relations between and within 
each component, the dimensions reduction resulted in three main factors. Among these 
factors, the authors identified as “Inner-grounding and social” a factor including 
metacognition, social valence, interoception, emotion, and importantly, mouth-effector. In 
sum, people seem to perceive abstract concepts and meanings as more related to the mouth 
effector than hands, legs or other action-related body parts, even though those 
“sensorimotor” factors appear as less relevant in relation to abstractness than e.g., the factor 
“social metacognition”. 
Neuropsychological evidence encompassing fMRI and TMS studies further 
confirmed the primary involvement of linguistic related areas and specifically mouth-motor 
areas in the processing of abstract meanings. Sakreida and colleagues (2013) for instance, 
conducted an fMRI study in which concrete vs abstract multi-word expressions were 
compared, and besides a general activation of the sensorimotor neural network (i.e. left 
lateral precentral gyrus and medial premotor cortex) elicited by both abstract and concrete 
expressions comprehension, abstract sentences appeared to be represented by the activation 
of the anterior part of left middle temporal gyrus (an area considered as part of the language 
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processing system). While specific patterns of mouth areas activations were already found 
for abstract emotional words (Dreyer et al., 2015; Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr, & 
Pulvermüller, 2012), recently Dreyer and Pulvermüller (2018) extended and refined 
previous findings showing sensorimotor activations–and specifically face and mouth areas 
motor regions activation–for abstract meanings of mental abstract words. In a passive 
reading task performed while scanning hemodynamic activity within the motor system, the 
authors found that mental abstract words such as “logic” (generally considered as more 
abstract than abstract emotional words such as “fear”, and therefore potentially less 
grounded in sensorimotor states) elicited relatively stronger activation in face motor areas, 
while emotion abstract words activated different foci of motor areas (e.g., hand, leg, mouth) 
to the same extent.  
The involvement of orofacial motor areas, and specifically the activation of mouth 
effector is also reflected in results coming from behavioral studies. The already mentioned 
study by Borghi and colleagues (2011) revealed a facilitation of responses given with the 
microphone (thus directly engaging the mouth effector) for abstract artificial concepts with 
respect to concrete ones, which in turn were responded to faster with the keyboard. 
Likewise, in a word-definition matching task, Borghi and Zarcone (2016) presented 
participants with either concrete or abstract word-definitions pairs and asked participants 
to respond in the first block with a key on a keyboard and in the second with a device to be 
pressed with teeth. Importantly, both target words and definitions could be either abstract 
or concrete (e.g., scientific or general knowledge definitions such as “Element formed at 
zero degrees and in the solid state” vs. perceptually connotated definitions as “It shapes 
icebergs and can be found in cubes or cocktails” for the concrete term “ice”; “A soldier 
executing the orders accomplishes it” vs “moral law imposing the execution of moral or 
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legal obligations” for the abstract term “duty”). The analysis of RTs showed that overall, 
responses given with the hand were always faster than those given with the mouth effector 
(possibly also due to the fact that the mouth device was more difficult to press than the key 
on the keyboard), but this advantage disappeared in the processing of abstract words. Note 
that, in line with Ghio et al. (2013), Borghi and Zarcone also performed a rating study on 
the set of words used in the experiment, asking an independent sample of participants 
whether the words they presented were more related to the mouth effector or to the hand. 
Their results are in trend with other rating studies on abstract concepts, showing a strong 
mouth-association for abstract words (D=2.2) and a strong hand-association for concrete 
words (D=2.1). 
This brief review of the extant literature regarding the importance of mouth 
activation during ACWs processing suggests that, as noted elsewhere (cf. Dreyer et al., 
2015), the intertwinement between sensorimotor patterns and the representation of abstract 
concepts is not merely epiphenomenal. One can thus wonder whether the forced stillness 
of mouth in early stages of linguistic development could have a subsequent impact on 
abstract conceptual knowledge.  
To this extent, in two different studies, Barca, Mazzuca and Borghi (2017a, b) 
investigated the effects of the prolonged use of an oral device such as the pacifier on 
children’s abstract conceptual and linguistic competence. In the first study (Barca, 
Mazzuca, & Borghi, 2017a), focused on the possible interference of the pacifier on the 
acquisition and consolidation in memory of abstract words. 7-years old children were asked 
to provide definitions of abstract, emotional and concrete words. Crucially, the sample of 
children had different history of pacifier use, ranging from children who never used the 
device to children who used it up to the age of 3 years or more. Responses were collected 
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and coded for accuracy and thematic associations the words elicited. Overall, children were 
accurate in their definitions, but abstract concepts resulted to be more difficult to define 
than both concrete and emotional concepts (confirming the need of distinguishing the two 
conceptual categories, see par. 2.3.1) with no distinctions in terms of pacifier use.  
Nonetheless, the pattern of conceptual relations primed by the three kinds of words 
differed as a function of pacifier use. In fact, children who overused the pacifier (up to three 
years or more) differentiated less markedly both abstract from concrete concepts as well as 
concrete from emotional ones. Interestingly, this subsample of children was also the one 
producing less “free-associations”, i.e. quite distinctive conceptual relations of abstract 
words compared to concrete and emotional ones (percentage of free associations: abstract= 
8.59; concrete= 5.43; emotional= 5.54). Therefore, even though the overuse of the pacifier 
preventing mouth-muscles activation and mimicry during language acquisition did not 
impact the accuracy of responses, these findings indicate that the overuse of the device 
could affect negatively abstract conceptual mastering. First of all, the associations elicited 
by concrete and abstract concepts in children with a long history of pacifier use are less 
differentiated than the other groups of children. Second, the supposed effect of the 
impairment caused by the forced inhibition of facial areas related to language acquisition 
and processing has a long-term impact, considered that the sample of children tested in the 
study were 7-years old–therefore they allegedly withdrew the pacifier at least two years 
before the administration of the test. 
Further support for these results came from a second study (Barca, Mazzuca, & 
Borghi, 2020) in which 8-years old children were asked to perform a semantic 
categorization task. Children were required to discern animal words from non-animal 
words presented on a computer screen by pressing a key on a keyboard. Target trials were 
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constituted by non-animal words, that were in proportion abstract, concrete and emotional 
words. In line with the previous study, information concerning the use of pacifier was 
collected through questionnaires distributed to parents in a precedent phase of the study. In 
this respect, the same four groups of children were distinguished on the basis of the use of 
pacifier (never; less than two years; two-three years and three years or more). The analysis 
of speed of responses revealed a significant interaction between the factors Concept Type 
(abstract, concrete and emotional) and Pacifier Use (four groups of interest, inserted as a 
continuous variable). The trend of the interaction shows that children who overused the 
pacifier (up to three years or more) were comparatively slower in responses to abstract 
words than the other three groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Raincloud plots displaying response times for groups of pacifier (A) and type of concept (B) in 
Barca et al., 2020. 
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The plot (panel A) shows that children who used the pacifier for longer (i.e., three 
years of age and more) tend to be slower in providing their correct responses. Panel B 
represents response time for three types of concepts. Emotional words were responded to 
shorter (1425ms ±518 sd) than both abstract (1496ms ±541 sd) and concrete words 
(1529ms ±535 sd). The interaction resulted from the LMM model is displayed in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Plot of the interaction effect of the Linear Mixed Model on Response time in Barca et al., 2020.  
 
The plot shows that the response time increases as a function of the increasing 
number of months of pacifier use. This trend holds for the three types of concepts, but is 
more marked in the case of the abstract ones. The slope (i.e. the proportional relation 
between the type of concept and the months of pacifier use), is greater for abstract concepts, 
while the difference is reduced for the other two kinds of concepts. A progressive slowing 
is observed also for emotional concept, but the slope of the predictive values suggests that 
overusing the pacifier is more harmful for abstract concepts than for emotional ones. 
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Response times for concrete concepts are the least influenced by the time of pacifier use, 
as indicated by their flat slope. Note that emotional words were processed faster than 
concrete ones by all four groups of children, clearly suggesting different patterns of 
elaboration for abstract, concrete and emotional words.  
To summarize, the studies on the relation between pacifier use and abstract 
conceptual knowledge provided additional evidence supporting the WAT claim on the 
centrality of linguistic information–and the related re-enactment of mouth effector–in 
abstract words acquisition and processing. Indeed, children who were overexposed to the 
use of pacifier (thus inhibiting the potential phono-articulatory re-enactment of words 
during acquisition processes) produced less associations related to the social context, to 
their experience and less free-associations than children who used the device to a minor 
extent. Additionally, they yielded longer RTs in the processing of abstract words.  
 
2.7.3. Abstract concepts and linguistic relativity. According to the WAT 
proposal, abstract concepts are mainly acquired via linguistic and social experience (see 
par. 2.7.1), and this linguistically and socially mediated modality of acquisition affects 
subsequent sensorimotor patterns of activation during the elaboration of AWs (see par. 
2.7.2). This being said, the last point of the WAT theory (d), contends that ACWs are more 
influenced by the linguistic variability than concrete ones (Borghi, in press). To dig deeper 
into the last tenet of the WAT proposal, I will briefly review some of the evidence that 
supports this claim.  
Ever since the work of Whorf and Sapir weaved in academic and public debates 
(Sapir, 1929; Whorf, 1956), suggesting the idea that language shapes thought, it has 
inspired a constant and passionate interest for the so-called “linguistic relativity 
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hypothesis”. The claim that our conceptual structure is constrained by the language we 
speak, which is by the way a radical form of linguistic relativity (i.e. linguistic determinism) 
has been subjected to criticisms coming from both linguists and psychologist. As a matter 
of facts, some scholars (Pinker, 1994; Pullum, 1991) contended that the theory of linguistic 
relativity is “all wrong” (Pinker, 1994, p. 57). Nonetheless, the debate concerning the 
Whorfian hypothesis (Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996) is 
still raising interesting questions, that scholars are trying to answer from different 
perspectives. If on the one hand the idea according to which language and thought stand in 
a one-to-one relation seems to be a rather strong commitment (Malt & Wolff, 2010), there 
is nonetheless a growing body of evidence describing how different languages encode 
elements of experience differently—as well as there are some similarities that cannot be 
underestimated (Malt & Majid, 2013). Nowadays, besides fierce critics to the Neo-
Whorfianism, the central question is not whether language affects thought but rather when 
and how the effect of language on thought is effective.  
Cross-linguistic studies investigating differences and similarities across languages 
have extensively demonstrated that languages vary dramatically in how they map words 
with the world. As noted by Malt and Majid (2013), those difference are not just a matter 
of how fine-grained are the distinctions a language makes, such in the alleged case of the 
Eskimos (Pullum, 1991). Instead, several conceptual domains vary qualitatively across 
languages, with some features being expressed more saliently than others. This observation 
brings forth a legitimate question: are our concepts built as a function of the language we 
speak? Among the conceptual domains explored by scholars over the last decades, some 
provided interesting insights on this question. A famous example of how differently 
languages encodes perceptual relation is constituted by the domain of space (Majid, 
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Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004), and specifically on the variety of frames of 
reference (Brown & Levinson, 1993) that different languages employ to describe spatial 
relations. The three main frames of reference (FoR) identified by linguists (i.e. relative: 
positioning objects according to the viewer-centered perspective, based on body axes; 
intrinsic: positioning objects in the space referring to object-centered location or 
environment features; absolute: locating the object according to pre-given coordinates such 
as cardinal directions), are used differently across languages, showing that spatial encoding 
does not follow a universal pattern (Pederson et al., 1998). For example, the description of 
the position of small-scale objects on a ‘table-top space’ can assume various forms, 
depending on the language spoken. The driving distinction pertains the scheme used to 
describe the relation between the object (i.e. the thing to be positioned) and the landmark 
(or the ground object). Majid and colleagues (2004) reported that while in languages like 
English, Dutch, and Japanese the relative FoR is most commonly employed for such 
descriptions (e.g., one would say that “the cup is to the left of the pen”), relegating the 
absolute FoR to big-scale geographical distinctions, other languages rely on intrinsic or 
absolute FoR. Arrernte speakers (Australia), for instance, would use cardinal directions (i.e. 
absolute FoR) for describing such relation, saying something like “the cup is to the north 
of the pen”. Finally, some languages like Mopan (Belize) do not make any use of either 
cardinal or relative landmarks, describing spatial relations through an intrinsic FoR (e.g., 
“the cup is at the nose of the pen”).  
Likewise, variations in the encoding of spatial categories has been extensively 
documented. The famous work by Bowerman and Choi (2000) described how in Korean 
the spatial semantic categories are not containment and support (as represented by the 
English prepositions in and on), but rather ‘fitting’, either tightly (kkita) or loosely (netha). 
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Events categorization has also been found to be affected by linguistic structures encoding 
it, as demonstrated by studies on motion verbs (Slobin, 1996) and on terms for actions such 
as cutting and breaking (Majid, Boster, & Bowerman, 2008). The conceptual domain of 
time has already been partly discussed in the course of this dissertation (see par. 2.2.1), but 
given the impact its study had for the renaissance of a weaker form of Whorfianism in 
cognitive science, it is worth mentioning some seminal findings concerning time framing 
across languages and cultures. To illustrate, research from Boroditsky and colleagues 
(Boroditsky, 2001; Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & McCormick, 2011), drawing on the implicit 
assumption of CMT regarding the overlapping between linguistic expressions and 
concepts, compared English and Chinese Mandarin time expressions. They observed that 
while in English the widespread metaphor of time is a horizontal line (e.g., ‘moving the 
meeting forward’), Chinese Mandarin speakers systematically use a vertical line as a 
metaphor for describing time. Thus, morphemes corresponding to the English expressions 
“up” and “down” are used to talk about the order of events in a time window (e.g., “shàng 
ge yuè”: is the expression used to refer to the previous month, where “shàng” is “up”; “xià 
ge yuè” on the other hand is referred to the next or following month, where “xià” is up).  
Henceforth, in order to test if these linguistic differences impact temporal concepts 
also at a behavioral level, Boroditsky et al. (2011) implemented an experimental paradigm 
based on RTs, in which a sample of English-speaking and Mandarin-speaking participants 
were presented with pictures of people at an early and later stage of life (e.g., a young 
Woody Allen and an old Woody Allen). They were required to indicate whether the picture 
represented ‘earlier’ or ‘later’ versions of the character by pressing two keys on a keyboard. 
Crucially, the spatial arrangement of the keys was counterbalanced within participants, so 
that half of the English-speaking sample responded “horizontally” (‘early-left’ and ‘later-
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right’) and the remaining half “vertically” (‘early-up’ and ‘later-down’), and the same 
applied to the Mandarin-speaking sample. The results showed a “canonicality effect” (i.e. 
there was always an advantage for responses coded as ‘left-early’), which the authors 
explained as a result of the writing direction of both English and Mandarin; importantly, 
however, the analysis of responses times of Mandarin speakers revealed that participants 
were equally fast in responses when ‘early’ was coded as ‘left’ and ‘up’, while this was not 
the case for English speakers.  
As this brief summary indicates, linguistic relativity has been tested on a number of 
conceptual domains, ranging from more perceptual and concrete ones as body parts (Majid, 
2010) and space, to more abstract domains such as odors (Majid & Burenhult, 2014), 
gender (Boroditsky, Schmidt, & Phillips, 2003)9, time and events categorization. However, 
some scholars have been reluctant to completely embrace Neo-Whorfian claims due to 
what Casasanto labeled the “Orwellian” confusion10 (Casasanto, 2008). Specifically, 
Casasanto pointed out that the idea that language and thought are the same thing (the 
“Orwellian” stance) cannot be conflated with the idea that differences among languages 
lead to differences in the thoughts of the speakers of those languages (the Whorfian 
hypothesis). The “Orwellian” claim is what is generally referred to as Radical Whorfianism 
(Reines & Prinz, 2009) which as the label suggest, is probably too radical to be accepted. 
But there are other options available for the Whorfianists, as Reines and Prinz (2009, pp. 
1027-30) evidenced.  
                                                     
9 For an in-depth discussion on grammatical gender assignment across languages and its implications see 
next Chapter.  
10 Casasanto refers to a passage in Pinker’s famous book The Language Instinct (1994), in which Orwell’s 
novel 1984 (Orwell, 1949) is taken as illustrative of linguistic determinism. In the novel, when the 
government strive to render subversive thoughts unintelligible by making them nameless in the new language, 
the overlapping between language and thought is made explicit.  
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First, there is the hypothesis of Habitual Whorfianism, according to which language 
influences our cognitive processes because it prompts habits of thought that drive us to 
think in ways we wouldn’t thought in without language mastering. As Majid (2002) noted, 
compelling evidence coming from research on expertise showed that reiterated cognitive 
activities lead to the construction of skills that augment our capacities to relate with the 
environment (think for example of the difference between an entomologist looking at a bug 
with respect to a lay person: probably that is not just “a bug”.). Hence, in this sense, 
different languages might habituate speakers to different portions of reality, without 
necessarily positing an incommensurability of conceptual knowledge among languages and 
cultures. The second hypothesis, which is slightly different but related to the first one, is 
the Ontological Whorfianism. Precisely, language is here conceived as influencing thought 
because it leads us to organize the experiences and the world into categories that are 
different from those we would have discovered without the use of language. In the words 
of Reines and Prinz (2009): 
 
The role of language is contingent on this scenario (something non-verbal 
could make the group salient), but profound. In leading us to habitually 
group certain particulars together (an effect of Habitual Whorfianism), 
language shapes the categorical boundaries that constitute our subjective 
organization of the world. (p. 1029) 
 
At a careful inspection, the last two proposals are not mutually exclusive. As posited 
by the WAT theory, both abstract and concrete concepts are influenced by linguistic and 
cultural variability. One hypothesis is that the representation of concrete concepts, like ring 
(see Borghi et al., 2018) is modulated by linguistic variability in an “habitual Whorfian” 
fashion: this is also what happens when we are comparing groups with different level of 
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expertise in some conceptual domains. To illustrate, a ring will have generally the same 
perceptual characteristics in Rome and in New Delhi, just like a bug will always be a bug 
whether it is observed by me or by an entomologist. Nonetheless, the aesthetic value of a 
ring might be judged differently by an Italian or an Indian, according to their own aesthetic 
canons, and the entomologist might recognize that the bug is not just a “bug”, but rather a 
member of the Endopterygota sub-class. This is a matter of attention to certain details, that 
might be conveyed by specific cultural and linguistic practices. On the other hand–trying 
to avoid “cocktail parties conversation’s examples” (cf. Malt et al., 2015)–“longing, 
missing or yearning” are not comprehensive and suitable definitions for the well-known 
Portuguese and Brazilian notion of Saudade. This is one of the cases in which possibly, 
without knowing the word for that particular emotional state, we would have not 
conceptualized the set of feeling we were experiencing as something at all. And this is when 
the “Ontological Whorfianism” comes at hand; that is, with respect to abstract concepts 
and words, linguistic and cultural practices exert a more profound impact on our 
categorization processes, if other because language binds together the totality of otherwise 
unrelated experiences constituting some abstract concepts–thus rendering them more 
intelligible and communicable. In framing the issue of linguistic relativity in the context of 
the WAT proposal, Borghi (in press) has recently underlined that one possible explanation 
reconciling different findings in this area might appeal to the level of abstractness of the 
domains considered. Indeed, studies investigating more concrete domains of experience 
such as containment objects (Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999) or action-related 
verbs (Majid et al., 2008) showed that although the number of words used for describing 
both categories consistently varies among languages, the way in which the events of 
containing and cutting/breaking was mentally represented exhibited a high degree of 
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convergence. An intermediate level is occupied instead by those domains that cannot be 
considered as completely abstract or as completely concrete. For instance, some sensory 
modalities have less perceptual strength than others (Lynott, Connell, Brysbaert, Brand, & 
Carney, 2019; Speed & Majid, 2019) that might result in higher level of abstractness. In 
this perspective, the auditory and olfactory senses represent paradigmatic examples: in fact, 
even though they are listed as perceptual modalities, linguistic variability seems to exert a 
consistent impact in these two domains (Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2013; 
Majid & Burenhult, 2014; Majid et al., 2018). On the other hand, words referring to 
domains such as numbers (Brysbaert, 2018), emotions (Goddard, 2010) and time11 
(Boroditsky, 2018) have been extensively scrutinized in order to assess whether language 
drives the categorization of these more “abstract” conceptual relations. Those studies 
suggest that experiential domains such as the ones mentioned above are more subjected to 
linguistic variation resulting in different conceptualizations. Building on those last 
considerations, a further impressive aspect of abstract concepts emerges, namely their intra-
class variability. In fact, as testified also by studies focusing on linguistic and cultural 
relativity, the extent to which language and culture affect the way we carve up reality is 
also a function of the degree of abstractness of the domains taken into account (e.g., action 
related verbs are more concrete than time concepts, but still more abstract than nouns 
referring to containment). In the following paragraph I will delve deeper into this aspect, 
                                                     
11It is interesting to note that even the well-documented mapping of time related concepts into the spatial 
domain (Boroditsky, 2018) cannot be considered a “universal”. For instance, speakers of Yélî Dnye, a 
language spoken in New Guinea that lacks of a calendar system, showed no clear time/space association 
(Levinson & Majid, 2013) when asked to locate temporal sequences in space. In contrast, Dutch speaking 
participants tended to employ the left-to-right mapping in referring to past, present and future.   
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and I will present relevant perspectives that can reconcile the heterogenous amount of 
scientific literature produced over years on abstract concepts. 
 
2.8. (Abstract) Concepts come in Variety 
 
In the previous sections, I focused on proposals within the EG account of cognition 
that endeavored to explain abstract conceptual knowledge. Among those influential 
perspectives I chose to deepen aspects of the WAT proposal because, to the best of my 
knowledge, so far it seems the most reasonable approach to the issue of how to explain 
conceptual knowledge12. Still, abstract concepts are a tricky issue to deal with, when 
considered as a heterogeneous category composed of sub-classes that can be very different 
one from the other. I have already illustrated (see par. 2.3.1) how, for instance, the domain 
of emotional concepts represents a matter of disagreement among scholars. On the one 
hand, it is contended that emotional concepts are part of the category of abstract concepts 
(Kousta et al., 2009; Ponari et al., 2018), while on the other hand they are thought of as a 
distinctive category (Altarriba et al., 1999; Barca et al., 2017; Mazzuca, Barca, & Borghi, 
2017). The argument is fueled by the fact that as might seems obvious, a concept such as 
love is more detached from physical and concrete referents than e.g., a concept like table. 
This characteristic detachment–or in keeping with the WAT theory this high level of 
abstractness–might lead us to think that love is an abstract concept. Nonetheless, love as 
well as fear (to name two of the most common emotional concepts) convey specific 
sensorimotor and physical patterns of activation, and both neuroimaging and behavioral 
                                                     
12Note that the authors have recently developed a Bayesian-inspired generative model accounting for the 
acquisition and grounding of both concrete and abstract concepts (Borghi et al., 2018, pp. 20-21), thus 
partially overcoming traditional critiques generally advanced to EG theories of cognition.  
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studies testified this specificity with respect to both abstract and concrete concepts (see 
among others Moseley et al., 2012; Ghio et al., 2013; Mazzuca et al., 2018).  
A further illustrative example of the variety of abstract concepts is constituted by 
the domain of numerical concepts. In fact, the ability to mentally manipulate numbers has 
been considered for a long time a highly symbolic skill. However, research in the frame of 
EGC showed that numerical cognition is modulated by sensorimotor capacities, which are 
specifically related to the habit of finger counting (Lakoff & Nuñez, 2000) consolidated 
through the modality of acquisition of numerical concepts. Studies addressing the mental 
representation of numerical cognition have evidenced the role of multiple systems involved 
in the mastering of numerical domains: numbers processing was found to be grounded in 
sensorimotor system, and a tight relation with hand movements and spatial cognition 
emerged from empirical investigations (Fischer & Brugger, 2011; Fischer, Castel, Dodd, 
& Pratt, 2003; Fischer et al., 2012; Tschentscher et al., 2012; Wood & Fischer, 2008). 
Therefore, although both emotional and numerical concepts are couched in our 
sensorimotor systems, the extent to which this relation is re-enacted is different between 
the two classes, and their inclusion into the class of purely abstract concepts is at least 
blurred. 
To better tackle the issue of abstract concepts, Multiple Representations Views 
among which the WAT theory (Barsalou, Dutriaux, & Scheepers, 2018; Borghi, Barca, 
Binkofski, & Tummolini, 2018b; Cuccio & Caruana, 2019; Ghio, Vaghi, Perani, & 
Tettamanti, 2016) have proposed that abstract concepts should be studied not as a 
monolithic whole, but rather according to the source of grounding13 of each of their 
                                                     
13 In the whole course of this dissertation I will follow Barsalou’s (2016a) definition of grounding, which 
in his words refers to “establish their [cognitive processes’] relations with the contexts in which they are 
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kinds/sub-types. Just as for concrete concepts a compelling body of knowledge has 
demonstrated that their representation vary depending on specific conceptual 
characteristics (Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Humphreys & Forde, 
2001), the same strategy should be applied to abstract concepts.  
When considered in this perspective, the sharp distinction between purely abstract 
and purely concrete concepts seems to be an artificial oversimplification (Barsalou et al., 
2018): as already pointed out in the frame of this discussion, concepts are abstractions on 
their own, but we can differentiate them on the basis of their higher or lower level of 
abstractness. Nonetheless, as portrayed by the examples of emotional and numerical 
concepts, there is at least another dimension to take into account in the study of concepts, 
namely, their grounding source. The latter factor seems to somehow undermine the well-
established distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, in that (as noted before) 
both the modality of acquisition and the context of usage of concepts elicits subsequent 
simulations, which are constitutive of conceptual knowledge.  
In line with these speculations, some scholars (e.g., Borghi et al., 2018; Barsalou et 
al., 2018) are recently challenging the traditional abstract-concrete dichotomy. At a careful 
inspection, in fact, abstract concepts incorporate aspects traditionally deemed as abstract 
and aspects traditionally considered as concrete. This ambivalence is elegantly illustrated 
by an example taken from an early study by Hampton on abstract concepts (Hampton, 
1981). Think for example of the concept art: its multilayered character is immediately 
explicit, not only because of the semantic ambiguity of the term.  
                                                     
embedded and on which they rely. At more specific levels, grounding refers to establishing specific accounts 
of how cognitive processes in the brain utilize the modalities, the body, and the environment”. (p. 1129); see 
also Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  
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By way of illustration, Hampton asked participants to produce features of some 
abstract concepts, among which art. According to participants’ responses, the concept of 
art included variegated semantic features like “is an artifact”, is usually visually 
experienced, pleasing, arouses emotions, is an object, involves skills or is expensive. 
Looking at this list, it is evident how those conceptual features comprise aspects that are 
neither exclusively abstract nor exclusively concrete: art encompasses features related to 
the visual and perceptual presentation of art works as well as features concerning 
expectations, internal states and intentions.  
A more recent example (Barsalou et al., 2018, p. 4) revisits the classic HAMMER 
example as concrete concept. The authors pointed out that even the most “concrete” 
situations could easily become “abstract” when considered in a perspective integrating 
concepts with situated actions. Following the example, the activity of hammering (typically 
conceived as the movement of hitting a hammer on a nail) usually includes a goal (viz. 
attaching something to somewhere), and could elicit emotions (e.g., accomplishment in 
doing something or fear of breaking something) or even social interactions (e.g., yelling at 
the annoying neighbor that hammers things to the wall in the night).  
Despite the wealth of research addressing the topic of abstract concepts in EG 
inspired approaches, then, some vicarious issues are still at stake. On account of this, some 
promising insights have been recently brought forward by a vast asset of proposals, labelled 
Multiple Representations Views. In a nutshell, three prominent novelties animate the so-
called Multiple Representations Views: first, the idea that the simple distinction between 
abstract and concrete concepts is not scientifically useful in the inquiry of conceptual 
knowledge. Second, that abstract concepts cannot be accounted for by considering them as 
a unitary category, given their dramatic intra-categorial variability. Last, that in order to 
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produce a honest sketch of how the conceptual system works, we need to investigate 
concepts at a more fine-grained level, that is to say, according to their grounding. These 
considerations suggest that from a theoretical point of view, searching for a kind of mental 
representation able to unfold all possible kinds of concepts might be a “quixotic dead end”. 
Thus, a possible strategy might be to acknowledge the role of different representational 
constructs and their influence in the constitution of concepts. The last sections of this 
Chapter are dedicated to a critical investigation of these tenets. 
 
2.9. Multiple Representations, Multiple Systems. A Call for Pluralism 
 
The first Chapter of this dissertation was devoted to a general overview of some of 
the most influential theories of conceptual knowledge. The take-home message from the 
first Chapter is that, as long as cognitive scientists will strive to tame concepts by framing 
them in a unitary representational construct, some critical information would always be left 
aside. One of the reasons of this ‘scientific failure’ is that among the desiderata for the 
psychological structures proposed over time, the capacity to coherently explain all kinds of 
concepts is highly problematic. Moreover, findings from the literature on conceptual 
flexibility (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Pulvermüller, 2018) 
demonstrated that the activation of relevant features in the encoding of a concept is strictly 
context-dependent. This last point puts further in jeopardy the notion of concepts as stable 
and unitary representational structures, in that they have been proven to be flexibly 
modulated by e.g. changing of points of view (Barsalou & Sewell, 1984), physical context 
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), linguistic context (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, 
& Nitsch, 1974), and cultural and linguistic environment (see par. 2.7.3). 
145 
 
 
 
Indeed, the pivotal property of concepts and categories of being highly flexible, 
along with their ‘resilience’ to be sharply framed in a unitary psychological structure, 
suggested some scholars to abandon the idea that concepts are stable entities in our minds. 
On the contrary, the retrieving and processing of conceptual representations related to 
words is affected by various components, such as contextual constraints, recency and 
frequency of instantiation, language specific aspects and also cultural and social factors14. 
Henceforth, experimental findings and theoretical criticisms converge in support of the idea 
that the existence of a single psychological structure unfolding all kinds of concepts is an 
untenable commitment.  
On this note, Weiskopf (2009) pointed out that it is legitimate to think that the 
conceptual system is built to employ a variety of different representational tools. 
Specifically, those tools vary with respect to (a) the kind of information they convey, (b) 
the ways they are acquired and processed, (c) the domain they favor and (d) the task that 
promote their use. What Weiskopf is defending is a pluralistic account of concepts, that has 
some appealing leads over “monolithic theories of concepts” (Rips, 1995; Weiskopf, 2009). 
As Weiskopf discussed, much of the strength of a pluralistic turn comes from its explicit 
rejection of two specific assumptions implicitly endorsed by traditional conceptual 
theories:  
 
                                                     
14 Note that a radical version of these claims (Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015) contends that even the most 
stable categories and concepts are instantiated as those that are generally considered ad hoc (cf. Barsalou, 
1983, see Chapter 1). Specifically, in this perspective, concepts are thought to vary (a) from one microsecond 
to another; (b) from one instantiation to the next within an individual and (c) from person to person or group 
to group depending on people’s experiential history. Although I do not endorse this position, I don’t fully 
embrace a perspective only focused on ‘conceptual core’, or psychological essentialism (cf. Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation). From my point of view, one of the problems with conceptual knowledge has always been that 
conceptual representation was conceived in a theoretical scenario where tertium non datur. We will see why 
this solution is probably not the best scientific option.  
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1. The Singularity Assumption (SA): any occurrence of a concept C is 
to be considered as pertaining to ‘the concept C’. In other words, the 
concept C needs to be represented only as ‘the concept C’, implying 
that any other conceptual representation not fitting this requirement 
cannot be considered as pertaining to the concept.  
2. The Uniformity Assumption (UA): all concepts belong to a single 
unitary psychological kind (in the case of the classical conceptual 
theory for example this kind is a definition, but it can be a prototype 
or every other form of mental representation).  
 
Both these claims have been falsified by empirical evidence, showing for example 
how concepts flexibly adapt to situations, and how their representation vary consistently 
among different people (hence SA cannot be correct). With respect to UA, as already 
introduced in this discussion, a general overview of the history of conceptual theories 
reveals how this is a rather radical position to accept. In his review of the literature of 
conceptual processing, Weiskopf showed how conceptual system reliably employs 
different kinds of conceptual tools, e.g. prototypes (lay people often conceptualize many 
domains in terms of prototypes: think for example of the concept of tree), whereas 
depending on the expertise the same domain can be conceptualized by other groups of 
people in terms of ideals (cf. Barsalou, 1983, 1985).  
By rejecting the Uniformity Assumption, instead, we can easily justify multiple 
forms of conceptual representation. Henceforth, the fact that some concepts are generally 
processed and stored in the long-term memory as e.g. conforming to a prototype, while 
others are dynamically created and elaborated in order to accomplish a goal, does not 
undermine the explanatory potential of concepts as scientific tools per se15. Moreover, if 
                                                     
15 It is worth noting that one of the arguments for conceptual eliminativism (Machery, 2009, 2015; see 
Prinz, 2010 for a critical reply) resides in the fact that over the history each scientific theory proposed that 
one single model (e.g., prototypes, exemplars etc.) ought to be considered the default and only form of 
“concept”. According to Machery’s view, given the broad body of evidence that some conceptual 
representations are stored as e.g., prototypes while others as mini-theories, the ontological character of 
concepts is undermined: in fact, the different models of concepts enumerated all have various functional 
status, and therefore it is impossible to categorize them under the same label. Machery thus argue for the 
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we take this pluralistic stance to be correct, the role of conceptual flexibility can be 
smoothly spelled out: in fact, the kind of structure a conceptual representation would rely 
upon would depend on the task being performed as well as on the context in which the 
concept is employed (note that this is also in accordance with a situated idea of cognitive 
processes)16.  
The reader might wonder how to effectively apply those speculations in the study 
of concepts, and at a more fine-grained level what are the benefits of a pluralistic theory of 
conceptual representation for abstract conceptual knowledge. The answer is−in line with 
MRV recent developments−to carefully investigate grounding sources of each class of 
concepts, both pertaining to more concrete domains and to more abstract ones. In this vein, 
a possible strategy is to look at different concepts without positing an a-priori epistemic 
lens. The impressive amount of literature produced over the years on abstract concepts 
needs not to be discarded: if we fully endorse a pluralistic perspective on conceptual 
representation, we can accept that (a) different classes of abstract concepts are acquired and 
grounded differently, and (b) the same concept can be processed and elaborated in different 
ways depending on the task for which it is required and the situation it is embedded in.  
For instance, let us step back to the introductive examples of this Chapter, namely 
the concepts of lust, pride and avarice. Considered in a pluralistic perspective, it seems 
perfectly reasonable to claim that they might have a metaphorical grounding (as the 
symbolic representations of the sins as animals testify), and that this metaphorical 
                                                     
elimination of the theoretical construct of “concept”, because in his perspective we cannot gain relevant 
scientific knowledge from it.   
16 A pluralistic approach to scientific phenomena does not entail the erase of genuine competition among 
different theories (Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009): rather, it suggests the possibility of theoretical 
integrations spanning across different contexts and disciplines.  
148 
 
 
 
grounding could be an important brick of the conceptual representation of the meaning of 
the terms. Indeed, referring concrete aspects such as renowned animal attitudes to abstract 
concepts such as lust, pride, and avarice might be crucial during the first steps of 
acquisition of the concepts, working as a concrete vehicle for an abstract topic (cf. Lakoff 
& Johnson 1980). Clearly, once acquired those concepts would undergo a process of 
semantic and conceptual implementation, that will enrich the conceptual knowledge with 
other important aspects. For example, one can learn that capital sins−as wonders of the 
world and Rome’s hills−come in lists of seven items; thus, once memorized the entire list, 
linguistic information may become another grounding source for the concepts (see e.g. 
Symbol Interdependency Hypothesis, Louwerse, 2008; 2011 or distributional approaches 
inspired by LSA). A further dimension to take into account might be emotional valence: 
after learning how to correctly apply the linguistic label to the concept by collecting 
different internal states and external observation, for instance, one can additionally add 
layers to her own knowledge of the concept pride. Therefore, we can recognize the 
instantiations of pride besides encyclopedic knowledge and metaphorical thinking by 
reasoning on our internal states triggered by e.g. the fulfillment of an assignment. 
Depending on the situation, hence, those different forms of grounding can be reactivated 
and re-enacted. In sum, by bridging together a pluralistic perspective and Multiple 
Representation Views on abstract concepts, it appears clearly how abstract concepts too are 
embodied, enacted, extended, and embedded to different extents.  
En route to puzzle out the conundrum posited by abstract concepts, studying few of 
them in detail and individuating differences and similarities in their underlying mechanisms 
might furnish us with a much clear understanding of this “hard nut to crack” (Barsalou, 
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2016; Borghi et al., 2018; Barsalou, Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018). Towards this end, in the 
remaining of this Chapter I will examine a specific class of abstract concepts, namely social 
concepts. I will offer a review, with no pretense to be exhaustive, of behavioral, 
neurocognitive and philosophical findings supporting the claim that multiple mechanisms 
subtend the representation of social concepts. Therefore, building on the ideas stemmed 
from the discussion of MRVs and their approaches to the problem of abstract concepts, I 
will lay the groundwork for the last Chapter of this dissertation, focused on a specific social 
concept, viz. the concept of gender.    
 
2.9.1. Unfolding abstract concepts: social concepts and the role of metacognition 
 
The bias against abstract concepts starts with the definition itself, in that 
they are defined negatively by what they lack rather than by what they 
contain. They are essentially ‘everything that is not concrete’. This is a bit 
like dividing buildings into ‘dwellings’ and ‘non-dwellings’. This can be 
useful especially if we are mainly interested in dwellings, but shortchanges 
the diversity of non-dwellings that vary from hospitals to museums to 
shopping centers. The most important feature of a movie theater is not that 
people do not live there. (Desai, Reilly and van Dam, 2018, p. 2) 
 
The quotation from Desai, Reilly and van Dam (2018, p. 2) excellently illustrates 
the ratio behind the new interest in unraveling the complexity of abstract concepts. De 
facto, a more flexible organization of the semantic system (viz. an organization that is not 
centered around the dichotomy abstract-concrete) has been recently proposed and tested by 
some scholars (cf. among others Binder et al., 2016; Borghi, Barca, Binkofski, & 
Tummolini, 2018b; Harpaintner, Trumpp, & Kiefer, 2018; Troche, Crutch, & Reilly, 2017, 
2014). With the aim of investigating the meaning of abstract and concrete words in a 
multidimensional perspective, for instance, Troche, Crutch and Reilly (2014) asked a 
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sample of 365 participants (English native speakers) to rate a set of 400 words, half of 
which were abstract and half concrete, on a number of dimensions. The list of dimensions 
they included in the study was relevant for testing their hypotheses, namely that meaning 
is spanned across a multidimensional space including both concrete and abstract aspects; 
thus, dimensions included were for instance polarity (in relation to positive or negative 
feelings elicited by the word), relation to action, mental activity or social interaction. After 
submitting the results of the rating to Factor Reduction, the authors identified three main 
factors, roughly corresponding to perceptual salience, affective association and magnitude. 
They subsequently plotted the results of the ratings into clusters (Hierarchical Cluster 
Analysis; HCA), and the area of highest overlap between abstract and concrete terms 
resulted to be evident for words at the high end of the ‘affective/association-social 
cognition’ dimension. By way of explanation, concrete words that had a high load on the 
factor identified as ‘affective-social’, were closer in the semantic space pictured by the 
solution of the HCA to those abstract words that didn’t load relevantly on that dimension 
(e.g., two words such as father−considered as concrete−and love−considered as 
abstract−were topographically placed aside).  
A similar pattern of results is reported in a recent study by Harpaintner, Trumpp and 
Kiefer (2018). The authors provided participants a large dataset of abstract words and 
requested them to generate properties for the items. Through descriptive and cluster 
analyses, they demonstrated that abstract concepts can be distinguished on the basis of their 
specific semantic featural composition: some abstract concepts are indeed more 
characterized by a high proportion of sensorimotor associations, some by verbal 
associations, while others by a larger proportion of internal and emotional features. 
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Interestingly, the cluster in which the internal and emotional features were predominant, 
was also the cluster that included the highest number of ‘social’ features.  
Evidence supporting the idea that sociality and emotion are determining aspects of 
abstract conceptual knowledge is refined by neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies. 
Metanalyses focused on the neuroanatomical substrates of abstract concepts’ representation 
(e.g., Wang, Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010) for instance showed that in a sample of 
19 studies two regions were found to be consistently activated by abstract content, namely 
the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). However, the 
scientific literature regarding the function of ATL is not uncontroversial; some have 
proposed that its role is that of a representational and transmodal hub (Lambon Ralph, 
Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007) connected to 
spokes localized across the cortex, integrating semantic information regardless of its 
content. Another line of research identified the more anterior regions of the ATL as central 
in the processing conceptual information related to people recognition and especially linked 
to emotional and situational contents, while others insisted on its role in sentence 
processing (cf. Mellem, Jasmin, Peng, & Martin, 2016).  
At a closer look, recent studies reveal that the role of ATL is tightly associated with 
abstract knowledge, and concomitantly linked to social and emotional cognition, 
integrating some of the most prominent perspectives like the ones described above. In an 
MRI study, for example, Mellem and colleagues (2016) showed that the activation of 
specific areas of the ATL (aSTG/STS) was strongly modulated by constituent size (i.e. 
number of words per phrase presented) but not by the condition of non-words. More 
crucially, they were selectively activated when sentences with social-emotional content 
were presented (i.e. sentences describing interactions between agents containing strong 
152 
 
 
 
emotionally valenced words). Rice and colleagues (2018) also described a consistent 
activation of ATL for processing people faces, and additionally they reported how a region 
in the aSTG responded selectively to socially relevant abstract words but not so socially 
relevant concrete words. Overall, recent research is evidencing how specific abstract 
semantic knowledge related to social concepts holds a tight relation with neural regions 
related to both social and emotional cognition and linguistic processing. These findings are 
in line with perspectives emphasizing different grounding mechanisms for specific sub-
classes of abstract concepts (e.g. the WAT theory), among which sociality and language 
appear as essential.  
Social concepts: a grounded perspective. Considered in a pluralistic framework 
that rests on the body of evidence just described, theories stressing the importance of 
language and linguistic information (LASS; WAT), theories centered on the role of 
emotions (AEA) and theories stressing the relation with sensorimotor activity (Glenberg, 
2015, see the role of action in ACE, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008) can 
be compatibly employed to disentangle the abstract conceptual domain. However, those 
proposals seem to provide only a partial explanation. For some abstract concepts, in fact, a 
further and yet unexplored grounding source might be pivotal, namely metacognitive 
processes (Borghi, Barca, Binkofski, & Tummolini, 2018b; Shea, 2018). Among those 
concepts, I will specifically consider the case of social concepts. The variety of 
experimental results concerning social abstract concepts indicates that dimensions such as 
affectivity, internal states and normative, social and contextual considerations might be 
jointly taken into account when investigating this kind of concepts (see also Roversi, 
Borghi, & Tummolini, 2013). What could possibly be the common grounding, the “glue” 
holding these kinds of experiences together? Arguably, specific classes of abstract concepts 
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(e.g. “social abstract concepts”) can be more linked to linguistic and social experience with 
respect to others. Why should this kind of information be so relevant for social concepts 
with respect to, for instance, numerical concepts?  
A possible explanation is proposed by Shea (2018) by introducing the notion of 
metacognitive deference. The author argues that many concepts are constructed through a 
collective process of deciding how to use them. In Shea’s view, language may serve as a 
grounding source in at least two ways: in an “internal” way, as a developmental tool for 
acquiring and differentiate concepts (see also Borghi et al., 2018; Barca et al., 2017), and 
in an “external” way, as a mean to socially connect our knowledge of a concept with a 
much wider body of knowledge. Starting from the process of explicitly deferring to experts 
when insecure about the correct use of a word, e.g. about the difference between two tree 
species, Shea extends the discussion by arguing that sometimes deference can be implicit. 
In this case, the users can just be disposed to trust others about how to use a concept and 
they can be prone to accept the established range of appliance of that concept. This is 
particularly true for some social categories, for which we may rely almost completely on 
deference from experts. 
Consider the following example. Martha is attending her first sociology class. The 
teacher is giving compelling explanations on the necessity of distinguishing the notions of 
race and ethnicity. Before that moment, Martha never felt the need to reflect on this 
distinction, but once at home she recognizes that most of the arguments provided by the 
teacher were in fact impressive. Therefore, from that moment on, she decides to apply 
consistently the notions of race and ethnicity. In this case, the linguistic experience 
provided from the explanation of the teacher, along with the “social” experience of 
becoming part of a shared knowledge, constitutes the primary source of grounding of the 
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concepts. Perhaps, when in doubt whether to apply the notion of race or that of ethnicity, 
Martha will recall and re-enact the teacher’s speech, thus making it her primary grounding 
source for the two concepts. 
When a category is socially determined, the users’ dispositions to classify things 
partly determine which phenomena fall into that category. This creates a mechanism of 
grounding that acknowledges the role of public language and public knowledge as a basis 
for our conceptual structure. What is the part played by metacognitive processes in this 
frame? Shea argues that deference in defining and using a concept, together with the 
explicit or implicit evaluation of its applicability are metacognitive processes, and that they 
can be considered as resources needed to ground particular abstract concepts. In this vein, 
Borghi et al. (2018) introduced the notion of social metacognition to account for abstract 
concepts. Drawing on the distinction between explicit and implicit deference (Shea, 2018), 
they argued that language and sociality play a pivotal role in the processing and acquisition 
of abstract concepts, because we might need to engage a process of assessment of our 
conceptual inadequacy and then to rely on others to fix reference.  
The role of social metacognition is thus to integrate different experiences (e.g. the 
internal acknowledgment of a conceptual gap with a new operational definition in the 
example of Martha), at an individual level, through language. Since language can also be 
intended as a social product and a social practice, it can hardly be separated by speakers; 
therefore, social metacognition operates also at a collective level, for example raising 
discussions among students attending Martha’s class that will confront each other on the 
newly acquired definitions, thus negotiating their meanings. Through language, in fact, we 
assign a new status to some phenomena, where the function of that status cannot be inferred 
solely by virtue of the physical characteristics of the phenomenon (Searle, 1995). 
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Institutional facts are especially representative of this process, in that as Searle pointed out, 
their creation can sometimes be simply stated by declaring it to be imposed. In his words 
(Searle, 1995): 
 
Symbols do not create cats and dogs and evening stars; they create only 
the possibility of referring to cats, dogs and evening stars in a publicly 
accessible way. But symbolization creates the very ontological categories of 
money, property, points scored in games and political offices, as well as the 
categories of words, and speech acts. (p.77) 
 
Henceforth, by creating the possibility to publicly refer to some phenomena, we 
simultaneously create the ontological category into which those phenomena can be 
included, negotiating its boundaries and refining the ambit of the concepts that pertain to 
that category (cf. Shea, 2018). Social concepts, as characterized in this discussion, 
constitute a specific class of abstract concepts. They are entrenched in social and linguistic 
practices, but they also encompass internal and experiential aspects.  
 
2.10. Halfway Conclusions. Malo Accepto Stultus Sapit 
 
The aim of this Chapter was to present some relevant problems in the study of 
abstract concepts. Indeed, abstract concepts have been traditionally taken as the prove that 
theories based on an embodied and grounded perspective on cognition are doomed to fail. 
Given the importance of bodily and sensory processes implied in the conception of 
cognition of EG theories, this is not particularly surprising. In fact, one of the reasons why 
some scholars were skeptical in completely endorsing an EG perspective on conceptual 
knowledge is that those accounts seemed to be particularly suited for the explaining of 
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concepts whose referents are manipulable and perceivable objects. In a simulation-based 
account of conceptual knowledge such as the one proposed by EG theories of cognition, it 
is easy to see how this type of concepts, i.e. ‘concrete concepts’ re-enacts sensorimotor 
states related to the experiences with its referents (see Chapter 1, par. 1.6.3). Abstract 
concepts such as mysticism, on the other hand, do not have single and bounded referents 
triggering simulations. Therefore, it has been objected that EGC theories cannot explain 
abstract concepts for the very same fact that abstract concepts are not tied to multimodal 
patterns of activation. Nonetheless, researchers embracing EG cognition stances advanced 
interesting hypotheses to account for abstract conceptual knowledge over the years, as 
testified by the brief review of literature of the first paragraphs of this Chapter. Some 
contended that our abstract conceptual knowledge is entrenched with linguistic expressions 
that shape our concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), others evidenced the relation between 
abstract concepts and action-oriented processes (Glenberg & Kaschack, 2002), while others 
claimed that abstract concepts are ‘built’ through the help of emotional concepts (Kousta 
et al, 2009; 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2014). The second part of the review is devoted to the 
inspection of those theories that characterized language as a central source for the 
acquisition and processing of abstract concepts. They can be roughly divided into two main 
groups: on the one hand, theories maintaining that language is a sort of shortcut for deeper 
(and sensorimotor) conceptual representations (cf. Louwerse, 2008; 2011; Louwerse & 
Jeuniaux, 2010; Barsalou et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2008; Dove, 2011; 2014; 2016), and 
on the other hand a theory that stresses the intrinsically social and embodied nature of 
language (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2018a, b).  
If we look critically at the recent discussion concerning abstract concepts, we can 
see the emergence of some interesting theoretical proposals. First of all, the traditional 
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distinction between abstract and concrete concepts might turn out to be an artificial 
oversimplification of the conceptual domain, if taken as the only distinctive parameter in 
the study of conceptual knowledge. Indeed, some of the researches cited in this Chapter 
(e.g., Hampton, 1989; Roversi et al., 2013; Harpaintner et al., 2018; Barsalou et al., 2018) 
showed how sometimes the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts is not so 
sharp, because properties that are traditionally considered as concrete sometimes contribute 
to the conceptual representation of abstract concepts and vice versa. Hence, recent 
proposals are endeavoring to refine this traditional dichotomy by taking into account other 
aspects of concepts (cf. Borghi et al., 2018; Barsalou et al., 2018) that might be more 
informative. A first operational distinction that can be made at a general level is the one 
between the notion of abstraction–i.e. the process through which we abstract general 
features of experience at the basis of categorization processes, which regards both abstract 
and concrete concepts–and abstractness–that specifically refers to the detachment from 
physical reality of the referents of the concepts being examined. Therefore, money for 
instance has a high level of abstraction, because it is placed somehow at the high end of the 
hierarchy composed by all possible kinds of currencies (e.g., euros, dollars, yen) and it has 
also a symbolic value, but it has a low level of abstractness because its referent can be a 
concrete object. In this way, we can distinguish those concepts that were previously 
considered as abstract in terms of their detachment from the experiential reality through the 
lens of abstractness. Therefore, a concept like mysticism would have a higher level of 
abstractness than a concept like number, because even though in an indirect way we could 
refer the concept of number to some concrete referent (e.g., 911 is “the number you call for 
emergencies”). For the sake of the study of abstract concepts, a first definitional criterion 
might thus be to focus on the dimension of abstractness, keeping in mind that sometimes 
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this is interwoven with the dimension of abstraction. The other important issue that 
Multiple Representation Views (MRVs) contributed to explicit is that the category of 
abstract concepts is comprised of a multitude of different sub-domains. Hence, studying 
abstract concepts as a cohesive and unitary category would mean to overlook at important 
differences within the category itself. Following this consideration, some scholars proposed 
that a further distinctive criterion, internal to the category of abstract concepts, might be 
concurrently employed in their description, namely their grounding source. This is pivotal 
for an embodied and grounded account of abstract concepts on two distinct and interacting 
levels: on a diachronic and on a synchronic level. Indeed, as evidenced in par. 2.7.1, 
converging evidence showed that the specific modality of acquisition of concepts impacts 
their subsequent representation and elaboration. This was evident for example in research 
focused on numerical knowledge, that revealed how the habit of finger-counting seems to 
be implicated in the representation of numbers. Importantly, the dimension of abstractness 
and the grounding source are strictly related: as noted by Borghi et al. (2018), concepts that 
have higher levels of abstractness are mainly acquired through e.g. linguistic explanations 
(or metacognitive deference, see par. 2.9.1), due to the fact that it is more difficult to ground 
them into some perceptual experience. Abstract concepts that have lower levels of 
abstractness instead can be grounded to a greater extent in our sensorimotor system, as the 
example of numbers demonstrated.  
Another line of criticism concerning abstract concepts derives from the general 
reluctance to accept the possibility of pluralism as epistemic path. Some influential 
proposals (cf. Dove 2009; Weiskopf, 2009) suggested that, in order to provide successful 
theories of conceptual representation, we might dismiss the general avoidance for multiple 
explanations. In fact, once recognized that different concepts might be represented 
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differently in our conceptual system, depending on the task being performed and on their 
grounding source, our knowledge of the functioning of the conceptual system can be 
enhanced. In this perspective, some concepts might be primarily represented in terms of 
linguistic associations with other similar concepts, while others may be strongly couched 
in sensori-motor systems. The epistemic turn implied in the endorsing of a pluralistic 
perspective has already been applied to concrete concepts, that were found to be grounded 
in different modalities; the next step is henceforth to apply it to abstract concepts.  
In a nutshell, in this Chapter I argued for a more complex distinction of abstract 
conceptual knowledge, which is not based on the classical dichotomy abstract vs. concrete 
(Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014; Paivio, 1986). On the contrary, abstract concepts 
can be characterized in an EG perspective through a more fine-grained classification, based 
on their level of abstractness and on their grounding sources, keeping in mind that the latter 
might be multifarious and differently employed and re-enacted depending on the situations.   
In line with these considerations, in the next Chapter I will introduce a possible key 
of interpretation in the study of abstract knowledge. Based on theoretical speculations 
coming from different disciplines, I will claim that to move forward in the understanding 
of ACWs, they need to be queered. The introduction of the notion of queer will offer a 
theoretical frame affording a reflection on abstract concepts critically outdoing classical 
dichotomies, with the aim of answering to the quest of specificity stemmed from recent 
debates. To demonstrate how the theoretical tool offered by the notion of queer might be 
useful, I will discuss how a concept that could be considered as a social abstract concept, 
namely the concept of gender, when inspected carefully encompasses both abstract and 
concrete aspects. Hence, through the analysis of some of the grounding sources of gender, 
I will contend that not only the category of abstract concepts is a queer category, but also 
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that the concept of gender in itself can be better accounted for if considered as a queer 
concept.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GENDER IS AN ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
 
3.1. What Would You Say to an Alien?  
 
On March 2, 1972, a spacecraft named Pioneer 10 was launched from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida. The space exploration project for which Pioneer 10 was designed and 
launched was conducted by the NASA Ames Research Center, and would have become 
famous for being the first mission to be completed to the planet Jupiter. But this is not the 
only reason why the spacecraft Pioneer 10–and the subsequent Pioneer 11–became world-
wide famous. The spacecraft would have in fact had the possibility to encounter 
extraterrestrial forms of life during its trip, therefore, someone thought that it would have 
been a good idea to send to our intergalactic neighbors a message. What would you 
communicate about our world to an alien? With the aim of solving this conundrum, Carl 
Sagan, Linda Salzman Sagan, and Frank Drake spent three weeks conceiving and designing 
special aluminium plaques to be placed on the Pioneer 10 spacecraft. Those plaques should 
have contained important information concerning the human kind, allowing extraterrestrial 
forms of life to get a sense of how we live and how we are ‘built’. Figure 5 depicts is the 
outcome of the work.  
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Figure 5. The Pioneer 10 plaque (Vakoch, 1998, p. 314). 
 
How would we present ourselves to the aliens? We would certainly represent the 
spacecraft wandering through the space and give a sketch of our solar system, but most 
importantly we would communicate that the human kind is divided into two big categories. 
We are males and females1.  
Despite all the criticisms raised by the plaque (cf. Wade, 1977), one thing this 
anecdote made extremely clear is that gender is a salient feature of humanity–so salient that 
it is the first information we would convey to aliens about our species. It is, so to speak, 
one way of classifying and dividing entities in the world, and its range of appliance is not 
limited to human beings: we ascribe a gender to inanimate entities like objects and also (in 
gendered languages) to abstract notions like philosophy (e.g., in Italian the word filosofia 
is feminine). We employ the categories of gender constantly in our everyday life, 
sometimes even without really paying attention to the distinctions we are making for 
                                                     
1 I am thankful to AG Arfini for introducing me to the story of these ‘gendered’ plaques.  
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instance by the means of language. But what are we really talking about when talking about 
gender? Are we referring to some physical and biological set-up allowing us to divide 
human beings into two categories? Are we talking about social roles to be fulfilled? And 
what about linguistic structures affording gendered conceptual representation of objects? 
In sum, how is our conceptual knowledge of gender constructed? What are the grounding 
sources of the concept of gender, and how those impact our conceptual representation?  
To these, and other questions I will try to provide partial answers in this Chapter. 
Drawing on the characterization of abstract social concepts proposed in Chapter 2, I will 
analyze the groundings of the concept of gender from multiple perspectives, encompassing 
psychological, biological and philosophical literature. With this respect, a preliminary 
methodological and theoretical remark is warranted. The present dissertation is centered on 
concepts and conceptual representations. Hence, I will examine how the concept of gender 
has been employed, articulated and analyzed in the scientific debate across several 
disciplines, tangentially related to cognitive science. Specific consequences of the 
understanding of gender-related concepts include the development of gender stereotypes 
(Ellemers, 2018), gender socialization (Epstein & Ward, 2011), legal and organizational 
practices (Risman, 2004), and cognitive bias or supposed psychological gender differences 
(for a review see Hyde, 2014; Hyde, Bigler, Joel, Tate, & van Anders, 2019). Although 
these elements contribute to the reinforcement and the re-conceptualization of concepts 
akin or knit together with the concept of gender, they will not be treated in this discussion. 
The specific literature concerning the aforementioned topics will only be discussed when 
relevant for the purpose of shedding light on the conceptualization of gender.  
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3.1.1. Some terminological distinctions–or not? Before moving to the core points 
of this Chapter, we need to precisely identify what is the object of its inquiry: gender. For 
the contemporary reader, the distinction between sex–the biological make-up that 
distinguishes males from females–and gender–the social distinctions constructed upon it–
might seem obvious, and even not worth mentioning. But things were different up to the 
late 60s. Indeed, until that time, English-speaking countries employed the word gender 
solely to refer to grammatical differences conveyed by masculine and feminine forms of 
language (such as lo and la in Italian) (Nicholson, 1994). The re-definition of the term 
gender followed two separate but parallel routes, that at the beginning of the seventies led 
to its articulation in terms of the social constructed norms based on biological factors that 
distinguish men from women.  
On the one hand, the work of sexologists Money and Ehrhardt (1972) contributed 
to spread the idea that sex and gender are different categories. Money and his colleagues 
were working with children that had ambiguous sexual markers (e.g. testes and vagina, two 
X chromosomes and a scrotum and so on), and started to develop a layered model of sex 
and gender, where the two categories followed a developmental path from birth to 
adulthood. Importantly, Money and Ehrhardt defined sex as a biological and physical 
determined attribute, and gender as the psychological conviction of being a male or a 
female (what we would call, with some caveats, gender identity), and the expression of this 
conviction. Specifically, they claimed that at birth a newborn is identified by people 
surrounding her as a male or a female through the external observation of her genital 
anatomy (genital dimorphism). Afterwards, this precise classification as either a male or a 
female triggers a social response that initiates the gender socialization of the baby (e.g. pink 
clothes for females, truck and guns toys for males). Therefore the gender fortification, that 
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is the process through which the baby learns what is in accordance with her sex, begins—
eventually resulting in the constitution of the adult gender identity.  
Concurrently, in the early 70s, feminist debates focused on the need to distinguish 
sex from gender, for very different reasons than the ones moving Money and his colleagues 
at the John Hopkins. The central motivation for feminists to keep sex separate from gender 
was to oppose biological determinism. Biological determinism, or the view that biological 
factors determine one’s own destiny, was in fact the motor for women’s discrimination over 
time. To illustrate, Geddes and Thomson’s (1889)2 theory of social, psychological and 
behavioral traits distinguishing men from women was based on the different metabolic 
states that the two categories supposedly held. Women were considered to conserve energy, 
and therefore they were deemed as passive and unable to develop interests for politics. 
Men, on the other hand, were considered ‘katabolic’, and in the need to spend their energy; 
thus they were supposed to be energetic, passionate and consequently apt for social and 
political activism. The biological and metabolic underpinnings of gender differences 
between men and women were understood not only in terms of behavioral differences, but 
they constituted also the basis for the exclusion of women from political life. Specifically, 
given that women were by nature unable to maintain an interest for political facts, they 
were denied the right to vote. Henceforth, with the aim of distinguishing between given 
and immutable biological properties and psychological or behavioral traits, feminists 
separated sex from gender. In a seminal work, Rubin (1975) defined sex as the biological 
and fixed datum, and gender as the oppressive outcomes of social costumes that define how 
men and women should behave. She coined the expression ‘sex/gender system’, which in 
                                                     
2 Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/.  
 
166 
 
 
 
her point of view illustrates “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of 
human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention” (Rubin, 1975, p. 165). 
The reconceptualization of the term gender aimed at highlighting the social nature of those 
behavioral and psychological traits that were prior judged to be immutable because 
biologically given, and that were used to justify women’s oppression. If gender was the 
social transposition of biological differences, it could have been in principle mutable. 
Political action was therefore invocated for ending women’s subordination and organizing 
a genderless (but not sexless) world. The basic assumption is that gender, intended as 
masculinity and femininity, is socially imposed on our sexed bodies: we are all born males 
and females, but what makes us women and men are the socially and culturally defined 
norms of masculinity and femininity. In Rubin’s words (1975): 
  
But we are not only oppressed as women, we are oppressed by having to 
be women, or men as the case may be. I personally feel that the feminist 
movement must dream of even more than the elimination of the oppression 
of women. It must dream of the elimination of obligatory sexualities and sex 
roles. The dream I find most compelling is the one of an androgynous and 
genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s own sexual anatomy 
is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes love. 
(p. 204)  
 
Although certainly promising when framed in the cultural and social context in 
which it appeared, the distinction of sex and gender is not so sharp as it seemed in the first 
place. From a theoretical point of view, the sex/gender dichotomy represents the old 
nature/nurture dichotomy; in this sense, feminist theorists arguing for a separation of sex 
from gender were overlooking some important issues, one above all the fact that we are 
actually living and sexed bodies, and that this property determines our interaction with the 
cultural and social world. We are, in fact, embodied agents and our cognitive skills are 
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profoundly influenced by the very same constitution of our bodies. Sexual attributes, in this 
sense, make no exception in shaping our cognition, if other because they are part of our 
bodily presentation that leads us in our interaction with the environment (see the discussion 
of EGC theories in Chapter 1).   
More to the point, what if the opposition between natural facts and socially 
constructed facts turned out to be artificial? After all, scientific theories are placed into 
existence by scientists through the observation of natural phenomena, but ultimately 
scientists are human beings on their own, and for that very reason they are interpreters. As 
a matter of facts, a large body of evidence questioned the supposed naturalness of the sexual 
dimorphism. Some influential works on the biological development of sexual markers 
(Fausto-Sterling, 1993, 2000, 2012), showed that typically masculine or feminine genitalia 
are just the two extremes of a variegated spectrum of possible combinations when it comes 
to chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal and genital sex. The history of treatment of intersexual 
persons, subjected to ‘corrective’ surgical and hormonal modifications in order to conform 
to either one or the other sex (see Chapter 2 in Fausto-Sterling, 2000) compellingly 
demonstrates that even our idea of ‘difference between sexes’ is somehow socially 
constructed and perpetrated through the means of culture (e.g. by defining what is normal 
and what is not from a medical perspective). Sex, therefore, and specifically the so called 
‘sexual dimorphism’ is not the natural underpinning of gender differences. Rather, it’s the 
naturalized biological basis for socially constructed differences. This is not to deny the 
materiality of our bodies: as Fausto-Sterling (2000) pointed out, there are indeed hormones, 
genes, prostates, uteri and other physical attributes that we can employ to recognize males 
and females, and importantly any variation if these aspects impacts one’s own experience 
of gender and sexuality. The point is that, we cannot completely disentangle the natural 
168 
 
 
 
body from the socialized body. This view was elegantly expressed in Butler’s seminal book 
Gender Trouble (Butler, 1990):  
 
Are the ostensibly natural facts of sex discursively produced by 
various scientific discourses in the service of other political and social 
interests? If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this 
construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, 
perhaps it was always gender, with the consequence that the distinction 
between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (p. 9, italics 
mine). 
 
As this brief discussion portrayed, terminological distinctions in this area are quite 
complex to fix, and still controversial. An honest sketch of what the terms gender and sex 
mean, if they mean something at all, and of what are the differences between them, should 
therefore take into account the fact that socio-cultural and biological factors are strictly 
intertwined. Recent lines of research are nowadays gradually abandoning the neat 
dichotomy opposing sex to gender and nature to culture (e.g. Hyde et al., 2019; Joel & 
Fausto-Sterling, 2016; van Anders, 2015). In keeping with this idea, in the course of this 
Chapter, I will try to keep the two notions, where needed, separate; as Fausto-Sterling 
(2012) pointed out, gender can be referred to social structures that differentiate men from 
women (and other gender identities) or to gender presentation of an individual, embedded 
in a specific culture. Sex, on the other hand, can be ascribed to the biological and physical 
conformation of one’s own body (male, female, not designated, other). Each of us engages 
in the environment through a gender presentation that can be traced back to her individual 
and physical sex, but is culturally interpreted by the society using specific gender 
categorizations of the culture she lives in. “Gender, then, is definitely in the eye of the 
beholder. Sex and gender presentation are in the body and mind of the presenter” (Fausto-
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Sterling, 2012, p. 7). In this perspective, I am not arguing for the elimination of the 
distinction between sex and gender. Rather, as it was the case for the abstract/concrete 
dichotomy, I think–in line with influential proposals such as the ones described above–that 
a critical examination of this distinction might lead us to a more thorough characterization 
of what matters (and when, and if it matters) when it comes to gender. van Anders (2015), 
for instance, proposed the notion of “sex/gender” rather than only sex or gender. She 
described “sex/gender” as an umbrella term that encloses gender, intended as socialization, 
and sex, intended as biology and evolution. The ratio behind this re-conceptualization of 
the two terms lies in some innovative findings–along with the influence of philosophers 
like Butler–that shed a new light on the working of testosterone. To give a hint, consider 
the following: testosterone is typically considered to be the “masculine” hormone, and 
being a hormone it is part of the ‘realm of nature’ that in this discussion would be translated 
into ‘sex’. Nonetheless, testosterone was found to be socially modulated, for example by 
incrementing sexual thoughts, or by increasing activities of nurturance (van Anders, 
Goldey, & Kuo, 2011; see also Hyde et al., 2019). Hence, van Anders speculates, “is 
testosterone “sex” because it’s biological, or is it “gender” because social forces affect it?” 
(van Anders, 2015, p. 1181). It is evident that with the advancement of scientific technology 
some of the old categories on which our knowledge system was previously based might be 
refined. Sex and gender are among those. To sum up, the main points we gained from these 
considerations are: (a) sex and gender cannot be always and completely disentangled, 
although (b) in specific situations and for specific purposes we can draw a line between the 
two terms, if keeping in mind that we are acting as interpreters and that natural variation 
and cultural practices are always behind the door. Henceforth, I will try to use the terms 
sex, gender, and gender/sex in this Chapter consistently with the discussion above.  
170 
 
 
 
  
3.2. Moving Beyond Dichotomies 
 
In the previous Chapter, I focused on embodied and grounded (EG) accounts of 
abstract conceptual knowledge. Among seminal proposals presented in the course of the 
discussion, I chose to give special attention to Multiple Representation Views (MRVs), and 
specifically to new developments of the WAT (Words As social Tools) theory. The 
motivation for this choice resides in the fact that, to the best of my knowledge, the WAT 
proposal put forward some important tenets to consider in the study of abstract concepts. 
First of all, Borghi and colleagues (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2018) provided 
some useful analytical tools, such as the distinction between abstraction and abstractness 
(see Chapter 2). By the means of this double construct, we are able to give a more precise 
depiction of what an abstract concept is, and not just what an abstract concept is not (i.e. 
an abstract concept is everything that is not a concrete concept). Second, in line with recent 
trends in the EG panorama, according to the WAT abstract concepts can have multiple and 
multifarious sources of grounding, ranging from sensorimotor engagement to linguistic and 
social practices. This consideration enables us to understand not only the contribution of 
the modality of acquisition of concepts, but at the same time their consequent representation 
and usage. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see par. 2.9) we can reach a precise 
portrait of abstract concepts, including both a diachronic and a synchronic point of view. 
From a theoretical perspective, I suggested that a good strategy to frame these aspects could 
be to adopt a pluralistic epistemology, that would allow researchers in this area to benefit 
from findings coming from e.g. philosophy, cognitive psychology, neuroscience etc. 
carefully weighing their contribution. To adopt a pluralistic stance in this context is to 
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acknowledge that (a) different concepts are acquired and represented differently; for 
instance, some concepts–being they abstract or concrete–might be primarily grounded in 
our sensorimotor systems, while other might be more related to linguistic information. 
Moreover, (b) the same concept may have different sources of grounding, and can therefore 
be represented differently depending on the situation (as studies on conceptual flexibility 
widely demonstrated). Think for example of a concept like dress. I can have a general 
representation of a dress, something similar to what could be called ‘a prototype’. From an 
EG point of view, when thinking of a dress, perceptual states connected with the referent 
of the word such as the sensation of pleasantness of wearing a silk dress might be re-enacted 
(Barsalou, 2008a) via simulations. I probably have an ‘encyclopedic’ knowledge of which 
dresses are appropriate for e.g. a cocktail party, or for clubbing, and also for instance of 
what are the properties that define a wedding dress. Ultimately, I might hold special 
feelings of emotional attachment for the dress my mother gave me when I was a little girl. 
All these different forms of grounding contribute varyingly to my conceptual representation 
of a dress, so that depending from the situation for which the concept is employed one 
might prevail on the other, without undermining the meaningfulness of the other aspects. 
This last point relates to a further idea that MRVs are advising for, namely to reconsider 
the binary opposition of abstract and concrete concepts. Just like the concept of dress 
(which is considered as a concrete concept) entails both ‘concrete’ aspects such as 
perceptual-based experience and ‘abstract’ aspects such as emotional involvement and 
encyclopedic knowledge, so abstract concepts are composed of a multitude of components.  
In a binary opposition, each term of the dichotomy defines the boundaries of the 
other via a process of negation. In the case of the dichotomy concrete/abstract, the positive 
pole is constituted by the ‘concrete’ part. Therefore, if concrete concepts have a 
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perceptually salient and manipulable referent, abstract concepts are those concepts whose 
referent is not perceptually salient and manipulable. If concrete concepts are said to activate 
neural areas related to actions their referents afford, then abstract concept are not supposed 
to activate sensorimotor areas. In a binary opposition, there is no space for variability. 
Something either is or is not. As we have seen in the previous Chapter, abstract concepts 
proved themselves to escape the boundaries of the binary opposition in which they were 
previously framed. In the same vein, in the preceding paragraph we witnessed the undoing 
of another binary opposition i.e. sex/gender. The brief discussion on sex and gender 
exposed how the boundaries of the dichotomy are blurred, and sometimes it is not clear 
where nature ends and culture starts. And after all, is this distinction really useful? At this 
point, the reader might wonder where all this discussion is going. After dismantling all 
these dichotomies, what is left for the researcher to investigate? And also, is this a 
characterization in which once more the only thing that is set is just what things are not? 
With the purpose of answering those questions, I believe that research on conceptual 
knowledge might benefit from a critical shift of perspective, like the one entailed in the 
questioning of well-established categories put forward by Queer Theory and Studies (see 
e.g., Sullivan, 2003; Halperin, 1995). 
 
3.2.1. Queering abstract concepts. The term “queer” was firstly introduced in the 
academic debate by Teresa de Lauretis in a conference held at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz, in the February of 19903. De Lauretis suggested the label “Queer Theory”, in 
                                                     
3 Butler (1993b) reminds us that the term ‘queer’ was originally a derogatory term, used to designate 
people who didn’t conform to the norms of heterosexuality. In her perspective, the term has operated actively 
by producing the collective identity that it intended to shame. In the same way in which performative speech 
acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1989) constitute a reality relying on a specific history and culture, so the term 
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the context of sexualities studies, suggesting the possibility to account for homosexuality 
not only with respect to heterosexuality. In addition, she overtly criticized the well-
established formula “lesbian and gay” traditionally used in studies of sexuality. She pointed 
out that, if used uncritically, this formula could lead to flatten the differences couched in 
gay and lesbians’ experiences on the basis of a common ground of oppression. In her words 
(de Lauretis, 1991): 
 
The project of the conference was based on the speculative premise that 
homosexuality is no longer to be seen simply as marginal with regard to a 
dominant, stable form of sexuality (heterosexuality) against which it would 
be defined either by opposition or by homology. […] Instead, male and 
female homosexualities-in their current sexual-political articulations of gay 
and lesbian sexualities, in North America- may be reconceptualized as social 
and cultural forms in their own right, albeit emergent ones and thus still 
fuzzily defined, undercoded, or discursively dependent on more established 
forms. Thus, rather than marking the limits of the social space by designating 
a place at the edge of culture, gay sexuality in its specific female and male 
cultural (or subcultural) forms acts as an agency of social processes whose 
mode of functioning is both interactive and yet resistant, both participatory 
and yet distinct, claiming at once equality and difference, demanding 
political representation while insisting on its material and historical 
specificity. (p. iii, italics mine) 
 
From that moment on, although not without criticisms, the label “queer” was 
adopted to describe a perspective in the study of social phenomena which encompasses 
different and critical approaches. One of the hallmarks of queer studies was the critical 
analysis and exploration of the very construction of the binarism homosexual/heterosexual 
as regulatory producer of identities and cultural discourses. By deconstructing traditional 
                                                     
‘queer’ has come to signify and represent political subjects of opposition to the established sexual norms. But 
Butler (1993b, p. 21) warrants “That it can become such a discursive site whose uses are not fully constrained 
in advance ought to be safeguarded not only for the purposes of continuing to democratize queer politics, but 
also to expose, affirm, and rework the specific historicity of the term.”.  
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identities, queer studies demonstrated how those identities are complex socio-cultural 
products, in which various discourses are embedded. More specifically, queer studies 
contributed to demonstrate how gender differences could not account by their own for all 
the possible differences that the binary cultural discourse produces. The multiplicity of 
differences, reiterated by the mean of power relations that suppress and norm identities, 
embraces other marginalized identities that are less frequently visible. For this reason, a 
queer perspective aimed at critically analyze and dismantling a binary construction of 
reality, in order to avail for all those identities that exist between and within binary 
categories.  
The label queer, therefore, fosters and emphasizes a transversal discourse that 
traditional binary cultural systems neglect, suggesting a more fluid way of thinking about 
identity and sexuality. Crucially, the term queer implies the acknowledgment of the 
incompleteness of definitions, and opens the way to new directions:  
 
If the term “queer” is to be a site of collective contestation, the point 
of departure for a set of historical reflections and futural imaginings, it 
will have to remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but 
always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in 
the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes, and perhaps also 
yielded in favor of terms that do that political work more effectively. 
(Butler, 1993b, p. 19) 
 
This perspective can be useful not only in the approach of gender and sexuality 
concepts, but it can also be a powerful analytical tool for tackling the topic of abstract 
concepts in a grounded approach. As a matter of fact, in cognitive science, nothing is as 
queer as abstract concepts. They proved to resist any attempt to be framed in a unitary 
category, showing differences at a fine-grained level that nonetheless resulted to be crucial 
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of their constitution. In the very same manner, the concept of gender can be considered as 
a queer concept in a double sense. First, it is queer because it can be considered a social 
abstract concept. Therefore, following the characterization introduced in Chapter 2 of 
abstract concepts, it might benefit of multiple grounding mechanisms—escaping the 
traditional dichotomy opposing linguistic and sensorimotor or perceptual groundings 
(Paivio, 1986; Brysbaert, 2014). Second, it is queer because it is irreducible neither to one 
end of the dichotomy (i.e. the biological/concrete/natural one), nor to the other (i.e. the 
social/abstract/cultural one). The concept of gender, as emerged from the discussion above, 
has undergone a multitude of substantial changes; in this sense, we can say that is a concept 
constantly being redefined by social actors. And yet, some perceptual and physical 
characteristics can be still traced back to one’s own gender/sex, and those features are likely 
to lead people’s cognitive activities (e.g. when recognizing a face). My suggestion is that 
in order to account for abstract concepts, it could be useful to adopt a critical shift of 
perspective, such as the one implied in queer studies. As a matter of facts, recent 
developments in the field of conceptual knowledge seemed to already have adopted a queer 
perspective on concepts, partly rejecting oppositional binarisms. In this Chapter, my intent 
is to show how combining scientific advancements in the study of abstract concepts with 
critical positions such as the ones derived from queer studies might contribute to a partial 
redefinition of the concept of gender. Specifically, the concept of gender would result to be 
a literary example of how taking into account different factors we might gain a more 
specific knowledge of our ‘abstract’ conceptual system. Thus, my portrait of gender will 
result in the description of a concept that could be considered as an abstract one, if keeping 
in mind the account of abstract concepts developed in the previous Chapter. To this extent, 
I will endeavor in the following of this Chapter to define and analyze some of the possible 
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grounding sources of the concept of gender, in a grounded and pluralistic perspective—and 
through a queer epistemological lens.  
 
3.3. Queer Concepts: Investigating the Grounding Sources of Gender 
 
In keeping with the idea that our cognition, and our conceptual system, is entrenched 
in the physical and cultural environment, and that it is influenced by our specific corporeal 
asset (Barsalou, 2008a), the following pages will unfold an analysis of the concept of 
gender along three main axes which are crucial in EGC accounts of conceptual knowledge. 
The concept of gender will be examined in relation to its embodied, grounded and situated 
aspects. As Pezzulo and colleagues already pointed out (2011), the notions of embodiment, 
groundedness and situatedness are often treated together and interchangeably. While 
certainly the three are interrelated and connected, for speculative purposes a more refined 
distinction can be drawn among them. Embodied aspects, as depicted by Pezzulo et al. 
(2011) emerge as the “consequences of the filtering properties of our sensory and motor 
systems”, therefore are specifically bodily-dependent. Grounded aspects can be seen as 
somehow “superordinate” with respect to embodied influences, in that they appeal to the 
consequences of being part of a determined physical environment (e.g. our cognitive world 
is somehow constrained by the fact that our physical world is governed by gravity laws). 
Despite this clear description of groundedness, however, this concept is frequently adopted 
to describe approaches to cognition that sees it as a complex set of interrelated things, 
among which simulations, bodily and emotional states and situated actions (Pezzulo et al., 
2011). Ultimately, the label situatedness generally refers to the fact that our cognitive 
processes and our concepts are highly context-dependent (see Chapters 1 and 2). They can 
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evolve and change with experience, practice, habits and can take different forms according 
to contextual (linguistic and physical) constraints.  
Henceforth, this tripartition is not intended as dogmatic or fixed, as clearly it is hard 
to disentangle whether a process is primarily embodied, grounded or situated—and 
probably it would make little, or no sense at all. In fact, as already discussed in the previous 
Chapters of this dissertation, more than 20 years of research in the field of EG theories of 
cognition compellingly demonstrated that all those aspects are intertwined, constantly 
interacting and contaminating each other. The tripartite model of analysis I am applying is 
thus only intended to serve expository purposes while at the same time exposing the 
complexity of both our conceptual system and of the concept of gender considered as an 
abstract concept in a comprehensive EG approach.   
 
3.4. Embodied Forms of Grounding  
 
Sex perceptions, discriminations and categorizations are highly valued social skills. 
Indeed, perceiving others’ sex has been defined a form of ‘compulsory judgment’ (Stangor, 
Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992), in that it occurs with quite remarkable precision and very 
quickly (Ito & Urland, 2003), and it has been hypothesized to serve adaptive functions (see 
the discussion on male-biased categorization in Johnson, Iida, & Tassinary, 2012). 
Obviously, just like a newborn is immediately categorized as a boy or a girl based on her/his 
external genitalia (see par. 3.1.1), the easiest way of inferring a person’s sex would be to 
look at her genitalia. As a matter of facts, in a seminal work Kessler and McKenna (1978) 
demonstrated that, among various gendered features (e.g. long hair vs. short hair, flat chest 
vs. breasts, penis vs. vulva) what drove the categorization of their participants when 
178 
 
 
 
required to decide whether the picture they were presented with was a man or a woman 
were, in fact, their genitalia—and in particular the presence of a penis. The authors 
concluded that ‘gender’ attribution is genital attribution, and specifically penis attribution 
(Kessler and McKenna, 1978, p. 153). Forty years after the intuitions of Kessler and 
McKenna, Wenzlaff, Briken and Dekker (2018), designed an experiment aimed at 
confirming this idea. The authors measured eye fixations of participants presented with 32 
black and white pictures of persons. Crucially, the stimuli used vary with regard of the 
combination of gendered cues: the drawings depicted persons with gender neutral face that 
could have exclusively male associated features (short hair, narrow hips, flat chest, body 
hair and penis), exclusively female like features (long hair, wide hips, breasts, no body hair 
and vulva), or a combination of either feminine secondary sexual markers and a penis or 
vice versa. Participants were required to decide whether the figure was more likely to be 
male or female. Their results partly confirmed Kessler and McKenna’s hypothesis: most of 
the gender attributions were made in keeping with the genitals being depicted. Importantly, 
when asked to categorize whether a figure presenting breasts, long hair, wide hips and a 
penis was a male or a female (incongruent condition) participants tended to judge the figure 
as male, while this pattern was softened in the reverse incongruent condition. As for eye-
tracking results, the authors reported that the areas that resulted to be central for gender 
attribution were head, chest and genitals.  
Hence, in order to categorize a person as either male or female we rely on our 
perceptual system scanning the external appearance of the person, and apparently genital 
discrimination constitutes the core of judgment. Typically, however, genitalia are covered 
by clothes, so that we must appeal to some other relevant features in order to decide; 
therefore, being the ‘primary’ sexual dimorphic characteristics concealed, the perceiver 
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focuses her attention to the ‘secondary’ sexual dimorphic features. The sense of vision is 
clearly the most commonly used to discriminate peoples’ sex–although auditory 
(Bachorowski & Owren, 1999) and olfactory (Penn et al., 2007) cues are quite precise as 
well–and the literature debating what are the most salient features that enable sex 
recognition is flourishing. For instance, facial traits conveying gendered features have been 
extensively studied, and empirical evidence converges in reporting a high level of accuracy 
in sex judgement based on facial cues such as eyebrows and face outlines (Yamaguchi, 
Hirukawa, & Kanazawa, 1995) even in the absence of specific sexual cues (Wild et al., 
2000). On the other hand, the role of specific perceptual bodily features in attributing 
sex/gender is nowadays well-established. Lippa (1983), for example reported that 
participants tended to rely primarily on the width of the waist when attributing gender than 
on the breadth of shoulders. Measures related to waist are among the most commonly used 
parameters allowing sex discrimination: in particular, a measure called waist-to-hip ratio 
(WHR, see Singh, 1993) was found to be a salient predictor of gender attribution. 
Henceforth, the morphology of human body brings important information regarding one’s 
own sex/gender, that the perceiver uses to navigate the social space. In a set of studies, 
Johnson and Tassinary (2005) took a leap forward in the unraveling of which features are 
determinant in sex/gender judgements. They speculated that while for the attribution of sex 
morphology would be predominantly employed (as suggested by studies investigating the 
role of WHR), in assigning ‘gender’–which they intended as being masculine or feminine–
patterns of motion would be more crucial. They presented participants with animated 
human beings walking, that varied in WHR (i.e. hourglass shape vs. tubular shape) and in 
motion pattern (i.e. extreme shoulder swagger vs. extreme hips sway). Every other 
observable sexual characteristic was removed from pictures. The authors recorded eye 
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movements of participants that were subsequently requested to judge whether the picture 
represented a male, a female and whether it was masculine or feminine. Results showed 
that overall, in sex judgements morphology was the key factor, while gender judgments 
were equally influenced by the morphology and the motion of the targets. In accordance 
with previous findings, waist and hips held the majority of dwell time (40%) and fixations 
(9.9).  
Henceforth, both visual-perceptual cues and knowledge of typical masculine-
feminine behaviors (e.g., the way women and man walk) are key factors in determining 
one’s own sex/gender. Notably, these perceptual hints are employed almost without effort, 
driving our categorization accurately. But where is this knowledge processed and 
represented? And more importantly, is sex/gender attribution just a matter of perceptual 
discriminability or does it entail other higher-cognitive skills? And above all, are the two 
processes distinct? 
    
3.4.1. Brain representation of sex/gender. Sex/gender, as characterized in the 
previous paragraph, is a perceptual feature of tantamount importance, whose saliency is 
conveyed by specific visual patterns. Early findings coming from neuroimaging studies 
failed to identify a specific region of interest in the perception and discrimination of 
gendered faces. For instance, Kaul, Rees and Ishai (2011) mapped face-responsive brain 
regions of the broad system of face network (FG, IOG, STS, AMG, INS, IFG and OFG) 
while asking participants to rate the attractiveness of male and female faces. Using 
multivariate pattern analysis, they found that signals from FG, IOG, STS, INS, IFG and 
OFG held significant information allowing to decode the gender of the stimuli. The authors 
reported that no increase in mean levels of brain activity of specific areas was evident for 
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gender recognition. Therefore, they concluded that information about gendered faces is not 
localized in a single region, rather it is represented in several face-responsive regions. 
Converging evidence showing how multiple face-recognition brain areas are involved in 
the categorization of gender evidenced how fusiform face area (FFA) and the lateral 
fusiform gyrus (FG) generally encode information of sexually dimorphic faces (Freeman, 
Rule, Adams, & Ambady, 2010). Fusiform face area is generally understood as the locus 
of face identity representations, among which sex, race4, and age are automatically coded 
(Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). In the effort to disambiguate whether race and gender could 
be localized in different regions of FFA, Contreras, Banaji and Mitchell (2013) scanned 
participants’ brain activity using fMRI, while participants were requested to categorize sex 
and race of depicted persons (males, females, Black and White). Multivariate pattern 
analysis showed that multivoxel patterns in FFA (but not other face-selective brain regions) 
distinguished faces by sex and race. Specifically, a distinct pattern of activation was 
observed between male and female faces and Black and White faces. The authors pointed 
out that the differences they found in multivoxel patterns related to sex and race were small 
but statistically reliable. Contreras and colleagues discuss their findings claiming that social 
categories representations such as sex and race might be part of face identity 
representations, i.e. intertwined with the recognition of a face, which are thought to take 
place in FFA. In their words “FFA could be the neuroanatomical locus in which social 
categories that are relevant to face identity (i.e. age, race, and sex) are integrated to form 
holistic representations of individual faces”.  
                                                     
4 The term ‘race’ is here used to conform to the literature cited. Although the term ‘ethnicity’ would be 
more appropriate, I will keep this presentation consistent with the terms employed by the authors. 
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Importantly, FFA (i.e. fusiform gyrus) is part of a more extended brain area, namely 
the Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL). ATL includes temporal pole and anterior portions of 
the fusiform, inferior, middle, superior and parahippocampal gyrus. Superior aspects of the 
ATL are also adjacent to insula (INS) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). A unique 
characterization of the ATL in terms of its functionality is still debated, in that ATL results 
to be “a transitional region where many different cortical regions met” (Olson, McCoy, 
Klobusicky, & Ross, 2013, p. 123), and therefore it is likely engaged in different functions. 
Some scholars, however, pointed out that ATL activity might be related to various aspects 
of social cognition, as a number of neuroimaging studies testifies (for reviews see Olson, 
Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; Simmons & Martin, 2009). Among those aspects, some are 
particularly relevant for this discussion. For instance, fMRI studies indicated that a ventral 
region of ATL resulted to be decisive for memory of persons (reviewed in Olson et al., 
2013): in fact, lesions to ATL were found to frequently cause “associative prosopagnosia” 
that differently from “apperceptive prosopagnosia” in which the patient is unable to 
recognize a person on the basis of perceptual cues, impairs the patient’s capacity to 
associate information about who is the person in question (e.g. her name, the relation that 
they hold, biographical information). Dorsal and polar regions of ATL were also related to 
higher forms of social cognition, such as the ability to infer others’ mental states, or Theory 
of Mind- related skills (Olson et al., 2013, 2007; Simmons & Martin, 2009). Overall, the 
contribution of ATL regions is discussed in three main lines of research: face recognition, 
semantic processing and social cognition (see Chapter 2, par. 2.9.1). As for its contribution 
to semantic processing, it is no surprise–given the aforementioned body of evidence–that 
ATL is of primary interest when it comes to social concepts. The debate concerning the 
alleged ‘supra-modality’ of ATL was already introduced in the previous Chapter (see par. 
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2.9.1), together with some of the most recent findings indicating ATL as the 
neuroanatomical locus of social concepts. 
Further evidence supporting the view that regions comprised in the ATL are crucial 
in abstract social concepts comes from another line of studies. Zahn and colleagues (2007) 
for instance, compared the neural activation elicited by couples of social (e.g. ‘honor’ and 
‘brave’) and non-social (‘nutritious’ and ‘useful’) concepts, using fMRI techniques while 
participants performed a meaning relatedness task. Their results show that social concepts 
consistently activated a superior region of the temporal lobe. Importantly, the authors 
framed their results in the debate on the activations of temporal pole regions connected with 
the simple processing of abstract words: they pointed out that since their analyses were 
carefully adjusted in terms of imageability (that is generally correlated with concreteness), 
the different patterns of activations they found between social concepts and animal function 
concepts (the control stimuli) cannot be ascribed to a difference in abstractness. Moreover, 
subsequent regression analyses showed that the degree of activation in the superior anterior 
temporal region was increased as a function of the extent to which concepts described social 
behavior (see also Zahn et al., 2009). These results were partly replicated in a study by Ross 
and Olson (2010), in which overlapping regions of ATL were found to be active both in 
the similarity judgment task previously performed by Zahn and colleagues and in a ‘social 
task’. Specifically, the social task they chose consisted in deciding whether geometrical 
shapes suggesting social relations and agency portrayed in moving scenes were ‘friends’ or 
not. The overlap of brain activated areas between the social task and the lexical task was 
evident in the left but not in the right of ATL. The authors argued that the social attribution 
in scenes like the ones used in their task (basically animations) elicits the activation of 
general semantic network in the ATLs, thus social semantic representations might be 
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triggered not only by lexical stimuli but also by pictorial cartoons given that they often 
involve interactions between people and anthropomorphic agents. They concluded that 
ATL areas are activated because these kinds of tasks require the retrieval of semantic 
information specific to social situations. This view reconciles perspectives ascribing the 
activation of ATL to semantic processing (Lambon-Ralph and Patterson, 2008; Patterson 
et al., 2007, Rogers et al., 2004) and those referring primarily to social tasks (Zahn et al., 
2007; 2009)5.  
Further insights indicating a strict relation between ATL and social semantic 
knowledge come from the few studies investigating stereotypes (cf. Olson et al., 2013). 
Given the pivotal role ATLs regions exhibited in social processing, Gallate and colleagues 
(2011) hypothesized that the inhibition of the activity in those areas could result in a 
decrease of stereotyped behaviors. Using transcranical stimulations (TMS) on ATL regions 
the authors designed an adapted version of IAT (Implicit Association Task) in which 
traditional good-bad and black-white pairs of words were replaced by “terrorist” and “law-
abider” and “Arabic” and “Non-Arabic” couples. Their results show that both left and right 
ATL transcranical stimulations significantly reduced IAT scores, indicating lower 
prejudicial attitudes. Neuroimaging studies corroborated these findings, suggesting that 
ATLs might contain conceptual associations that lead to overgeneralizations and 
stereotypes of social groups. Contreras, Banaji and Mitchell (2012), for instance, performed 
an fMRI study with the aim of disambiguating between knowledge regarding social and 
non-social categories. They asked participants to perform a categorical knowledge task in 
which pairs of nouns were to be associated with relevant features. Crucially, the stimuli 
                                                     
5 For an account of different contributions of left ATL and right ATL to representation of social and non-
social concepts see Pobric, Lambon-Ralph & Zahn (2015). 
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included social groups forming stereotypical categories (e.g. man-woman) and objects (e.g. 
guitar-violin), and the properties were balanced following the same ratio (e.g. ‘watches 
romantic movies’ or ‘has strings’). The authors reported activation for objects in typical 
semantic-related areas (inferior frontal gyrus and inferotemporal cortex), while activation 
in these areas didn’t differ from the baseline when participants were presented with social 
categories. Instead, areas of the anterior temporal cortex like the ones described before were 
found to be selectively activated.  
Recently, Freeman and Johnson (2016) proposed a dynamic interactive model (DI) 
accounting for social perception. In contrast with previous understandings of social 
categorizations, according to which social perception is the result of perceptual features 
associations that in turn prompt category’s formation, the authors argued that multiple 
information sources are integrated in social perception. Specifically, they claimed that 
social perception and categorization arise from the dynamic interaction of both visual 
processing of facial features and high-order social cognitive processes such as stereotypes, 
attitudes, and goals. In their perspective, high-order social skills inform the system with 
additional feedback, constraining and contributing to the formation of category activation 
and featural representation. The authors conceived categorical activation (e.g. male) and 
featural representation (e.g. larger jaw) as the result of not only lower-level visual 
processing, but also of already activated stereotypes (e.g. aggressive) in a “top-down 
fashion”. In their model Freeman and Johnson evidenced the relative contribution of precise 
neural areas to the process of social perception, including the fusiform gyrus (FG), 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior temporal lobe (ATL). The authors suggested that 
the network sustains quick and flexible integration of bottom-up perceptual cues and 
higher-order social cognitive processes. In their words: “Not only are visual perceptions of 
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other people malleable to higher-order social cognition, but the dynamics of these 
perceptions, in turn, may uniquely impact higher-order processes and bear downstream 
effects on social evaluation and behavior.” 
Sex/gender categorization, therefore, emerges from the interplay of basic perceptual 
skills and more ‘abstract’ forms of knowledge. The evidence canvassed so far on the role 
of ATLs in sex/gender categorization supports an embodied and grounded view of gender 
as a complex abstract social concept (see discussion in Borghi et al., 2018): in fact, 
sex/gender discrimination seems to rely not only on physical salient features, but it is 
constructed and represented through the integration of relevant social information. Those 
two aspects interact and are coupled, resulting in the articulation of the category of 
sex/gender.  
 
3.5. Grounded Forms of Grounding 
 
3.5.1. Faces beyond dichotomies 
 
Adults don’t ask. Adults are afraid to ask, “What are you?” so we ask 
“What do you do?” …in hopes of getting a clue to someone’s identity—
gender identity seems to be an unspeakable thing in our culture, just as 
names are considered unspeakable in some other cultures. […] When it 
comes to sex and gender, we’re supposed to observe discreetly and draw 
our own conclusions. (Bornstein, 1994, p. 10) 
 
Bornstein’s quotation from the pivotal book Gender Outlaw (1994) is embedded in 
the context of several considerations on transgender people’s appearances, and specifically 
on lay people’s reactions to their appearances. The fact is, as Bornstein portrayed, that in 
our cultural world, you either are perceptually a boy, or a girl. Every other configuration 
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renders the sex/gender categorization–that as emerged from the previous paragraphs is a 
key feature in face recognition–problematic, at least. Hence, adults try to find other ways 
to understand what “category” a transgender person belongs to. But, as Bornstein pointed 
out “Children still ask” (Bornstein, 1994, p.11). Indeed, children learn at very early 
developmental stages to distinguish genders in their environment. Around 3–4 months, 
infants are able to discriminate male from female voices, and by the second half of the first 
year of life they develop what psychologist call “intermodal” associative skills, allowing 
them to associate e.g. female voices with female faces. Finally, before the age of one, they 
can associate pictures of males with culturally stereotyped items such as hammers (Levy & 
Haaf, 1994), and as they enter the second year of age they show refined associative skills 
related to gender categories. Specifically, children become progressively aware of 
culturally specific stereotypes, so that they generally look longer to pictures showing a man 
putting lipstick or a woman hammering (Poulin‐Dubois, Serbin, Eichstedt, Sen, & Beissel, 
2002; Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001; Serbin, Poulin‐Dubois, & 
Eichstedt, 2002). Therefore, gender representations seem to follow a developmental path 
starting from the processing of visual, tactile and auditory information and progressively 
adding layers of knowledge through the observation of frequent patterns of social activities, 
resulting in a sophisticated gender-knowledge (see Chapter 5 in Fausto-Sterling, 2012, for 
a recent discussion see 2019).  
Despite the ease children show in gender categorization, the gendered world is not 
composed of only two neat categories. Rather, our environment is filled of diversity, a 
biological and social “rainbow” (Roughgarden, 2004) spreading its colors from the animal 
world to the human society. As already discussed in the course of this Chapter, 
sexes/genders come in variety. Transgender spectrum individuals, for instance, often 
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experience being misgendered, and this misclassification leads to negative sensations 
including negative affect, less perceived authenticity, less identity strength and coherence, 
and more transgender felt stigma (McLemore, 2015). The reader might wonder, therefore, 
what is at the basis of the evaluation and recognition of non-stereotypical gendered faces. 
When traditional perceptual and physical aspects such as the ones describes in the previous 
sections fail, what accounts for gender categorization?  
With the aim of identifying cultural stereotypes connected with transgender 
individuals’ appearance, Gazzola and Morrison (2014) designed a study that included both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses. They first asked participants in three focus groups 
how did they perceived society to view transgender men and women, and subsequently 
which stereotype traits they personally endorse regarding transgender men and women. 
They analyzed the results of their focus groups using thematic analysis, and they reported 
the emergence of eight main themes. Among those themes, some are particularly 
interesting: participants tended to assign primary importance to the sex transgender 
individuals were born with, rather than their gender identity, and this tendency is reflected 
in the judgments they gave regarding physical appearance. To illustrate, transgender 
women were believed to display physical attributes in accordance with their birth sex (e.g. 
large shoulders, large hands). The most important trait for the purposes of this discussion, 
is related to the perceived “abnormality” of transgender appearance. Gazzola and Morrison 
reported that participants often referred to transgender women and men as “odd, different 
and gross” (Gazzola and Morrison, p. 81). In sum, participants believed that transgender 
people looked different from non-transgender people. As suggested by recent 
developments in the field of social perception (Freeman and Johnson, 2016), expectations 
and previous stereotypical knowledge regarding specific social groups are likely to shape 
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both perception and categorization of people in a two-way interaction from perceptual cues 
to higher forms of cognitive skills.  
In a set of studies, Huart, Corneille and Becquart (2005) provided evidence in 
support of the idea that prior knowledge impacts subsequent categorization and memory 
for gender-ambiguous faces. In one of their studies, participants were told they would be 
presented with a picture of either “Jean” (i.e. a French masculine name) or “Marie” (i.e. a 
French feminine name). They were therefore shown pictures of a visually androgynous face 
and afterwards asked to categorize the face as either male or female, and to sort the original 
face from a series of pictures. In addition to the target (original) picture, among those 
pictures two were feminized faces and two were masculinized faces. The authors reported 
that participants categorized the pictures as either male or female faces accordingly with 
the label (Jean/Marie): 13 out of 15 pictures labelled as Jean were categorized as male, and 
the same proportion was evident for the female condition. Crucially, memory for target 
items was also affected by the gendered linguistic label provided by the experimenters: the 
same extremely gender ambiguous face appeared to be misrecollected depending on the 
gender information previously attached to it. In fact, 24 of 30 participants in the study failed 
to recollect the face from the set of pictures, showing a tendency towards more feminized 
faces when the label previously presented were feminine and vice versa. Wittlin and 
colleagues (2018) confirmed this pattern in a set of studies exploring how expectations and 
memory for a given face vary as a function of whether the face is said to belong to a 
transgender or a non-transgender individual. Their results showed that participants tended 
to remember an androgynous face as physically feminine if they were told that was a 
cisgender woman face, and the reverse pattern was true when they were told the face 
belonged to a cisgender man. Conversely, participants who were told the face belonged to 
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a transgender woman or man, in the recognition task were less likely that participant who 
were told the face belonged to a cisgender woman or man to assign the gender congruent 
version of the face. In addition, participants in the ‘transgender condition’ remembered as 
more androgynous the face they attended to with respect to participants in the ‘cisgender’ 
condition, even though the picture depicted the same individual. To summarize, Wittlin and 
colleagues demonstrated that overall people expect transgender individuals to look less 
gender congruent than cis-gender individuals. 
Social psychologists have largely studied traits related to the evaluations of both 
feminine and masculine faces, highlighting the role of dimensions like trustworthiness and 
dominance as well as attractiveness in the perceived positivity or negativity of a face. For 
instance, Stern and Rule (2018) demonstrated that people tended to rate more negatively 
transgender people faces when they had androgynous traits, compared to when they had 
typically masculine or feminine facial features. Furthermore, Sutherland and colleagues 
(2015) showed that female faces with counter-stereotypical facial traits (e.g. masculine and 
“dominant” perceived females) were rated more negatively and descripted in less positive 
terms than both the stereotypical feminine faces and the counter-stereotypical masculine 
faces, from both females and males. Intriguingly, though, one of the strongest predictors of 
prejudicial attitudes towards transgender individuals resulted to be respondents’ own 
gender identity. Gerhardstein and Anderson (2010) found that men had significantly more 
negative evaluations for transgender people’s facial appearance than women when 
measured on a set of dimensions such as attractiveness, Osgood’s (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975) evaluative dimension and supposed 
mental health. 
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This brief discussion evidenced how, when supposed sexually dimorphic 
characteristics are left aside, such as in the case of some transgender individuals’ facial 
appearance, other factors contribute to the sex/gender categorization and representation. 
Among those, expectations, stereotypes and symbolic or metaphoric thinking (e.g. 
dimensions such as potency, trustworthiness and attractiveness) connected to the gender 
binary system appear to be relevant cues (Oh, Dotsch, Porter, & Todorov, 2019; Sutherland, 
Oldmeadow, & Young, 2016).  
   
3.5.2. Metaphorical thinking and symbolic associations. In her inspiring book 
The Lenses of Gender (Bem, 1993), feminist psychologist Bem identified three lenses 
through which it is possible to observe how biology, culture, and what she called ‘the 
individual psyche’ all interact to perpetrate the oppression of women and sexual minorities. 
Those lenses are androcentrism, biological essentialism, and gender polarization. Gender 
polarization is intended as the belief that the perceived differences between men and 
women stand as organizing principles of societal life and culture. Bem claimed that gender 
polarization operates in two ways: first, it defines mutually exclusive scripts for being male 
and female; second, it defines any person or behavior that deviates from the script as–at 
least–problematic (cf. Bem, 1993, p. 81). The effect of these two interconnected processes 
is to construct and naturalize a ‘gender-polarizing’ link between the sex of an individual 
and the characteristic features of her psyche and sexuality. As she clearly pointed out, the 
history of psychology and psychiatry has been dominated by the convictions that 
masculinity and femininity are two extremes and opposite ends of a single dimension.  
To contrast this dominant view, Bem started to investigate in the early 70s the 
concept of androgyny, developing an instrument aimed at measuring masculine and 
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feminine traits independently. The famous Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI, Bem, 1974) 
was designed to reflect psychological traits that American individuals considered to be 
salient and socially acceptable for women and men. The Inventory is composed of 60 
attributes, among which 20 were considered as typically masculine, 20 as typically 
feminine, and 20 were equally attributed to women and men. The items were selected from 
an initial large pool of attributes on the basis of the score they got from an independent 
sample of participants, who were asked to rate on a 7-points scale whether an attribute was 
“desirable” or not both for a man and for a woman in the American society. The BSRI 
therefore asks how well each attribute of the list describes one’s own personality; scores of 
masculinity and femininity are calculated independently on the basis of participants’ 
responses, and an androgyny score is calculated as well. Bem imagined this instrument as 
descriptive of one’s own “sex-typing”6 i.e. the degree to which a person self-definition and 
behavior are intertwined with stereotyped definitions and gender appropriateness in her 
culture. I found it useful to introduce some of the most relevant aspects of Bem’s work in 
this context because, even though possibly quite dated (for a recent discussion on the 
contemporary applicability of BSRI see Donnelly & Twenge, 2017), some of the attributes 
in the BSRI are rather interesting, and turned out to be recurrent conceptual features in the 
representations of masculinity and femininity.  
                                                     
6 The notions of “sex-typing” and of “androgyny”–that were introduced in this seminal work–received 
several critics over the time. In later works, Bem shifted the attention to what she came to call “Gender 
Schema Theory”, from which the notion of “gender-schematic” emerged (Bem, 1981, 1983). Gender 
schematicity is understood as the imposition of gender-based classification in the social reality. It is the 
underlying mechanism of “the sorting of persons, attributes, behaviors and other things on the base of polar 
definitions of masculinity and femininity that prevail in the culture” (Bem, 1993, p. 125). Importantly, in 
Bem’s perspective, gender-schematicity is both the process and the result of gendered classifications that take 
place from the infancy and consolidate through adulthood.  
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Although Bem clearly stated that the masculinity and femininity scales were 
conceived as independent measures, they present relevant similarities with a famous 
psychological tool, developed in the 50s by Osgood and colleagues (Osgood et al., 1975, 
1957), the Semantic Differential Scales (SD). Osgood (Osgood, 1952) traced back the 
origins of the SD method in research on synesthesia, a phenomenon occurring to certain 
individuals in which some sensations belonging to one modality “attach” to certain 
sensations pertaining to other modalities, and appear regularly whenever a stimulus of the 
latter occurs (one of the most famous examples concerns the attribution of colors to specific 
musical tones). With the aim of identifying recurrent semantic features in conceptual space, 
Osgood and colleagues grouped a total of 50 scales to be used in the judgement of 20 
concepts rated by 100 students, and subsequently submitted them to Factor Analysis. They 
singled out three main dimensions that accounted for the most of variance7. These 
dimensions were “evaluation” (e.g., good-bad), “potency” (e.g. hard-soft), and “activity” 
(e.g. active-passive). Importantly, the scales that compose the dimensions are bipolar and 
dichotomous. These three dimensions have been interpreted as corresponding to 
fundamental dimensions in the adjustment of the individual to the objects in her 
environment, so that for instance the evaluation dimension measures an individual’s 
tendency to approach or avoid a stimulus, the activity dimension is a measure of the 
necessity to make movements to interact with the stimulus (the dimension encompasses 
scales such as fast-slow; active-passive; excitable-calm; rash-cautious), whether the 
potency dimension is supposed to measure the amount of adjustment made to the stimulus 
(it includes scales like hard-soft; masculine-feminine; severe-lenient; strong-weak; 
                                                     
7 The complete system of SD is composed of eight main dimensions (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 
1957): evaluation, potency, activity, stability, tautness, novelty, receptivity and aggressiveness.  
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tenacious-yielding). If we take a closer look at the attributes in the BSRI, it is evident how 
a consistent number of descriptors of masculinity and femininity adhere to the SD. Among 
those, some are particularly salient. In the masculine side we find adjectives like aggressive, 
assertive, dominant, forceful, strong personality, willing to take risks, and of course 
masculine. On the other hand, in the feminine side adjectives listed include tender, gullible, 
gentle, flatterable, shy, yielding and feminine (Bem, 1974, p. 156). The resemblance with 
some of the poles of SD scales is evident, and what is even more striking is that some of 
the dimensions discussed above resulted to be also significant predictors of sex/gender 
categorization in face recognition (see previous paragraph).  
Hence, the conceptual articulation of masculinity and femininity seems to rely, 
besides other things, on some sort of “metaphorical” knowledge enclosed in some relevant 
semantic dimensions. Are those dimensions universal? As a matter of facts, Osgood and 
colleagues provided cross-cultural evidence suggesting that some of the dimensions are 
equally important in different cultures, and elicit the same conceptual associations among 
cultures (see Osgood et al., 1975, and the discussion on anthropological findings suggesting 
a universal association between up-bright-good and down-dark-bad in Osgood, 1952). 
More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the potency dimension has been found 
to correlate with masculinity and femininity evaluations in a number of psycholinguistic 
studies investigating the conceptual underpinnings of grammatical gender across cultures 
(e.g. Ervin, 1962; Konishi, 1993; Zubin & Köpke, 1981, 1984). Overall, those studies 
demonstrated that masculine names were rated as more ‘forceful’ while feminine names as 
‘weak’ (for an in-depth discussion, see par. 3.6.1).  
Gendered categorizations are also carried out by implicit associations with objects–
as shown by the developmental literature–and colors. Besides the canonical cultural 
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association blue-male and pink-female (Paoletti, 1987), some scholars have hypothesized 
that a much broader dimension might be crucial in gendered-colors associations, viz. the 
bright-dark bipolar scale. In fact, several cultural traditions seem to rely on the implicit 
association between gender and brightness: white, for instance is the color of virginity (in 
some Western societies brides wear a white dress), while black is usually culturally 
associated with authority and seriousness, which in turn are often associated with men (cf. 
Semin & Palma, 2014). Moreover, the visual opposition between bright and dark has been 
found to map metaphorical thinking about good and evil (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004). 
It is possible, therefore, that visual patterns constitute the sensory scaffold for reasoning 
about more abstract categories, in keeping with the Conceptual Metaphor tradition (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980). Recently, however Semin and colleagues (e.g. Semin & Palma, 2014; 
Semin, Palma, Acartürk, & Dziuba, 2018) suggested how the cognitive representation of 
gender might be grounded in the sexual dimorphism of skin color, and as a second step it 
would be culturally reinforced and encoded in the brightness dimension. Inspired by 
anthropological and biological evidence showing that overall females have lighter skin than 
males, the authors proposed that this encoded difference might implicitly drive 
performances on a variety of tasks. Indeed, across different experimental and cross-cultural 
studies, the dimension of brightness (light-dark) resulted to be associated with masculinity 
and femininity. For example, in a classification task, masculine names were processed 
faster when they were presented in dark colors with respect to light colors, while feminine 
names showed the reverse pattern (Semin & Palma, 2014). In a recent paper (Sebastián-
Enesco & Semin, 2019), the authors extended their findings concerning the grounding of 
gender in the brightness dimension to a sample of non-industrialized participants (the Wichí 
community, Salta, Argentina) and compared them with a Spanish sample of participants. 
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Interestingly, their samples in both communities included both adults and children. In two 
experiments, they used a newly developed task, in which children and adults were requested 
to choose for a female (or male) target person between two identical objects that differed 
only for their degree of brightness. Crucially, they manipulated brightness on the green 
scale, rather than on the typical white-black scale. The results showed that the children from 
the two cultural communities were more likely to choose a lighter colored object for the 
female target and a darker version of the same object for the male target. In both 
communities of interest, the pattern held constant irrespectively of the age of participants—
with the only exception of male Wichí participants. 
These findings suggest that, at least to some extent, the grounding of gender 
includes a perceptual component constituted by colors associations such as the ones 
described before. Clearly though, color associations are subjected to cultural practices that 
are able to reinforce or weaken them. It is possible that these established unconscious 
associations affect our way of categorizing in terms of gender in shallow tasks, while deeper 
elaboration might recruit other sources of grounding.  
 
3.5.3. Internal and experiential forms of grounding. Gender has always been 
deemed a pervasive psychological construct. Traditionally, psychological research 
addressed the topic of gender in the context of a binary system, opposing men to women 
while only recently is this bigenderist8 assumption starting to be challenged. Specifically, 
                                                     
8 In a bigenderist perspective, there are only two genders that map onto two sexes—male and female. 
Importantly, this strict categorization influences the perception of gender displays that exceeds this binary, 
such as transgender individuals and or cross-dressers, which are regarded as ‘outsiders’. Moreover, 
historically the two genders were considered to have different weights and importance, resulting in the 
oppression of the category of women. Some scholars coming from different research areas are nowadays 
challenging the bigenderist assumption, rejecting both its biological constitution and its social implications. 
Gilbert (2009), for instance, at the end of an essay dedicated to the examination of bigenderism and its social 
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a gender binary system entails that “there are two discrete categories into which all 
individuals can be sorted […] and one’s category membership is biologically determined, 
apparent at birth, stable over time, salient and meaningful to the self, and a host of 
psychological variables”(Hyde et al., 2019, p. 1). To date, based on the bigenderist 
assumption, scientists attempted to uncover traits and attitudes distinctive for the two 
categories. Instrumental tools like scales measuring the degree of gender congruence and 
“sex-typing” of adults and children (Bem, 1981; Slaby & Frey, 1975) were used as direct 
measure of gender experiences. Some influent proposals highlighted the complexity of 
gender experiences and subsequent attainment to gender roles, discussing in particular the 
intertwinement between socially learned features and biological factors in the constitution 
of gender identity and stereotyped traits (Spence & Buckner, 2000). The notion according 
to which a monolithic and bipolar concept of masculinity-femininity could be inferred from 
the attainment of individuals to directly observable sets of gender-differentiating attributes 
(such as the traditionally used BSRI items) was criticized by Spence and Buckner (2000), 
who claimed that “gender-related characteristics and beliefs have diverse etiological roots, 
that vary widely from one individual to another within each gender” (p. 60). They suggested 
that, beside one’s own sense of gender identity, other factors play a causal role in the 
development of gender stereotyped behaviors, such as personal temperaments and attitudes, 
                                                     
and behavioral entailments proposed a radical model, viz. ‘Non-genderism’. According to ‘Non-Genderism’ 
there would not be a binary distinction based on the supposedly dimorphic sexual characteristics of people, 
and no societal valuation rendering masculine more valuable than feminine (cf. p. 107). Clearly, behavioral 
patterns such as being nurturing, aggressive and so on would still exist; but the difference with a bigenderist 
conception is that those behaviors would only be considered for what they are, namely behaviors. No further 
association with any specific gender would be inferred from them. In Gilbert’s perspective, (but see also Bem, 
1993; Risman, 2004), such a non-gendered world would be the basis for eliminating sexism and 
androcentrism from our social structures.   
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social models provided by parents and other social actors, and the value system that an 
individual is exposed to.  
A growing line of research is instead currently facing gender related issues 
questioning the traditional binary system from neuroscientific, behavioral, biological and 
physiological perspectives (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1993; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; 
Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; Olson, Key, & Eaton, 2015; Roughgarden, 2004; van 
Anders et al., 2011). The recent interest for gender-nonconforming individuals in 
psychological sciences is also attested by the APA publication (2015) of recommended 
guidelines for psychological practice with transgender and gender-nonconforming 
individuals, alongside with critical reviews on the topic (Matsuno & Budge, 2017; Mueller, 
De Cuypere, & T’Sjoen, 2017) Overall, researchers are becoming gradually aware of the 
predominance of a gender-binary perspective in the scientific literature. Even though the 
interest for gender non-conforming experiences is not completely new–the existence 
through history and across diverse cultures of individuals whose gender identities are not 
confined into the gender binary system is in fact well documented (e.g., Devor, 1997; Herdt, 
1993)–in the western culture, studies on non-conforming gender identities were generally 
focused on clinical populations and mainly aimed at assessing gender dysphoria (e.g., 
Coolidge, Thede, & Young, 2002; Deogracias et al., 2007). With this respect, there have 
been important changes in the fifth edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), that updated its section on ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ changing the label into 
‘Gender Dysphoria’. In doing so, people who experience a feeling of discomfort in being 
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socially identified with the gender ‘corresponding’ to their natal sex, are no more 
considered to suffer from a mental disorder9.  
The notion of gender non-conforming, or genderqueer, has only recently appeared 
in the measurements of some researchers. Terms such as genderqueer, or non-binary 
gender, and gender non-conforming are umbrella terms introduced to account for those 
people who feel traditional labels do not fit with their identities10 (Richards et al., 2016). 
As pointed out by Richards and colleagues, non-binary or genderqueer identities might 
appear a recent and under-represented phenomenon, but it is possible that people who 
would have previously identified themselves as transsexuals (i.e. moving across the gender 
binary but still in the binary framework) would have nowadays identified themselves as 
genderqueer, if that label existed. The authors outlined that individuals reporting a 
discomfort with their gender (usually linked with their sex) have been historically treated 
as having some forms of gender identity disorder, regardless of the specific aspects this 
inference might have carried. Thus, people who do not identified with the gender ‘related’ 
to their birth sex, people who felt they were both genders or neither of them could have 
been conflated into the same label. Moreover, studies investigating the incidence of gender 
dysphoric feelings in population traditionally looked to individuals who seek for sex 
reassignment surgery (SRS) or hormone treatments to affirm their experienced gender, and 
this could have lead to an underestimation of the percentage of individuals experiencing 
some forms of gender distressing who do not seek, for various reasons, for this kind of 
treatments. In a study from 2014, for instance, Kuyper and Wijsen (Kuyper & Wijsen, 
                                                     
9 For further insights see https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-
dysphoria. 
10 For a critique to the notion of ‘queer’ as an umbrella term see e.g., Anzaldúa (1991).  
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2014) examined the presence of ambivalent and/or incongruent gender identities or gender 
dysphoric feelings among a large sample of Dutch participants. Through the assessment of 
several aspects related to gender distress, the authors provided evidence that gender 
dysphoric conditions are composed of a set of dimensions, which are not always reducible 
to the incidence of participants undergoing SRS or hormonal treatments. In fact, only 1.1% 
of natal men and 0.8 % of natal women included in their sample reported an incongruent 
gender identity, while 4.6% of natal men and 3.2% of natal women reported an ambivalent 
gender identity.  
Nowadays, there is an increasing awareness of different gender experiences, and the 
legal and bureaucratic system is generally evolving to afford several options (e.g. third or 
neutral gender recognition on documents in some countries). The intent of introducing these 
notions is therefore aimed at exploring the conceptualization of people’s gender identity, 
avoiding the pathologisation of those individuals whose gender identity doesn’t match with 
the sex assigned them at birth, or that simply are not satisfied with a bigenderist description 
of their gender and/or sexual identity (Ansara & Hegarty, 2014). For example, Galupo and 
colleagues (2017) asked to a sample of 197 individuals who self-identified as either gender 
variant or a-gender to describe their gender identities, focusing on their own “lived 
experience” rather than on traditional labels. The aim of the study was to investigate 
through descriptions used by non-binary individuals which features they considered as 
central for their gender identity. Their findings showed that thematic features in the self-
descriptions of participants’ gender identities were cues like “fluidity” and “mixture or 
rejection” of the traditional gender binary system. Moreover, some participants explicitly 
expressed the need for terms moving “beyond”, rather than “between” the two gender poles 
of woman and man in their descriptions (for a discussion on labels describing the sexual 
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orientation of transgender individuals see Galupo, Henise, & Mercer, 2016). Similarly, 
Kuper, Nussbam & Mustanski (2012) investigated current and past gender identities, sexual 
orientations and surgery and hormonal statuses of individuals who identify with a gender 
identity other than the gender associated with their birth sex (“Anyone who does not 
identify strictly as their ‘male’ or ‘female’ birth sex is encouraged to participate, whether 
you identify as transgender, genderqueer, intersex, or you enjoy deconstructing gender 
through drag and so on” p. 246). Specifically, the authors were interested in the analysis of 
all the possible gender identities generally included in the umbrella-term of transgender. 
Interestingly, genderqueer was found to be the most frequently reported gender identity 
(55.1% of participants), along with changes of gender identity over time. Hence, although 
the label genderqueer is still largely absent from the academic literature, these studies 
express the need of contemplating more gender categories with respect to just women and 
men.  
Interestingly, non-conforming gender experiences were also found to be an 
important aspect of “normative”11 individuals’ perception of their gender identity. Joel and 
colleagues (2014), compared the scores of a new tool, the Multi-GIQ questionnaire which 
accounted for dimensions like gender identity, gender dysphoria and gender performativity 
among people who identified themselves as men, women and queer. Their findings 
evidenced that non-conforming gender experiences are not limited to non-conforming 
gender identities. In fact, among men and women enrolled in the study, over 35% reported 
to feel to some extent as the “opposite” gender, as both genders, or as neither. Although 
                                                     
11 With the term “normative” in this literature are usually indicated those people who feel their assigned 
birth sex is aligned with their perceived or expressed gender identity. Thus, an example of a normative identity 
in this scenario would be a natal female identifying herself with the label woman.  
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those feelings were especially prevalent in queer individuals with respect to men and 
women, there were no significant differences between the three groups. Crucially, the 
Multi-GIQ questionnaire is designed as to allow an independent measurement of perceiving 
oneself as a man and as a woman: therefore, it is able to reflect participants’ ambivalence 
towards a masculine and feminine gender identity. In addition, the authors conceived the 
questionnaire in compliance with the idea that affirmed gender identity is not a unitary 
construct, and is not necessarily stable over time. Lately, those findings were replicated and 
implemented through the examination of a self-identified cis-gender sample of participants, 
that showed how the presence of “queer” feelings is widely spread even among those 
individuals who are expected to conform to the gender binary system. In fact, 38% of 
participants reported to feel sometimes as both a man and a woman, 35% as neither; 38% 
further expressed a wish of being the “opposite” gender and 35% a desire to have the body 
of the “other” sex (Jacobson & Joel, 2018). The authors successively compared the cis-
gender sample with both a transgender and a gender-variant sample of participants 
(Jacobson & Joel, 2019). Overall, their results suggest that cis-gender, transgender and 
gender diverse individuals endorse a wide range of gender experiences. The results were 
interpreted by the authors as stressing the multidimensionality and fluidity of the 
conceptualization of gender, that emerged as a complex construct rather than binary and 
dichotomous. Differently from traditional gender identity measurements, the scale also 
included the dimension of performativity. Gender performativity is conceived as the effect 
of a regulatory regime of gender differences, in which genders are differentiated and 
organized in hierarchy. Through performative acts, a gendered identity is not only 
communicated, but is also created and presented in social contexts (cf. Butler, 1988). 
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Considered in this perspective, gender identity’s conceptualization seems to resent 
of factors which are strictly related with one’s own personal experience. Internal feelings 
and sensations, together with emotions might represent a grounding mechanism for 
thinking and reasoning about gender at a deeper level. These internal and embodied factors 
are also likely to be relevant for the re-enactment of one’s own gender expression, affording 
different gendered performances. Crucially, conceiving gender as a complex construct, not 
exhausted by the dichotomy male/female (or sex/gender as representative of the dichotomy 
nature/culture) may allow to uncover potential grounding mechanisms beyond the ones 
traditionally investigated. In this sense, it could be important to queer the concept of gender 
also in psychological measurements, by acknowledging both the existence of different 
experiences and its result on conceptualization. 
 
3.6. Situated Forms of Grounding 
 
3.6.1. Language and gender. In the previous paragraphs I focused on how 
sex/gender, expressed through physical, perceptual and internally experienced 
characteristics, informs our cognitive world dividing it into distinct categories. 
Nevertheless, gender is also a grammatical feature, that together with number, person and 
case separates nouns into classes. Indeed, almost half of the languages in the world possess 
a grammatical gender. Whether a language encodes gender in relation to biological sex, or 
to some other criteria on the other hand, is a highly variable. As a matter of facts, the word 
gender derives from the Greek γένος, that indicates ‘kind’, rather than ‘sex’. A frequently 
cited example of this variability is the classification system of Dyirbal (Australia), 
described in several works by Dixon (Dixon, 1972, 1982) and reinterpreted by Lakoff 
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(Lakoff, 1987). The Dyirbal language is described as a semantic system with four genders, 
that classifies entities on the base of rules denoting important properties:  
 
 
Figure 6. Gender assignment in Dyirbal (retrieved from Kilarski, 2013, p. 214). 
 
Two pivotal rules, according to Dixon, account for gender assignment in Dyirbal. 
On the one hand, entities are included in a specific gender in order to evidence a salient 
property (typically harmfulness), so that dangerous fishes and plants are included in gender 
II instead of I and IV; on the other hand, myths and beliefs seem to shape the constitution 
of gender assignments. For instance, birds are considered to be the spirits of dead women, 
thus they are assigned to gender II rather than to gender I. Lakoff (1987) interpreted this 
system of gender assignment in terms of radial structures, centered on a prototype that share 
relevant properties with the other constituent entities of the category. In this perspective, 
the supposed arbitrariness of Dyirbal gender assignment system is rather explained by 
appealing to some salient cognitive characteristics (e.g. harmfulness, myths)12 (see also 
Kilarski, 2013).  
                                                     
12 The Dyirbal ‘gender’ classification confirms the idea advanced to explain some of the findings coming 
from Osgood’s SD discussed in the previous paragraph: in fact, it seems that the categorization suggested by 
the Dyirbal system rests on general guidelines of interaction with objects, such as harmfulness. Through the 
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Besides world-wide famous examples, the extent to which gender differences are 
coded and expressed in one language or another fascinated linguists and psychologists for 
a long time, revealing its global pervasiveness. To illustrate, in a seminal work investigating 
how more than 200 languages express gender categories, Corbett (1991) reported that “the 
number of genders is not limited to three: four is common and twenty is possible” (Corbett, 
1991, p. 5). Thus, across languages in the world gender classes vary consistently, and the 
extent to which these classificatory schemes exert an influence in the conceptualizations of 
different populations animated the scientific debate for a long time.  
The potentiality of tools already cited, like the Semantic Differential Scales 
(Osgood et al., 1957/1975) of revealing covert properties correlated with masculinity and 
femininity, for example, captivated the interest of linguists and psychologist extensively. 
Ervin (1962), for instance, conducted an experiment with Italian-English bilinguals, asking 
them to rate a set of non-sense words that differed in their suffixes –either Italian masculine 
–o or Italian feminine –a- on two of the scales from the Osgood Semantic Differential scale 
which have been previously reported to correlate with men and women concepts, namely 
the potency scale (strong-weak, big-little) and the evaluative scale (bad-good and pretty-
ugly). Results showed a tendency to ascribe different connotations to masculine or feminine 
words according to differences in the connotations of men and women concepts. In line 
with these results, studies from Zubin & Köpcke (1981; 1984) and Konishi (1993) showed 
the same pattern with German speakers, suggesting that grammatical markers may carry 
some kind of semantic meaning, leading to specific types of conceptualizations. More 
recently, scholars developed a wide range of behavioral tasks with the aim of verifying if 
                                                     
means of linguistic features, therefore, Dyirbal speakers were able to discriminate entities in the world in an 
adaptive way.  
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gender assignment is completely arbitrary or if it reflects some essential properties of 
objects, and when does gender assignment affect cognition. For example, Boroditsky & 
Schmidt (2000) had English participants classify in terms of masculinity and femininity a 
set of objects and animal nouns, and compared these classifications with the grammatical 
gender of the items in both Spanish and German. In this case, there was an agreement 
between English, Spanish and German classifications for animals but not for objects, 
suggesting that animals’ classifications as either masculine or feminine could rely on some 
animals’ property stereotypically masculine or feminine. In the same study, the authors 
tested German and Spanish participants in English, and made them learn either masculine 
or feminine names for objects. The task consisted in learning names and remember the 
pairings. Results showed that participants remembered better object-name pairs when the 
gender of the proper name assigned to the object was consistent with the grammatical 
gender of the object in their native language. This suggest that people’s intuitions and 
conceptualization of objects include gender as a feature, even if it is irrelevant such in the 
case of objects, and that this is modulated by language. An interesting insight comes from 
a later work (Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003) in which Spanish and German participants were 
asked to repeat random letters in the middle of a picture similarity task between objects and 
humans. Results showed no effect of subvocalization: participants rated person-object pairs 
as more similar when the grammatical gender of the object name in their native language 
was consistent with the biological gender of the person. Conversely, in a study by Cubelli 
and colleagues (2011), the effect of gender congruity disappeared in a category membership 
task implemented by an articulatory suppression task. This suggests that the effect of 
grammatical gender on categorization is indirect, and occurs because the process of object 
categorization requires the access to lexical representations.  
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The constraints of grammatical gender on categorization and conceptualization 
have been investigated also by Vigliocco and colleagues (2005). With a series of 
experiments including similarity judgment tasks with triplets of words and pictures, and 
through the analysis of semantic substitutions errors the authors showed that language-
specific effects of grammatical gender might be constrained to languages with a two-gender 
system (i.e. Italian but not German). Additionally, they might occur in tasks requiring 
linguistic or verbal information processing (similarity judgment task on words and not on 
pictures), and they can be limited to a certain semantic category (animals and not objects). 
In the same vein, Sera and colleagues (2002) asked English, Spanish, French and German 
speaking children and adults to assign male and female voices to inanimate objects. They 
found that the assignment of French and Spanish speakers varied predictably with the 
variation in gender assignment in the two languages, while the German grammatical gender 
system didn’t affect classifications of German speakers to the same extent the Spanish and 
French system did. Effects of grammatical gender on entities’ categorization have therefore 
proved themselves to be a prominent feature of our conceptual system. Languages assign 
genders to inanimate entities according to arbitrary criteria, as testified by the cross-
linguistic differences described by linguists. But is this assignment completely arbitrary or 
is it somehow motivated by cultural patterns, as in the case of Dyirbal gender system? And 
are speakers aware of the possible underlying cultural patterns that constitute the grounding 
of the gender assignment rules? Bassetti (2014) investigated the impact of second language 
learning (German) on the grammatical gender arbitrariness awareness. She tested a sample 
of young adults composed of Italian monolinguals, early bilinguals and instructed second 
language bilinguals. Participants were asked to evaluate the gender assignment of 25 nouns 
of entities (animals, abstract concepts, natural kinds and artifacts) and answered open and 
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closed questions on grammatical gender. Specifically, they were asked to rate on a 7-point 
scale the acceptability of the opposite Italian-German gender assignment of gendered 
nouns, and then to motivate their choice. Results showed that monolinguals considered 
gender as semantically motivated, while second language learners mostly explained 
grammatical gender in terms of culture. A qualitative analysis of the motivations provided 
by participants revealed an interesting pattern of results. In fact, the most relevant 
motivation for grammatical gender assignment resulted to be (i) association with traditional 
feminine vs. masculine properties (beauty vs. ugliness/ strong vs. weak) and (ii) 
associations with culture (e.g. myths and children tales). Grammatical gender was 
considered to be more semantically motivated for animals than for artifacts, but abstract 
concepts and natural kinds were related to the semantically motivation too.  
Grammatical concepts like gender are thus conceptually salient, activated 
automatically and unconsciously, and profoundly affect “how we understand everyday life” 
(Lakoff, 1987, p. 335). In this perspective, languages that possess a gendered system drive 
the speaker’s attention to some features, habituating individuals to categorize the world in 
certain specific ways (e.g. by dividing it into two categories corresponding to males and 
females). One might therefore wonder, in line with neo-Whorfian speculations, whether 
those linguistic differences affect thought not only in shallow tasks, but possibly at a deeper 
level. Some political psychologists recently started to interrogate the role that language 
exerts on the production of gender stereotypes. Tavits and Pérez (2019), for instance, 
hypothesized that speaking a genderless language, such as Estonian, would promote a 
greater perceived equality between men and women with respect to a gendered language 
like Russian. To test this hypothesis, the authors administered to a large sample of Russian-
Estonian bilinguals a questionnaire measuring social and political attitudes towards gender 
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parity. In the first study, they randomly assigned a Russian or Estonian questionnaire to a 
sample of 1200 bilinguals, while in the last study they extended their design to a cross-
national sample of participants (divided into gendered and non-gendered languages 
speakers). Overall, the authors reported that speaking a genderless language “boosts mass 
support for efforts to combat gender inequality, implying that structural nuances between 
tongues explain some of the persistence in gender disparities” (p. 21).  
To sum up, the robustness of grammatical gender effects on conceptualization 
suggests that at least to some extent, gender conceptualizations can be grounded in 
linguistic practices, and that the other way round linguistic practices can shape the way in 
which we perceive gender differences. Possibly, grammatical distinctive traits of a specific 
language, interfere with conceptual representations related to gender at a shallow level of 
reasoning. Arguably, if required to delve into the concept of gender in relation with their 
identity, people might elaborate on other features as relevant (see previous paragraph). 
 
3.6.2. A role for metacognition and deference. “One is not born, but rather 
becomes, a woman” (de Beauvoir, 1989, p. 267) is the world-wide famous claim that 
inspired generations of feminist scholars to rethink of the social conditions allowing the 
perpetration of sexual-based inequalities. As already noted, in fact, the distinction between 
the concept of sex as something natural and given, and that of gender as the result of social 
interactions is relatively new. Feminists have insisted for a long time on the notion of 
gender as a social structure, or as the “socially imposed division of the sexes” (Rubin, 1975, 
p. 179), with the aim of unmasking the mechanisms responsible for women’s oppression 
through history and time. Some have proposed to consider gender as an analytical category, 
such as economy and race, a lens through which it is possible to interpret human history. 
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Scott’s (1986) definition of gender, for instance, is composed of two parts: in her 
formulation, gender is the constitutive element of social relations and the primary signifier 
of power relationships. Being based on the perceived sexual differences, gender as central 
element of social relations involves mainly four interconnected elements, which 
nonetheless need to be addressed separately in order to prospect a clear interpretative 
picture of how gender works. In Scott’s model of analysis, first culturally available symbols 
that evoke gender-related representations need to be investigated (e.g. remember 
metaphorical mapping of light and dark colors into sex/gender concepts). Second, science, 
religion, and education contribute to create normative concepts in order to interpret the 
cultural symbols13, typically expressed into binary and exclusionary categories (male-
female; masculine-feminine). Those normative concepts are generally taken as fixed, while 
Scott urges us to consider that the positions emerging from these statements (e.g. what is 
defined as masculinity) are but one of the possible positions–in fact they are the result of 
the refusal or repression of alternative possibilities. As a third step, one must account for 
social institutions and organizations (e.g. politics) that construe and reinforce the idea that 
those normative representations are immutable and timeless. Last, a comprehensive 
analysis of gender must include a suitable theory of the formation of gendered subjective 
identities. As an historian, though, Scott is primarily interested in the study of gender as the 
                                                     
13 Note that the role of allegorical images and practices has already been discussed in this dissertation, 
embedded in the discussion of how abstract concepts are often represented through more concrete entities 
(Chapter 2). The relation is all but fortuitous: in order to explain and portray complex aspects of abstract 
concepts such as those related to capital sins, the human kind has adapted to “ground” them into more concrete 
instantiations, in order to vehiculate their difficult and complex meaning in a way that is more 
“understandable”, because more concrete. The same is true for the concept of gender, and its consequent 
social categorizations. Due to the fact that some social treatments based on gender are not justifiable only 
through biological differences (for example the fact that women were supposed to be unsuitable for politics 
life, one of the reasons being that they were considered irrational), myths and images are employed to 
reinforce and establish normative categorizations (think for example of Eve’s incapability to resist temptation, 
and the impact the myth had on the conceptualization of women overall). I am thankful to M. Santarelli for 
discussing with me this topic. 
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pivotal means by and through which power is articulated. She therefore provides example 
of how gender categories, as expressed by the binary distinction built upon sexual 
differences, have informed the politics of social institution as well as personal behaviors. 
In her words “Gender, then, provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the 
complex connections among various forms of human interaction” (p. 1070).  
A multidimensional analysis of gender is also warranted by Risman (2004), when 
she claims that gender cannot be understood in isolation from other social structures such 
as race and economy. In her perspective, gender appears as a structure at various level of 
society, ranging from the individual, to the interactional and the institutional level. 
According to Risman, overlooking one of the aforementioned aspects of gender–intended 
as a structure in the same sociological sense of politics and economy–would impoverish 
the analysis of gender. That is to say, some previous influential perspectives on gender 
focused specifically on the individual or cognitive aspect of gender (e.g., Bem, 1981), while 
others evidenced how gender can be considered an institution embedded in social processes 
of everyday life and social organizations (e.g., Lorber, 1994). Risman’s definition of gender 
as a social structure instead is centered on the interconnection among different analytical 
planes. To this extent, she defines a social structure as something that shapes individuals, 
but is simultaneously shaped by individuals. This is a focal point in the understanding of 
gender as a social structure, in that it acknowledges the fact that social forces influence 
individual life, but most importantly that those social forces are not “mysterious forces” 
(Risman, 2004, p. 432): they are constituted by human actions.  
In short, according to these perspectives, gendered identities and the differences 
they carry can be intended as the result of cultural practices and expectations. Gender can 
be conceived as a social structure in the same way as economy was longwindedly 
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considered a foundational social structure. Furthermore, in light of these characterizations, 
the concept of gender unravels its complexity. In this context, the link of gender with its 
supposed concrete referent is loosened, in favor of a more complex understanding of the 
idea that not only biological forces contribute to the construction of gendered identities. In 
this regard, it is important to appeal to two central notions in the debate concerning gender 
concepts, namely those of performativity and normativity. Butler (1988, 1990, 1993a) 
compellingly questioned the idea according to which gender is the cultural meaning of sex. 
Her critique goes back to the genealogy of the idea that sex is the given and factual datum 
of gender, showing how, instead, sex-based categorizations are in themselves discursive 
products. Specifically, she argued (Butler, 1993a): 
 
The category of "sex" is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault 
has called a "regulatory ideal." In this sense, then, "sex" not only 
functions as a norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the 
bodies it governs, that is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind 
of productive power, the power to produce—demarcate, circulate, 
differentiate—the bodies it controls. Thus, "sex" is a regulatory ideal 
whose materialization is compelled, and this materialization takes place 
(or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated practices. In other 
words, "sex" is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through 
time. (p.1) 
 
In her perspective a body becomes a gendered body through the repetition of a series 
of acts, that are constantly being renewed and consolidated through time. In this sense, 
gender is conceived as performative: it doesn’t express any pre-given core essence, but 
rather it is the result of the collective agreement on normalized acts. The notion of 
performativity has two other central facets, in Butler’s work. First, gender is performative 
for it creates what it names (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1989) and therefore it is “real” only when 
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enacted14. Furthermore, gender is never an ‘individual’ act, but it is social in that it is 
discursively created, interpreted and intelligible. In the same way as the script existed prior 
to the play and survives the enactment, so gender is constituted by a series of norms 
sedimented through history that will be interpreted individually, and that will survive their 
contingent embodiment. The notions of performativity and normativity become strictly 
intertwined in Butler’s depiction of gender (Butler, 1993a), when she asserts that 
performativity must be understood as the reiterative power of discourse to create the 
phenomena that it intends to regulate and constrain, rather than as the act through which 
the subject brings into being what is being named. It is therefore evident that the discourse 
she is referring to is the hegemonic discourse of heterosexuality, the “heterosexual matrix” 
(Butler, 1995) through which gender identity is stabilized and created, and that dictates the 
norms and the accomplishments one must fulfill in order to emerge as a gendered self. 
Going back to the deconstruction of the distinction between sex and gender, distinction that 
was so important in the first feminist critiques, Butler argues (Butler, 1990): 
 
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct 
called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender indeed, perhaps it was 
always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between 
sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (p. 9, italics mine) 
 
Whether we are to embrace Butler’s skepticism to distinguish sex from gender, or 
we are anchored to the traditional distinction between a natural and a cultural pole of the 
concept gender/sex, it is evident that society and culture (and discourses, and language, and 
                                                     
14 This notion is in contrast with the view that there is a “true” or “real” gender identity, that needs to be 
expressed. Being a performative act, gender is real only when it is enacted, and importantly it is performed. 
Butler (1988) claimed, for instance, that there is nothing about femaleness to be expressed; on the other hand, 
there are several things that are being expressed about different experiences of being women. Nonetheless, 
she warrants caution in the use of this terminology, in that not only labeling someone as a female (or a woman) 
constructs her/his identity, but it also limits the boundaries of the analyses of her experience. 
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practices) emerge as constitutive of both alternatives. Specifically, both if we want to 
acknowledge that gender is the cultural signification of sex, and if we are endorsing the 
view according to which sex is the naturalization of gender, we are implying that those 
concepts are socially constructed. But what does it mean for something to be “socially 
constructed? 
Social constructionists claims about reality take many forms, and crucially aim at 
dismantling essentialism. Since the philosophical literature on social constructionism is 
extremely conspicuous, and the definition of specific meanings of social constructionism 
exceed the purposes of this discussion, we can accept the social constructionist claim in its 
broader form in these terms: something is socially constructed if it is not inevitable, or if it 
is not determined by the nature of things. This statement often carries the implication that 
e.g. the concept X (defined as socially constructed) is quite bad as it is, and therefore we 
would do better without it—or by radically transforming it15 (Hacking, 1999; Haslanger, 
2012). Generally speaking, no one would deny that our concepts are socially constituted: 
we learn them with the help of our parents, in school, and they are the result of historical 
and linguistic processes. They also vary from culture to culture and evolve with the 
advancement of technology. So, what is the point in claiming that a concept is socially 
constructed? As some scholars acknowledged (Haslanger, 2017), saying that something is 
socially constructed evidences the ordinary view on our concepts and prompt the analysis 
of the motivations concurring to the establishment of a specific conceptual framework, as 
well as its limits. More importantly, some concepts are said to be socially constructed in a 
                                                     
15 See for instance “ameliorative” projects of conceptual engineering (Haslanger, 2000; Jenkins, 2015).  
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very specific sense. Haslanger (1995, p. 99) defines discursive16 construction as a particular 
kind of social construction in which what or how it is partly depends on a sort of looping 
feedback involving activities such as naming or classifying. In her words “Something is 
discursively constructed just in case it is the way it is, to some substantial extent, because 
of what is attributed (and/or self-attributed) to it.” This might seem a very vague statement, 
but if we consider the famous Hacking’s (1999, p. 11) example of the social construction 
of the kind “refugee woman” we can see that for someone to be classified a refugee woman, 
some criteria must be met. Importantly, those criteria are embedded in a “matrix” which is 
composed by a set of institutions such as advocates, papers, lawyers, court decisions, 
immigrations procedures etc. that simultaneously create the very category of “refugee 
woman” and reinforce it (for example through the physical construction of barriers, 
detention centers, passports). The process through which the social kind of “refugee 
woman” is created is not an exclusively perceptual process. It is not the same to 
discriminate a tree from a fish, and to discern who is a refugee woman and who is not. In 
this sense, some social categories, among which gender, seem to be created by the means 
of language and symbolic structures. This is one of the central features of institutional facts, 
as described by Searle (1995); in his account, institutional facts (such as money and 
marriage) cannot be said to perform their function by virtue of their physical structure. 
Language is thought to be at the basis of institutional facts, because it is a constitutive part 
of them. Searle (1995, p. 37) cites the example of ants and bees, who are said to have queens 
and slaves. Is this an institutional fact or is it just a social behavior? In Searle’s view, that 
                                                     
16 Note that, in this context the notion of “discourse” is mediated by poststructuralist philosophical 
speculations. Here, discursive practices are not solely related to linguistic utterances, but specifically refer to 
historically, socially and institutionally specific structures of statements and categories (Foucault, 1980; Scott, 
1988).  
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would be just a social behavior, intended as a cooperative behavior, in that it lacks the 
symbolic apparatus that permits the definition of queens and slaves. Language, i.e. the 
symbolic apparatus allowing for discursively constructed categories, do not bring into 
existence de novo (Haslanger, 2012, p. 123) the entities that it nominates, rather as 
Haslanger (ibid.) puts it:  
 
[…] something in existence comes to have—partly as a result of 
having been categorized in a certain way—a set of features that qualify it 
as a member of a certain kind or sort. My having been categorized as a 
female at birth (and consistently since then) has been a factor in how I’ve 
been viewed and treated; these views and treatments have, in turn, played 
an important causal role in my becoming gendered a woman. (p.123-124) 
 
Butler (1990) would also agree on the fact that gender is socially and culturally 
constructed, in the sense that certain cultural configurations of gender (e.g. the assumption 
that there are two genders, and that they map preexisting distinctions based on biological 
factors) assume the status of “real” categories through the reinforcement of the hegemonic 
discourse (e.g. medical and scientific knowledge of sexual configurations, exposure to 
stereotypical descriptions of masculinity and femininity). This is not to say that gender is 
not “real” (cf. Butler, 1990; Haslanger, 2017). Rather, gender is socially constructed in two 
main senses: first, social forces contribute to its formation, and second the conditions for 
membership in a specific gender group are social rather than biological or perceptual 
(Haslanger, 1995; Searle, 1995). 
This brief excursus through some seminal and challenging perspectives on gender–
by no means exhaustive–delineated a further grounding source of the concept of gender, 
namely a social metacognitive grounding. Indeed, what we consider as gender is composed 
by a set of socially agreed upon criteria, partly derived from biological factors. This socially 
(and culturally) mediated way of using and defining concepts is largely compatible with 
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the idea of social metacognition (Borghi et al., 2018; Shea, 2018; see par. 2.9.1 of this 
dissertation) as the grounding mechanism through which we reflect on our conceptual 
inadequacy and consequently we decide to rely on others’ knowledge to fix the reference 
of the concept. Importantly, this process might even occur unconsciously, without 
explicitly deciding to derogate the redefinition of some of our concepts to others. In fact, 
the social environment we live in is constantly affording re-conceptualizations of some 
sorts by the means of social and cultural practices. It is likely that we absorb and accumulate 
knowledge of different instantiations of concepts through the interaction with others, and 
that via this process our concepts are continuously being refined. This would be especially 
the case for abstract concepts (as defined in the previous discussions), in that they are 
applicable to a wider range of situations with respect to concrete ones. Therefore, their 
representation and consolidation in memory is strictly related to linguistic practices, which 
contributes to give coherence to different experiences with abstract concepts, but also to 
the interaction with other social agents.  
In the case of gender, the “others” can be experts such as philosophers or theorists, 
as well as people we encounter in our everyday life, e. g., during demonstrations or political 
actions. Being a social structure (Risman, 2004), gender shapes individuals, but it is 
simultaneously shaped by individuals in its conceptual content. The same constraints that 
society imposes on the category of gender can never be separately conceived from the 
individuals that constitute the society itself. Social structures never exist beyond actors 
perpetrating and sustaining them through their actions, or through their words. The concept 
of gender, as sketched out in the previous discussion, is partly the result of critical 
examinations of those mechanisms supporting gender differences and essentialist views of 
gender. Indeed, historically, the concept of gender has undergone substantial changes, also 
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due to the effort of scholars. If nowadays we are quite accustomed to the label queer in 
gender-related discourses, and if we went beyond the traditional dichotomy opposing sex 
and gender (e.g., van Anders, 2015; Hyde et al., 2019), it is also due to the fact that the 
concept of gender has been reshaped by cultural and social agents. Henceforth, academic 
discussions, public discourses, political actions, media representations, poetry and 
literature are all forms of deference that we may consciously or unconsciously engage to 
define and redefine a concept like gender. To put it roughly, by the means of metacognitive 
deference, the meaning of social concepts is re-enacted and possessed in the collective 
linguistic body (Putnam, 1973). As already pointed out by Putnam (1973), specific 
meanings of everyday concepts can be possessed exclusively by a sub-class of individuals 
(e.g., experts): at a really fine-grained level, there is no need for me to precisely identify if 
the ring I am wearing is really gold, or if it is not. This is because I can benefit of the 
specific knowledge of a goldsmith. Putnam referred to this phenomenon as the division of 
linguistic labor. Through this mechanism, even though I do not possess individually the 
right competence to discriminate whether something is gold or not, refined aspects of the 
concept of gold are nonetheless engendered in the linguistic collective body. These 
considerations parallel the notion of metacognition and deference Shea (2018) purported 
as fundamental grounding sources for specific sets of abstract concepts, namely social 
abstract concepts.  
Clearly, these forms of grounding are more crucial for gender with respect to other 
abstract concepts, such as “satisfaction”, which may be more related to internal, emotional, 
and physical experiences. This complexity might be allegedly constructed and enriched via 
social interactions and engagement in specific kinds of debates, being that political, 
institutional or academic. Possibly, at least when the concept is employed in a sort of 
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“thinking for speaking” process (Slobin, 1996), the social metacognitive aspect may serve 
as a grounding source. 
 
3.7. Conclusions. It Takes Two to Tango  
 
In this Chapter I offered an analysis of the concept of “gender” from a broad 
cognitive science perspective, hence combining evidence coming from different scientific 
disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, psycholinguistics, and philosophy. I 
specifically focused on the concept of sex/gender as developed and articulated in the course 
of time, in different scientific domains and its consequences on the public understanding of 
the concept. I deliberately decided not to discuss the large amount of literature concerning 
sex/gender differences and similarities, sexual orientation and stereotypes for two main 
reasons. The first and more naïve one appeals to my specific competences, which do not 
cover those specific areas. Nonetheless, the interested reader will find a great body of 
informative and critical works produced in the last years (just to name a few see e.g., Eagly 
& Wood, 2013; Ellemers, 2018; Hyde, 2014; Hyde et al., 2019; Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 
2016; Petersen & Hyde, 2011). The second reason is more of a theoretical kind. 
Philosophical traditions inquiring the genealogy of the concept of gender (e.g., Butler, 
1990; Foucault, 1980) as well as biological evidence (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1993; 2012) 
evidenced how much of the phenomena we generally consider as neat evidence of a 
distinction between the sexes are mediated and constructed by and through our contingent 
understanding of the concept of gender. To illustrate, consider the mediatic resonance the 
debate over the banning of Caster Semenya, the two-time Olympic gold medallist, held in 
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the past months17. Semenya, competing in the 800m feminine race refused to reduce her 
testosterone level as introduced by the IAAF in order to prevent female athletes with 
differences of sexual development (DSD) to be “advantaged”. As this example illustrates, 
the controversy arises when a binary categorization, such as the one opposing females to 
males, is strictly applied to a wide range of diverse sexual/biological and social 
configurations, positing a direct relation between being categorized as a female and 
hormonal levels. As recent developments in the field of social neuroendocrinology 
demonstrated (van Anders et al., 2011; van Anders & Watson, 2006, 2007), instead, sex-
related hormones production can be socially modulated. Whether athletes are judged to be 
suitable or not for a given competition, in this case, seems to be more the consequence of 
whether being female/woman implies one’s own attunement with what is considered to be 
a “normative” feminine body. And yet, history proved those norms to be discursively 
constructed upon an “ideal” concept of gender. In some relevant sense, whether athletes are 
judged to be suitable or not for a specific competition, is a matter of how gender is 
conceptualized. Therefore, in this Chapter I endeavored to unravel what are the most 
important features the concept of gender is supposed to comprise, and also to offer an 
understanding of the concept that overcomes the classical nature/nurture dichotomy.  
My portrait of gender proceeded along three main axes of analysis, that are integral 
for EGC theories: embodiment, groundedness and situatedness. This structure is thought to 
metaphorically and theoretically mirror the abstractness continuum described in Borghi & 
Binkofski (2014) as a way to interpret abstract concepts. The authors proposed that abstract 
concepts can have different levels of abstractness, mainly depending on their grounding 
                                                     
17 See for example https://www.theguardian.com/sport/caster-semenya . 
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sources and their modality of acquisition. In more recent developments of the WAT 
proposal (e.g., Borghi et al., 2018; 2019) abstract concepts are defined as an heterogeneous 
category comprised of concepts that vary in their being more or less embodied or grounded 
(e.g., think of numbers, emotions, moral concepts etc.). In this light, I proposed an account 
of gender as a special kind of social abstract concept, informed by the recent advancements 
in the field of conceptual knowledge and representation constituted by Multiple 
Representation Views (MVRs, see Chapter 2). I have suggested that, attempting to capture 
the representations of the concept gender requires a critical turn of the epistemic 
perspective, such as the one implied in the tradition of queer studies and Queer Theory (cf. 
Sullivan, 2003). As Ahmed (2006, p. 67) reminded us, in fact, the word “queer” comes 
from the Indo-European word “twist”. The orientational aspect conveyed by the very 
etymology of the term is precisely what queer studies have strived to outline: the idea that 
a dominant perspective on sexual (and existential) categories can be challenged by 
changing the point of view, hence revealing the existence of some individualities that 
“exceed” the orientation they are directed towards (in this case sexual orientations). Besides 
epistemic considerations, this suggestion has also consequences on the content of inquiry 
of this Chapter, namely the conceptual representation of gender. Indeed, a queer perspective 
affords the analysis of phenomena that falls between and beyond the binary composed by 
abstract and concrete concepts, by acknowledging the multilayered and composite 
character of our conceptual system.  
Building on these premises and on the literature reviewed up to this point, some 
general considerations on the concept of gender can be made. In line with influential EG 
perspectives on conceptual system (e.g., Borghi et al., 2018; Barsalou, Dutriaux & 
Scheepers, 2018), gender can be considered as an abstract concept. It should be noticed that 
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it is entailed in these approaches a radical detachment from the idea that abstract concepts 
are to be considered as the antonymic counterpart of concrete concepts. In this sense, gender 
appears as a literary exemplification of how abstract concepts can be grounded in physical, 
perceptual and biological systems as well as in linguistic, cultural and social practices. In 
the course of this Chapter, in fact, I presented various ways in which the concept of gender 
assumes its meaning, ranging from perceptual discriminations conveying gendered traits to 
academic and politic discussions re-shaping the concept. Crucially, those different planes 
interact so as to form the complex set of relations that compose the concept of gender. This 
being said, the discussion aimed at underscore how dichotomies such as abstract/concrete, 
gender/sex, and nature/nurture have exhausted their explanatory potential. The concept of 
gender, in fact, has been shown to be couched in multiple grounding systems: among those, 
some were previously been ascribed as pertaining to the concrete pole of conceptual 
representations, while others were indicated as distinctive for the abstract pole. Gender can 
thus be defined as a queer concept in itself, in that it escapes binary distinctions traditionally 
drawn in the field of conceptual knowledge, and historical debates regarding the 
predominance of nature over culture—and vice versa. It follows, that a fixed and stable 
definition of gender as an abstract concept is only partial. Instead, according with recent 
theories of conceptual knowledge it is urgent for the researcher interested in gender-related 
concepts to firstly identify the context in which she is studying the concept. In fact, in some 
cases the perceptual underpinnings of gender might be more relevant, while in others 
cultural and social discourses might be more salient aspects of the conceptualization18. 
                                                     
18 Recently, a promising line of research addressing the topic of gender identity is approaching the issue 
combining different scientific approaches. For instance, Fausto-Sterling (2019) is advising for the application 
of both psychological dynamical models and speculations coming from embodied and enacted theories of 
cognition in the understanding of sex/gender identities and sexual orientation.  
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Although those analytical planes can be kept separate for theoretical and sometimes 
applicative purposes, it is fundamental to keep in mind that one side of the coin is never 
given without the other. Separating sex from gender–thus nature from culture and, I would 
say abstractness from concreteness–is a theoretical artifact, and most importantly has 
proven to limit the potential of the analysis, when those distinctions prevent the 
contextualization of the concepts under scrutiny. The aim of this Chapter was therefore to 
advise for the abandonment of traditional dichotomies, in order to unravel and render 
explicit aspects of the concept that would otherwise be concealed because placed within or 
beyond the binarism opposing abstract/concrete, gender/sex, and nature/culture.  
Given the impressive body of literature that has been produced over the decades 
around gender and gender-related concepts, the reader might wonder what difference could 
possibly make to queer the analytical approach on gender in cognitive science. Eagly and 
Wood (2014) elegantly discussed the consequences of nature-nurture debates in 
psychological research, claiming that often researchers focused on one type of cause, or 
treated them as competing explanations. Moreover, as they noted (p. 340) despite the width 
of psychological research on gender, it does not always inform public discourse on gender 
issues. In the same vein, I think that engaging in the investigation on how our concept of 
gender comes to be structured as it is, starting from a critical perspective on both conceptual 
representation theories and gender research, could impact not only our methodological 
practices as cognitive scientists but also our everyday understanding of the world 
surrounding us.  
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PART II 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE  
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Preface to Part II 
 
In the first part of this dissertation I have expounded on theories of conceptual 
representation, with a special focus on recent developments in the EGC panorama. In 
particular, I deepened aspects related to one of the most debated topics in theories of EG 
cognition, namely abstract concepts. I have provided theoretical and empirical arguments 
in support of the WAT theory, a proposal emerged within the broad research field of 
Multiple Representation Views (MRVs). Building on the characterization of abstract 
concepts depicted according to the WAT theory, I have argued that gender is a special kind 
of abstract concept, whose grounding entails different aspects.  
The second part of this dissertation comprises empirical studies aimed at supporting 
four main tenets arisen from the previous discussion:  
(a) The representation and processing of abstract concepts is influenced by the 
linguistic system—whose embodied counterpart is constituted by the mouth 
effector—to a major extent than that of concrete concepts;  
(b) Abstract concepts encompass grounding sources that can be considered as both 
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’;  
(c) The concept of gender can be accounted for by considering it as a social abstract 
concept. Therefore, its representation would be spanned over a continuum of 
abstractness in which both embodied/physical properties and situated/cultural 
features interact;  
(d) Being a social abstract concept, the representation of gender could be flexibly 
modulated by experiences, languages and cultures.  
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Hence, in Study 1 is addressed the point (a), while Studies 2 and 3 are aimed at 
investigating points (b-d). For further details on the theoretical stances underlying the 
assumptions of Study 1 see Chapter 2 of this dissertation, whereas for Study 2 and 3 see 
Chapter 2 and 3.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 1 
Abstract, Emotional and Concrete Concepts and the activation of mouth-hand effectors1. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
According to embodied and grounded theories, concepts are grounded in 
sensorimotor systems. The majority of evidence supporting these views concerns concepts 
referring to objects or actions, while evidence on abstract concepts is more scarce. 
Explaining how abstract concepts such as “freedom” are represented would thus be pivotal 
for grounded theories. According to some recent proposals, abstract concepts are grounded 
in both sensorimotor and linguistic experience, thus they activate the mouth motor system 
more than concrete concepts. Two experiments are reported, aimed at verifying whether 
abstract, concrete and emotional words activate the mouth and the hand effectors. In both 
experiments participants performed first a lexical decision, then a recognition task. In 
Experiment 1 participants responded by pressing a button either with the mouth or with the 
hand, in Experiment 2 responses were given with the foot, while a button held either in the 
mouth or in the hand was used to respond to catch-trials.  
 
                                                     
1 This paper was published in December 2018 in the peer-reviewed scientific journal PeerJ, and can be 
accessed through this link: DOI 10.7717/peerj.5987.  
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Experiment 1 
 
Previous results in which participants were required to decide whether a definition 
matched with a target words revealed that the processing of abstract concepts was 
facilitated with mouth responses, while the processing of concrete ones with manual 
responses (Borghi & Zarcone, 2016). In Experiment 1 we used the same response modality 
and the same response devices adopted by Borghi and Zarcone. We intended to verify 
whether the facilitation of abstract over concrete concepts in responses with the mouth was 
also present in a task involving a more superficial processing level, i.e. a lexical decision 
task, and in a subsequent recognition task. As to emotional words, we were interested in 
investigating whether they were processed similarly to other abstract words or whether they 
differed from both concrete and abstract words.   
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Forty native Italian speakers in a range of age between 20-30 years (22 females and 
18 males; mean age: 20.1; standard deviation of age: 2.12) participated voluntarily. 
Handedness was assessed using an abridged version of the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971). All participants were Italian native speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. All participants gave written 
informed consent, and the experimental procedures were approved by the Ethic Committee 
of the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council, 
Rome, Italy (Approval number: 0000441). 
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Materials 
 
We selected 90 Italian words from the Della Rosa et al. database (Della Rosa et al., 
2010), composed by 30 concrete words, 30 abstract and 30 emotional words. The selected 
words were balanced in Familiarity (mean = 590; SD= 148.09). We considered as concrete 
words, the words that scored high on Concreteness (max. 700, min. 596; mean of 
Concreteness= 660.42; mean of Abstractness= 138.87), and considered as abstract the 
words with high Abstractness scores (max. 635, min. 375; mean of Abstractness= 535.24; 
mean of Concreteness= 213.28). We considered as emotional words those words that had 
intermediate scores of Abstractness and Concreteness (mean of Concreteness= 400; mean 
of Abstractness= 372.74) and that according to the experimenters had high emotional 
valence.  
Because the emotional value was not present as a parameter in Della Rosa et al. 
(2010), in order to verify the emotional valence of words we performed an on-line pre-test 
in which 25 participants (13 females; mean of age= 30.6; SD=14.5) judged the emotional 
value of each word on a 7-points Likert scale (1 was rated as non-emotional and 7 as 
completely emotional). Since in the literature it is debated whether emotional words can be 
considered as a subset of abstract concepts or represent a kind of concepts different from 
both concrete and abstract concepts (Altarriba et al., 1999; Kousta et al., 2011), the pre-test 
also aimed to clearly distinguish abstract, concrete and emotional words, avoiding overlaps 
between abstract and emotional words.  
Among the original 90 words we selected 48 words: the 16 more concrete, the 16 
more abstract and the 16 rated as more emotional. Characteristics of the three categories of 
selected words in terms of dimensions and psycholinguistic variables are shown in Table 
1a.   
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We performed a T-Student test for independent samples by items and we calculated 
the Effect size (Cohen’s d), in order to verify if concrete, abstract and emotional words we 
chose differed in Concreteness, Abstractness and Emotional value. All the categories 
(abstract, concrete and emotional words) resulted to differ in Concreteness (ps< .001), 
Abstractness (ps < 001) and Emotional value (ps< .001). Emotional words were rated as 
more emotional than both abstract and concrete words (ps< .001); also abstract words were 
rated as more emotional than concrete words (p<.001).  
We also verified whether abstract, concrete and emotional words differed along a 
series of dimensions that, according to different theories, are considered crucial to 
distinguish concrete and abstract words, i.e. Imageability (IMG; Paivio, 1986), Age of 
Acquisition (AoA; Gilhooly, & Logie, 1980), Context Availability (CA; Schwanenflugel 
et al., 1992) and Modality of Acquisition (MoA; Wauters et al., 2003). We decided to avoid 
controlling for these variables while selecting abstract and concrete words, because this 
would result in using a very reduced number of abstract and concrete concepts. More 
crucially, it would lead us to use concepts that are weird and scarcely familiar. We instead 
decided to select “good” abstract and concrete words: when compared to concrete words, 
“good” abstract words are typically less imageable (IMG), they are acquired later (AoA) 
and mainly through language rather than through perceptual modalities (MoA), and they 
are less associated to contexts (CA) (see e.g., Borghi et al., 2018b; Villani et al., 2019). The 
abstract, concrete and emotional words we selected thus differed not only in Concreteness 
and Abstractness but also in Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context availability, and 
Modality of Acquisition. 
As to psycholinguistic variables, we took care in balancing words for Familiarity, 
thus the three categories didn’t differ on this dimension (all ps=.9).   
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The abstract and emotional words we selected were more frequent than concrete 
ones (ps<.005) We chose highly frequent abstract words because we wanted to avoid stimuli 
that were unfamiliar for participants which could have lead to abstractness driven effects. 
Emotional and abstract words did not differ (p=.4). Concrete words were also shorter than 
abstract and emotional words (ps<.04), while emotional and abstract words did not differ 
(p=.2). Results of the comparisons between the three categories of selected words in terms 
of psycholinguistic variables and of all the relevant dimensions are shown in Table 1b. 
The effect of these variables on the results was determined through Generalized 
Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) performed on both experiments (1 and 2) and tasks 
(Lexical Decision and Recognition) with accuracy and RTs as dependent variables. 
Together with Type of Concept and Effector as main factors, we added Imageability, Age 
of Acquisition, Contex Availability, Modality of Acquisition, Frequency and Number of 
Letters as covariates (see Results section).  
To complete our stimuli we subsequently added 48 pseudowords, created by 
modifying one letter at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of concrete, abstract and 
emotional words in the same proportion as the critical words. Then we created 24 words to 
be used as catch-trials: they were Italian words with a bold letter, at the beginning, in the 
middle or at the end of the word. Finally, we selected 24 new words, maintaining the 
proportion between abstract, concrete and emotional words for the recognition task. Words 
that can directly activate hand or mouth (e.g., tools or food related words) were excluded 
from the list. Stimuli are shown in Table 2.  
The experiment consisted of two tasks, a lexical decision task and a recognition 
task, that were presented in sequence; the lexical decision task always preceded the 
recognition one. Two separate lists of words were created for the two tasks: for the lexical 
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decision task 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract, 8 emotional), and 24 pseudo-words. 
For the recognition task list, 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract and 8 emotional) and 
24 new words were used.  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were tested individually, and were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to each trial using a response box connected with a pedal and a button 
(see Figure 1a). They were given the instructions on the computer screen and were trained 
at the beginning of every task. In no case further instruction from the experimenter was 
needed; she only needed to specify how to use the button for the mouth responses, and she 
made sure that participants used their dominant hand for hand’s responses. Participants 
were not aware of the subsequent recognition task; during the instructions they were just 
informed that they would complete an experiment composed by two phases. Only the 
participant and the experimenter were present in the room; after the training the 
experimenter sat outside the lab in order to avoid any kind of interference with the 
experiment. Testing took place on a Pc (resolution: 1024x768 pixel) running EPrime2 
Professional software. Participants sat on a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen, 
at a distance of about 60 cm.  
Words appeared at the center of a computer screen at maximum 6.20° of visual 
angle. Each trial began with a centred black fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the 
presentation of the word. Words remained on the screen for a time of maximum 1.5 second. 
After 1 second the next trial started (see Figure 1b).  
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Lexical Decision task 
 
The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a training 
block of 12 trials (6 words and 6 pseudo-words). Depending on the block, participants kept 
the button to press in their dominant hand or in the mouth. The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. A set of 48 words was presented on the computer 
screen (24 critical words, 24 pseudo-words). Participants were asked to press the button 
with the hand or with the mouth, depending on the instructions, if they read an Italian word, 
and to refrain from responding if the word they read was not an Italian one.   
 
Recognition task 
 
The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a training 
block of 6 trials (3 words, 3 new words). Depending on the block, participants were required 
to keep the button in their dominant hand or in the mouth, between the teeth. A set of 48 
words was presented in each block, composed by 24 critical words and 24 new words. The 
order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were asked to 
press the button with the hand or with the mouth, depending on the condition, in case they 
recognized the word on the screen as a word already presented in the previous task, or to 
refrain from responding if they read a new word.  
 
Results 
 
The data were analyzed with Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM). 
Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) incorporate random effects into the linear 
predictor of a generalized linear model (GLM). They include fixed linear predictor 
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variables, within subject measures and random variances to account for cluster-related 
correlations in the data. GLMMs consider all the available data points, including those 
which occasionally failed on some trials. Furthermore, GLMMs can handle non-normal 
outcome distributions, which is important to account for accuracy, as it is likely to be highly 
skewed (Hedeker, 2005).  
The effect of Type of Concept (abstract, concrete and emotional), of the Effector 
(mouth vs. hand) and of their interaction were analyzed on the response times and on the 
accuracy score (error) with two types of GLMM using Frequency, Number of Letters, 
Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition as 
covariates. We introduced these covariates to be sure that they did not affect our main 
results – for example, that the differences we found in processing the kinds of concepts 
were not due to a linguistic dimension, their different frequency.  
In the first type of GLMM model, the response time was assumed to be normally 
distributed, therefore the Identity link function was used, whereas in the second type of 
model we adopted a logistic function because the accuracy was considered as having a 
binomial distribution (presence/absence of error). The two types of models were applied 
for the Lexical Decision and Recognition tasks of both Experiments 1 and 2. 
Table 3 displays the GLMMs results in the different experiments showing the effect 
of Type of Concept (abstract, concrete and emotional) and the Effector (mouth vs hand) and 
their interaction as well as the covariates effect on the response time and accuracy. 
Means of response times as a function of Type of Concept and Effector for both 
tasks (Lexical Decision and Recognition) and experiments (1 and 2) are displayed in Table 
4. 
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Lexical Decision task 
 
All erroneous trials (2,96%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In the lexical 
decision task, we found that the factor Type of Concept affected the response time [Wald 
(2) = 11.04; p=.004]. Abstract concepts (mean:738.59 ms, SE= 10062.11) were responded 
to slower than emotional ones (mean:697.27 ms, SE= 10058.79) and concrete ones (mean: 
685.18 ms, SE= 10048.57). The analysis also showed an advantage for the hand (mean: 
669.44 ms, SE= 10056.26) over the mouth effector (mean:744.58 ms, SE=10056.70) (Wald 
(1)= 77.43; p<.001).  
All these effects are corrected for Frequency, Number of Letters, Imageability, Age 
of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition, however only Frequency 
[Wald (1) = 33.84; p<.001; B=-.51], Number of Letters [Wald (1) = 69.04; p<.001; 
B=18.36] and Age of Acquisition [Wald (1) = 9.46; p=.002; B=.31] affected the time of 
response in the lexical decision task. The predicted interaction between the two main 
factors did not reach the significance.  
The factor Type of Concept also affected the accuracy of responses [Wald (2)=6.82; 
p=.03]. The mean rate of errors corrected by the covariates were computed from the logistic 
model for each effect. Mean rates of errors are reported in terms of percentage of errors 
[abstract=96%, SE=13.51; concrete=99%, SE=4.87; emotional=98%, SE=5.38]. All the 
effects are corrected for the abovementioned covariates, however only Frequency [Wald 
(1) = 11.06; p=.001; B=.01] affected the accuracy of responses. No other main effect or 
interaction reached the significance.  
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Recognition task 
 
All erroneous trials (28,30%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In the 
analysis of response times, we found an advantage of the hand (mean:726 ms, 
SE=14405.92) over the mouth effector (mean: 777.34 ms, SE= 14396.75) [Wald (1)= 
22.68; p<.001]. All the effects were corrected using Frequency, Number of Letters, 
Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition as 
covariates, however only Number of Letters [Wald (1) = 25.17; p<.001; B=13.60] affected 
the response time in the recognition task. No other main effect or interaction reached the 
significance.  
Nonetheless, a qualitative inspection of the interaction between the two main factors 
Type of Concept and Effector revealed that the pattern was in trend with our hypothesis: 
the advantage of the hand over the mouth responses was namely smallest with abstract 
words. Emotional words were the most affected by the effector, showing 70 ms of 
advantage of the hand over the mouth responses. They were followed by concrete words 
that showed a facilitation of 50 ms of the hand over the mouth responses, while abstract 
words showed the smallest advantage with the hand (30 ms of difference), as shown in 
Table 4 and Figure 2. 
In the analysis on the accuracy, the interaction between the two main factors Type 
of Concept and Effector was significant [Wald (2)= 7.16; p=.02] (see Figure 3). All the 
effects are corrected for the abovementioned covariates, however only Number of Letters 
[Wald (1)= 4.06; p=.04; B=-.05], Frequency [Wald (1)=25.20; p<.001; B=-.006] and 
Modality of Acquisition [Wald (1)= 6.17; p=.01; B=-.003] resulted to affect the accuracy. 
No other main effect reached the significance.  
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Discussion 
 
The results show that in the lexical decision task abstract words were processed 
slower than emotional words and in trend slower than concrete ones, confirming the well-
established concreteness effect (Paivio, 1986). In the lexical decision task, Frequency and 
Number of Letters, together with Age of Acquisition appeared to be important variables, 
that may have affected the results since in general the selected abstract words were longer 
and acquired later. As to emotional words, their pattern seems to be similar to the pattern 
of concrete words: in general, they yielded shorter response times than abstract words, and 
they seem to be slightly advantaged in the hand condition.  
Across the two tasks, responses with the mouth were slower than those with the 
hand, independently from the concept kind; this effect is not worth discussing since it was 
likely due to the fact that the button to hold among the teeth was harder to press than the 
key to press with the hand (see also Borghi and Zarcone, 2016). 
As to the activation of the hand and mouth effectors in relation to the different type 
of concepts, in the lexical decision task we found no significant interaction. A possible 
explanation is that effectors are differently activated only in tasks that require a deeper 
processing level. The interaction between Type of Concept and Effector was instead 
significant in the recognition task, in the analysis on accuracy, in which the general 
disadvantage with the mouth effector was less pronounced with abstract words with respect 
to concrete ones, while emotional words showed an advantage with the mouth effector. It 
is worth noting that, beside Frequency and Number of Letters, Modality of Acquisition 
impacted significantly the results on accuracy of the recognition task. This could suggest 
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that, in a task requiring a deeper level of processing the way, in which we acquire words is 
more relevant than other psycholinguistic variables.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
A potential problem of Experiment 1 was that the device used to respond to critical 
trials differed in the mouth and the hand conditions; this could explain why RTs were 
slower with the mouth responses. Experiment 2 was designed to verify whether the findings 
of Experiment 1 could be replicated also in an experiment in which the mouth and the hand 
were not the direct response effectors, but were nonetheless occupied during the task. We 
therefore introduced catch-trials, to which participants had to respond pressing the button 
either with the hand or with the mouth. Participants were instead invited to respond to 
critical trials by pressing a pedal with the foot, in order to avoid any potential interference 
with the hand and mouth effectors. This change had the advantage to allow us to manipulate 
the effector (hand vs. mouth) and at the same time to collect response times and errors with 
the same device, i.e. the pedal.  
In this experiment we intended to test whether abstract, concrete and emotional 
concepts were differently activated when the mouth and the hand effectors were occupied. 
We predicted a facilitation of the mouth responses with abstract concepts.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Forty native Italian speakers in a range of age between 20-30 years (22 females and 
18 males; mean of age: 23.5; standard deviation of age: 2.12) participated voluntarily. 
240 
 
 
 
Handedness was assessed using an abridged version of the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971). All participants were Italian native speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. All participants gave written 
informed consent, and the experimental procedures were approved by the CNR- ISTC 
ethics committee.  
 
Materials 
 
Materials were the same as Experiment 1, except for 16 catch-trials that were added. 
Catch-trials were Italian words with a bold letter.   
As in Experiment 1, the experiment consisted of two tasks, a lexical decision task 
and a recognition task, that were presented in sequence; the lexical decision task always 
preceded the recognition one. Two separate lists of words were created for the two tasks: 
for the lexical decision task 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract, 8 emotional), 24 
pseudo-words. For the recognition task list, the stimuli consisted of 24 critical words (8 
concrete, 8 abstract and 8 emotional) and of 24 new words. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1.  
 
Lexical Decision task 
 
The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a training 
block of 16 trials (8 words and 8 catch-trials). A set of 64 words was presented on the 
241 
 
 
 
computer screen (24 critical words, 24 pseudo- words and 16 catch-trials). The words were 
arranged in two different lists, one for each block. Depending on the block, participants 
were required to keep a button in their dominant hand or in the mouth, between the teeth, 
and to respond to catch-trials by pressing it; they were instead asked to press the pedal to 
respond to critical stimuli. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were asked to press the pedal if they read an Italian word, and to refrain from 
responding if the word they read was not an Italian one. They were also required to respond 
to catch-trials by pressing the button with the hand or mouth, depending on the condition. 
Hence the mouth and the hand were not the direct response effectors, but depending on the 
condition either the mouth or the hand were occupied during the execution of the task.  
 
Recognition task 
 
The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a training 
block of 8 trials (3 words, 3 new words and 2 catch-trials). A set of 62 words was presented 
in each block, composed by 24 critical words, 24 new words and 12 catch-trials. The order 
of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Depending on the block, participants 
were required to keep the button in their dominant hand or in the mouth, between the teeth. 
As to the critical stimuli, participants were asked to press the pedal in case they recognized 
that the word on the screen had already been presented in the previous task, or to refrain 
from responding if the read a new word. When catch-trials were presented, they had to 
respond by pressing the button with the hand or mouth, depending on the block.  
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Results 
 
Lexical Decision  
 
All erroneous trials (4,58%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In the lexical 
decision task, the factor Type of Concept affected the response time [Wald (2) = 15.56; 
p<.001], showing that abstract words (mean: 876.14 ms, SE=10707.86) were processed 
slower than both concrete (mean: 771.67 ms, SE=10692.50) and emotional words (mean: 
821.95 ms, SE=10704.06). All the effects are corrected using Frequency, Number of 
Letters, Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition 
as covariates, however only Frequency [Wald (1) = 10.82; p=.001; B=-.33], Number of 
Letters [Wald (1) = 33.68; p<.001; B=13.75] and Imageability [Wald (1) = 7.37; p=.007; 
B=.31] affected the response time. No other main effect or interaction reached the 
significance.  
In the analysis on accuracy, the hand condition elicited more errors than the mouth 
condition. The mean rate of errors corrected by the covariates were computed from the 
logistic model for each effect. Mean rates of errors are reported in terms of percentage of 
errors (mouth: 95%, SE=11.28; hand: 97%, SE=7.09); (Effector [Wald (1)= 4.88; p=.02]. 
All the effects are corrected for the linguistic dimension of the stimulus, however only 
Imageability [Wald (1) = 4.24; p=.03; B=-.005] had an impact on the accuracy. No other 
main effect or interaction reached the significance.  
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Recognition task 
 
All erroneous trials (26.1%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In the 
analyses on response times, no main effect or effects of the covariates reached the 
significance. However, the interaction between the two main factors Type of Concept and 
Effector was significant [Wald (2) = 7.72; p=.02] showing the predicted interaction:  
abstract words were responded to faster with the mouth than with the hand, while concrete 
and emotional words were responded faster with the hand than with the mouth (see Table 
4 and Figure 4).  
In the analysis on accuracy no main effect or interaction reached the significance, 
nor did the effect of the covariates.  
 
Discussion 
 
Across the two tasks, abstract words were processed slower than both concrete and 
emotional words. As in Experiment 1, our findings confirm the concreteness effect and at 
the same time suggest that emotional words cannot be properly assimilated neither to 
concrete nor to abstract words. In line with the results of Experiment 1, we did not find a 
significant interaction between Type of Concept and Effector in the lexical decision task. 
The effect of the covariates Frequency, Number of Letters and Imageability in the lexical 
decision task, but not in the recognition task, suggests that these parameters could have 
affected more incisively a relatively shallow task, especially in the speed of processing. In 
the recognition task, instead, the interaction reached significance in the analysis of response 
times. Abstract words yielded faster RTs when processed in the mouth condition, while 
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concrete and emotional words were responded to faster in the hand condition, as predicted 
by the WAT (Words As social Tools) view.  
 
General discussion 
 
According to some proposals, abstract concepts evoke more linguistic experience 
than concrete words (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2018b; Dove, 2011; 
Gleitman et al., 2005). If the involvement of language activates a motor simulation, this 
should result in a higher engagement of the mouth effector in the processing of abstract 
words, compared to that of concrete words. The main aim of this paper was to test the 
hypothesis that different kinds of concepts, i.e. concrete, abstract and emotional ones, 
differently engaged the mouth and hand effectors. In the two experiments we reported the 
mouth and the hand effectors were involved either directly, to provide a response 
(Experiment 1), or indirectly, keeping them occupied during the response (Experiment 2).  
A further aim of this paper was related to the distinction between abstract, concrete 
and emotional words. Since many authors consider emotional concepts as a subset of 
abstract concepts while others tend to consider them as independent from both abstract and 
concrete ones, we intended to verify whether performance with emotional words reflected 
that with abstract words or not.  
Overall, our results confirmed the hypothesis that abstract words involve the 
activation of the mouth, but the effect was modulated by the task and differed depending 
on whether the response was provided directly using that effector or not. In the following 
we will point out the main results, discussing them in light of the advanced hypotheses. We 
will first illustrate results on the differences in processing the three concept kinds 
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independently of the effector, then we will focus on differences between concepts kinds in 
relation to the activation of mouth and hand effectors. 
Overall processing differences between concept kinds. Overall, abstract concepts 
were processed generally slower than concrete ones in the lexical decision task (E1 and E2 
lexical decision). Our results confirm the well-established concreteness effect (Paivio, 
1986; but see exceptions to the effect when controlling stimuli for valence: Kousta et al., 
2011; Barca et al., 2002), that shows that abstract words are slower than concrete ones, and 
extended it showing that in the lexical decision task they are also slower than emotional 
words (see also Ponari et al., 2017). Interestingly, however, such effect reached significance 
only in the lexical decision task.  
As to emotional words, our results cast doubts on the assimilation of emotional to 
abstract concepts: across experiments and tasks, the pattern of responses elicited by 
emotional words differed from that of abstract words and occasionally from that of concrete 
words too. In the lexical decision task of both experiments emotional words were processed 
faster than abstract words and did not significantly differ from concrete words. Our results 
are in line with those of a study by Siakaluk et al. (2016) showing that valenced words were 
processed faster than other words in lexical decision task. Overall, emotional words 
differed in processing from both concrete and abstract concepts, confirming the views 
according to which they represent a third kind of concept (Altarriba et al., 1999; Setti and 
Caramelli, 2005).  
Processing differences between concept kinds in relation to the effectors. The 
experiments we designed were driven from the hypothesis that abstract concepts would 
activate more the mouth motor system. Furthermore, we wanted to explore whether the two 
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effectors, mouth and hand, would be differently activated with emotional words. We thus 
expected to find a Type of Concept x Effector interaction.  
If we consider lexical decision, in neither experiment the predicted Type of Concept 
x Effector interaction was significant. Results thus seemed to suggest that the lexical 
decision task did not lead to a differential activation of the hand and mouth effectors 
depending on the concept kind, likely because of the superficial processing level it implied. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that in the lexical decision task typical 
psycholinguistic variables such as Frequency and Number of Letters resulted to impact the 
speed of responses in both Experiments and also the accuracy in Experiment 1. 
The results consistently differed if we consider the Recognition task. In Experiment 
1 the interaction reached significance in accuracy and was present in trend in RTs, while in 
Experiment 2 the interaction was significant in RTs. In Experiment 1, the general 
disadvantage caused by the mouth device was smaller for abstract words with respect to 
concrete words in both the accuracy and the response times. In Experiment 2, in which the 
hand and mouth were occupied but responses were provided in the same manner, namely 
pressing a pedal with the foot, responses to abstract words were faster in the mouth than in 
the hand condition, while the opposite was true for both concrete and emotional words. 
These results clearly confirm our hypothesis, indicating that abstract words were facilitated 
when the mouth was activated, and extend previous results, showing that such a facilitation 
occurred not only when the mouth was the direct response effector but also when the mouth 
was occupied with a device.  
This confirms the predictions of the WAT proposal, according to which abstract 
concepts re-enact linguistic and social experience more than concrete concepts, hence 
determining a higher activation of the mouth. Three possible mechanisms can underline 
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this activation (see for further discussion Borghi & Zarcone, 2016; Borghi et al., 2018b): a. 
the re-enactment of the acquisition experience, which is mainly linguistic and occurs in a 
social context; b. the inner speech used to re-explain to us the meaning of abstract concepts; 
c. the meta-cognitive awareness that our conceptual knowledge is inadequate followed by 
the motor preparation to ask to others information on words meaning (social-
metacognition, Borghi et al., 2018b). The present study does not allow us to determine 
which of the three mechanisms is responsible of the effects; further research is needed in 
order to disentangle them.  
The pattern of results of emotional concepts was also rather consistent across the 
two experiments, and clearly different from that of abstract concepts. In the recognition 
task of both Experiments 1 and 2 emotional words were processed slightly slower in the 
mouth than in the hand condition, differently from abstract words. Finally, the fact that 
abstract but not emotional words selectively engage only the mouth effector is in keeping 
with recent experimental results. Ratings results showed that emotional concepts activate 
both the mouth and the hand effectors, while mental states concepts activate more 
selectively the mouth (Ghio et al., 2013), and fMRI results clearly demonstrated that while 
the face/mouth motor system in the brain is more activated by “pure” abstract concepts as 
mental state concepts than by emotional ones, which activate hand and face motor cortex 
to similar degrees (Dreyer and Pulvermüller, 2018). Overall, this finding is in line with 
views according to which no dichotomy between abstract and concrete concepts exists. Our 
results rather suggest that emotional concepts cannot be assimilated neither to concrete nor 
to abstract concepts, (see Barca et al., 2017, and Mazzuca et al., 2017, for further 
discussion), and are in line with the proposal according to which emotional concepts, being 
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more grounded than other abstract concepts, provide a bootstrapping mechanism to learn 
them (Ponari et al., 2017). 
While we found that abstract concepts processing was facilitated with the mouth, 
the results are less marked than in a previous study (Borghi and Zarcone, 2016). We ascribe 
this difference to two factors: first, to the fact that in the previous study participants were 
provided with a context and not only with single words, and second, to the fact that the task 
was a deep processing one.  
It can be objected that effectors effects have previously been found with lexical 
decision tasks. However, it is difficult to directly compare our results with those of previous 
studies with lexical decision, such as those by Pulvermüller et al., 2005 and Neininger & 
Pulvermüller (2003), because these studies employed as stimuli action words directly 
related to the effectors (Pulvermüller et al., 2005) and strongly perceptual related words 
(Neininger & Pulvermüller, 2003).  
Even if we did not find the predicted interaction with effectors, our findings are in 
line with those of previous lexical decision studies with concrete and abstract words. For 
example, Dreyer et al., (2015) comparing abstract emotional words with tool, food, animal 
words and effector related words, showed that in the control group abstract-emotional 
words yielded longer RTs than food and animal related words, while there was no 
difference in the accuracy. Moreover, in the same study (always in the control group), 
Dreyer et al. found that hand-related verbs were processed faster than verbs related to face 
and leg. Our results on lexical decision are in line with the evidence reported, showing a 
concreteness effect and a general advantage of responses given with the hand.    
In sum, the present study adds important information to previous studies on 
concepts and effectors activation: it suggests that the mouth and hand effectors can be 
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differently activated depending on the task and on the depth level it implies. The different 
effectors did not influence results in the lexical decision task, but they had an impact on a 
subsequent recognition task.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, our studies show that, in general, abstract words are more difficult to 
process than concrete ones, as revealed by the slower RTs, independently from the task. 
This confirms the concreteness effect, well-established in the literature. Furthermore, the 
pattern of results obtained with emotional words suggests that they are markedly different 
from both concrete and abstract concepts.  
If we consider the relationship between concepts and effectors, we confirmed the 
hypothesis proposed by the WAT proposal that abstract concepts had an advantage in the 
mouth condition. The result was however modulated by the task: the effectors did not have 
a different effect on concepts in a lexical decision task, but impacted a subsequent 
recognition task. Overall, our findings highlight that concepts are grounded and activate 
bodily experiences, but they also point out the exquisitely flexible character of our 
conceptual representation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Procedure and devices used to respond to stimuli. (A) Mouth and hand buttons used to respond 
to stimuli in Experiment 1, and to catch-trial in Experiment 2; pedal used to respond to stimuli 
in Experiment 2. (B) Procedure: each trial began with a centred black fixation cross for 500 ms, 
followed by the presentation of the word. Words remained on the screen for a time of maximum 
1.5 s. After 1 s the next trial started. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in response times of Recognition, 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in the accuracy of Recognition task, Experiment 
1. The mean rate of errors were corrected by covariates included in the logistic model (Frequency, Number 
of Letters, Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition).  
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Figure 4. Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in response times of Recognition 
task, Experiment 2. 
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Table 1  
Characteristics of the three categories of words. A. Characteristics of the three selected 
categories of words in terms of psycholinguistic dimensions. B. Comparisons between 
the three selected categories of words in terms of psycholinguistic dimensions. 
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Table 2 
Selected stimuli from Della Rosa et al. (2010) database. 
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Table 3  
GLMMs results of Experiments 1 and 2 of both lexical decision and recognition tasks. 
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Table 4 
Means of response times as a function of Type of Concept and Effector for both tasks 
and experiments. 
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CHAPTER 5.  
STUDY 2&3 
Study 2  
Gender is a multifaceted concept1. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Categories and concepts are what allow us to coherently make sense of the 
world: they constitute the “bricks” of thought (Murphy, 2002). Importantly, concepts 
are said to be flexible representations, re-enacting relevant information about a given 
category in a specific situation (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013). A large body of evidence 
demonstrates that the structure of categories and concepts varies as a function of 
context, both if considered as the physical context in which people are asked to judge 
sentences, and when considering the linguistic context (or frame) in which people 
produce features of concepts (for a review see Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). Even in 
tasks explicitly addressing semantic access, the activation of salient semantic features 
generally depends on task conditions and is dynamically tied to the context (Lebois, 
Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2015; Borghi & Barsalou, in press). Concepts also 
show flexibility across individuals and within the same individual over time, and as a 
function of changing points of view (e.g., Barsalou & Sewell, 1984). The capacity to 
retrieve different information in different situations for the same concept has been 
                                                     
1 This paper is currently under review in the journal Language & Cognition.  
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robustly demonstrated both with behavioral tasks (e.g., Barsalou, 1987) and through 
neuroimaging techniques (Hoenig et al., 2008; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).  
Together with task contexts, linguistic and cultural contexts can also affect 
categories. As the growing number of studies concerned with the linguistic and cultural 
relativism testifies, concepts of time (Boroditsky et al., 2011), space (Majid et al., 2004), 
motion (Papafragou, Hubert & Trueswell, 2008), color (Regier & Kay, 2009) odor 
(Majid et al., 2018), and moral concepts (Casasanto, 2009) are influenced by the 
linguistic, cultural, social, and experiential environment, demonstrating how variable 
concepts can be across groups of people in different environments (see Malt & Majid, 
2013). In this paper, we specifically address between-groups conceptual flexibility by 
the means of a linguistic task. 
In fact, in order to reveal insights about conceptual structure, linguistic tasks 
such as word-associations or feature- and property-generation tasks are among the most 
commonly employed tools (e.g., McRae et al., 2005). Asking participants to produce 
properties for a given concept like “truth” (i.e. property-generation task), for example, 
shed light on some of the relevant features incorporated in the representation of abstract 
concepts, such as introspective and experiential relations (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005), and show how abstract concepts are characterized by fewer intrinsic 
properties and more complex situational relations in their representation (Wiemer-
Hastings & Xu, 2005; Barca, Mazzuca & Borghi, 2017). Given the higher contextual 
dependency of abstract concepts compared to concrete concepts (Borghi & Binkofski, 
2014), their representation might be more flexibly tied to the social context and personal 
experiences.   
While traditional theories contend that abstract and concrete concepts engage 
different semantic systems (e.g., Paivio, 1986; Brysbaert, Warriner & Kuperman, 
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2014), recent approaches have started to reconsider the classic dichotomy between 
purely “abstract” and purely “concrete” concepts (Borghi et al., 2018a, 2018b, 2019; 
Barsalou, Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018). Specifically, in a situated perspective (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008), both concrete and abstract concepts include situational and perceptual 
information, and support goal-oriented actions. In this light, abstract concepts can be 
considered as being represented in a multidimensional semantic space with regions that 
partly overlap with the semantic space of concrete concepts (Troche, Crutch and Reilly, 
2014; 2017; Binder et al., 2005; Harpaintner, Trumpp & Kiefer, 2018).  
Abstract concepts also show high intra-class variability (Ghio et al., 2013; 
Borghi et al., 2018b; Desai et al., 2018). For instance, Roversi, Borghi and Tummolini 
(2013) compared properties listed for “social entities” such as “party” with properties 
listed for “institutional artifacts” such as “ownership” in a property-generation task and 
found that although both classes of concepts could broadly be considered “social”, each 
elicited distinct properties: “social entities” elicited a higher proportion of contextual 
features (e.g., typical situations, entities or events that co-occur with the target concept), 
while “institutional artifacts” were conceptualized in terms of normative relations. So, 
some abstract concepts are more linked to linguistic and social experience, while others 
have a more salient affective and experiential component (Prinz, 2002; 2012). More 
generally abstract concepts might be considered a heterogeneous class, grounded in 
multiple systems, including perception, action and sensori-motor components just like 
concrete concepts, but also language, emotion and sociality (cf. Borghi et al., 2018a; 
2019; Desai, Reilly & van Dam, 2018; Mellem, Jasmin, Peng & Martin, 2016). These 
grounding mechanisms might contribute to the representation of specific abstract 
concepts to different extents.   
1.1. Is Gender an Abstract Concept? 
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Gender is an interesting concept to think about in this context. It can be 
considered an embodied social concept in which both concrete (e.g. sexual and 
biological factors) and abstract components (related to social interpretation) are 
relevant. In fact, recent research has proposed the hybrid label “gender/sex” pointing to 
the coupling of biological, physical and perceptual factors with the social and cultural 
in the constitution of gendered and sexual identities (van Anders, 2015; Fausto-Sterling, 
2019). This contrasts with the traditional distinction between sex as the natural datum 
of biological sex (hormones, genes, genitalia etc.), and gender as the province of social 
and cultural practices built upon a supposed sexual dimorphism. The sex-gender 
distinction dates back to feminist works (e.g., Rubin, 1975) and aimed at opposing the 
biological determinism at the basis of women’s discrimination. Separating sex from 
gender allowed feminists to show that gendered traits (Bem, 1974), and more broadly 
genders (West & Zimmerman, 1987), are at least in part products of social practices 
(Haslanger, 1995; Risman, 2004). Nonetheless, scholars such as Butler (1990) have 
made clear that not only “abstract” notions such as gender roles, but also our sexed 
bodies (Fausto-Sterling, 1993; 2012) are defined by cultural practices and do not exist 
outside social meanings (Butler, 1993a). 
Within psychology, gender is perhaps one of the most employed constructs. 
Psychological research has focused on gender/sex differences relying on a binary 
gender system that opposes men to women. Specifically, a binary gender system 
presupposes that “there are two discrete categories into which all individuals can be 
sorted […] and one’s category membership is biologically determined, apparent at birth, 
stable over time, salient and meaningful to the self, and a host of psychological 
variables” (Hyde et al., 2019, p. 1). On this basis scientists have attempted to unravel 
traits and attitudes that distinguish the two categories. By the means of instrumental 
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constructs, such as gender-schematicity (Bem, 1981) or gender-consistency, scholars 
have tried to explain the degree of gender-congruence of individuals from childhood to 
adulthood.  
Another line of research specifically addresses gendered social stereotypes, 
showing how these implicitly guide people’s expectations, judgements and perception 
of individual men and women (for a review see Ellemers, 2018). For instance, traits 
such as assertiveness, competence, warmth, and nurturance are valued differently in 
relation to men and women; overall, women are more frequently associated with family 
life, whereas men are associated with career advancement (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Importantly, implicit stereotypical gendered knowledge is also activated in language 
processing: the elaboration of linguistic information consistent with stereotypical 
gender-expectations (e.g., feminine pronouns and “nurse”) has a cognitive advantage 
over grammatical and stereotypical gender mismatch (e.g., masculine pronouns and 
“nurse”; see e.g., Miersky, Majid & Snijders, 2019; Pesciarelli, Scorolli & Cacciari, 
2019)  
Other approaches focus instead on the influence of grammatical gender in 
cognitive processes such as categorization (e.g., Cubelli et al., 2011). Converging 
evidence suggests that speakers of gendered languages incorporate gender as a salient 
feature even when this is irrelevant, as in the representation of inanimate entities. For 
example, Spanish and French adults and children tend to assign feminine and masculine 
voices to objects according to the grammatical gender of the objects in their native 
languages (Sera et al., 2002), and Spanish and German speakers remember noun-object 
pairings better when the noun of the object matches the grammatical gender of the 
object in their language (Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000; for a systematic review see 
Samuel, Cole & Eacott, 2019).   
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1.2. Challenges to the Binary Gender System.  
While the “bigenderist assumption” dominates the scientific literature, an 
emerging area of research from cognitive science and biology questions the binary 
nature of gender (e.g. van Anders, Goldey & Kuo, 2011; Olson, Key & Eaton, 2015; 
Joel & Fausto-Sterling, 2016; Roughgarden, 2004; Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; 
Joel, 2016). Notably, although most people are likely cisgender (i.e., people who 
perceive their assigned birth sex as congruent with their expressed and desired gender 
identity), individuals whose identities are not confined to the binary gender system (e.g., 
gender non-conforming, genderqueers, gender-diverse or transgender individuals) have 
been documented through history and across diverse cultures (Herdt, 1993; Devor, 
1997). Attention to gender-nonconforming individuals in the psychological sciences is 
also promoted by the American Psychological Association, which in 2015 issued 
guidelines for best practices with transgender and gender-nonconforming individuals 
(APA, 2015) 
Only recently have some scholars introduced in their measurements the notion 
of gender non-conforming or genderqueer (i.e. a person rejecting traditional gender 
categories such as man/woman), and they have begun to investigate gender identity 
without pathologizing gender-diverse individuals (see Hegarty, Ansara & Barker, 2018 
for a recent discussion). For example, Galupo, Pulice-Farrow, and Ramirez (2017) 
asked a sample of 197 individuals who self-identified as either gender-variant or 
agender to describe their gender identities with the aim of investigating what non-binary 
individuals consider as central features of their gender identity. A thematic analysis of 
responses showed that fluidity, mixture and rejection of traditional bipolar dimensions 
such as femininity and masculinity were key features.  
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Experiences of non-binary feelings were also evident among “normative”2 
individuals in a study by Joel, Tarrasch, Berman, Mukamel and Ziv (2014) with Israeli 
participants. Joel and colleagues explored gender identity using a questionnaire which 
measured gender identity, gender dysphoria and gender performance (Multi-GIQ 
questionnaire, Joel et al., 2014; see also Jacobson & Joel, 2018; 2019) among people 
who identified themselves as men, women, and queer. They found that among self-
identified men and women, over 35% of people reported feeling the “opposite” gender, 
both genders, or neither. This was especially prevalent in queer individuals, although 
no significant differences emerged between the three groups suggesting that far from 
being binary, gender is fluid and multidimensional.  
To summarize, gender has been investigated from three broad perspectives: (1) 
relating to the representation of grammatical gender in language and thought, (2) as a 
characteristic related to the sense of one’s own identity, and (3) in relation to social 
stereotypes. However, it is unclear how lay people conceptualize gender exactly. Is it 
something related to our physical and biological make-up or better characterized by 
social practices? For reasons discussed next, our study aimed at examining the concept 
of gender in Italian speaking participants. 
1.3. The Current Study: How do Italian People Conceptualize Gender?  
We adopted a common methodology used to investigate conceptual knowledge. 
We asked a sample of Italian speaking participants to list words they freely associated 
with the concept of genere ‘gender’. The main purpose of the study is to offer a 
depiction of people’s conceptual representation of gender, taking into account specific 
                                                     
2 “Normative” in this literature refers to the situation where people feel their assigned birth sex is aligned 
with their affirmed gender identity, and that generally conform to heterosexual norms, or that are not 
plurisexual (i.e. are sexually attracted by only one sex). Note that the term “normative” is in quotation 
marks, indicating that the term is applied in a strictly statistical sense, and not as a value-judgement (see 
Joel et al., 2014).  
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experiences that might contribute to the shaping of the concept. Henceforth, we will 
first delve into the free-listing results provided by the whole sample of participants, to 
understand how gender is broadly represented; afterwards we will focus on results from 
specific sub-groups, to test whether there are some differences in conceptual 
representations derived from different gender-related experiences.  
Our study was conducted in Italy which is an interesting context to explore this 
question because of the specific linguistic and cultural particulars of this community. In 
the Italian language, genere (‘gender’), is a polysemous word covering five areas of 
meaning. In addition to the social interpretation of sex3 it also includes: (1) The original 
Latin notion of “genus” representing what species have in common, e.g., the genus 
Panthera, within the family Felidae, includes species such as lions and tigers; (2) A 
notion similar to the English meaning of kind or type; (3) Aesthetic canon—similar to 
the English genre—applying to literature as well as to cinema, arts, and music; (4) The 
grammatical category distinguishing nouns into masculine or feminine classes, also 
used to differentiate individuals based on biological features. This distinction is not 
confined to animate entities, but also applies to inanimate entities on the basis of 
linguistic conventions—e.g., in Italian philosophy is feminine and table is masculine. 
This binary dichotomy may have ramifications for the general concept of “gender” too. 
Indeed, it has been hypothesized that speaking a language encoding gender in a binary 
fashion (e.g., Italian, French) may contribute to reinforce the conceptualization of 
gender as a binary system, and possibly strengthen sexist conceptual associations (see 
Gabriel & Gygax, 2016; Gabriel, Gygax & Kuhn, 2018; Pérez & Tavits, 2019).  
                                                     
3 In Italian the terms sex and gender are frequently used interchangeably. However, there is a growing 
awareness of the necessity to separate the two terms to account for social phenomena such as gender gaps 
in salary, gender-based violence, and to bring attention on specific gender non-conforming experiences, 
mostly due to the efforts of academic and political discourses (LGBTQ and feminist activism).  
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The concept of gender in Italian is also interesting because of the specific 
cultural and social context. Italy is a predominantly catholic country, and theological 
accounts of gender, sexuality and family politics are very prominent4. In Italian public 
debate, the English term gender is maintained in its English form as a derogatory term. 
It describes gender and queer studies as based on an “ideology” that undermines the 
structure of the traditional family and suggests the possibility of choosing one’s own 
gender identity and sexual orientation (the so-called ideology of gender; see e.g., 
Garbagnoli, 2014; Bernini, 2016).  
In order to investigate how Italian speakers represent the concept of gender, we 
used a free-listing paradigm. We were primarily interested in uncovering conceptual 
structure, and not in assessing participants’ explicit attitudes towards gender-related 
issues. To avoid participants adopting social desirability strategies, we refrained from 
explicit measures such as questionnaires or scales measuring attitudes towards sexuality 
or gender-roles. Instead we focused on participants’ own conceptual relations, thus 
opting for an approach more explicit than, for example, IAT (Greenwald, McGhee & 
Schwartz, 1998). Free-listing tasks, also termed semantic fluency procedures, are 
thought to make explicit the psychological proximity of concepts and words produced 
in sequence. The general assumption underlying this kind of task is that when a concept 
is activated in memory, be it recalled or spoken, it will in turn prime words and concepts 
which are semantically related or similar to it. This provides an indirect measure of the 
psychological saliency of concepts (see Crowe & Prescott, 2003).  
                                                     
4 An illustrative example is provided by some of the statements of Bergoglio on the family, which 
according to him is composed solely of a union between man and woman. This perspective is shared by 
the former Family and Disabilities Minister Lorenzo Fontana, who in his first public statement declared 
that “rainbow families [families headed by gay couples] don’t exist” 
(https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-5800563/Italy-Right-wing-leader-says-new-govt-wont-
undo-gay-unions.html). Indeed, in Italy same-sex marriages are not legal: civil unions between same sex 
partners are regulated by a law enacted in 2016 as a special social formation.  
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We conducted the free-listing task with a diverse pool of Italian participants that 
were divided into three subgroups according to their gender identity, sexual orientation, 
and classification according to heteronormative or bigenderist benchmarks.  
In line with the idea that abstract concepts are represented as multidimensional 
constructs (Borghi et al., 2018a; Barsalou et al., 2018), where both embodied and 
contextual aspects interact, we expected that across all participants we would find 
evidence of the duality of genere ‘gender’ in Italian, such that participants would list 
features relating to both the abstract and concrete sense of gender. So we expected early 
and frequent listing of features of gender as a social construct (e.g., culture, femininity, 
masculinity), as well as features related to the more concrete meaning (e.g., sex, body, 
genitalia).  
In addition, we hypothesized that gender is at least in part represented differently 
depending on the sub-group of interest following the proposal that conceptual 
knowledge is flexibly modulated by different experiences (Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). 
We investigated whether participants that differed in their gender identity listed 
different features of the concept gender. Additionally, we expected “normative” and 
heteronormative individuals, which typically conform to the gender-binary system 
(Motschenbacher, 2019), to produce more features focusing on physical, sexual and 
biological aspects of gender, while “non-normative” and non-heteronormative (i.e. 
homosexual, plurisexual) participants would generate more features related to their 
personal experiences and to the social sense of gender. 
 
Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
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80 native Italian speakers voluntarily took part in the study. Ethical approval was 
provided by the Ethics Committee of the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and 
Technologies of the Italian National Research Center (ISTC-CNR Ethical Approval 
n.0000315). Participants were asked to provide their birth sex, self-identified gender 
identity, and sexual orientation (details of procedure below). The majority of 
individuals were highly educated: 67.5% had a Master Degree and 13.7% had a PhD; 
17.5% completed High School, while only 1.2% had Lower High School education.  
2.2. Procedure  
We created an on-line questionnaire divided into three sections that participants 
filled in a fixed order. In the first section, participants gave basic personal information, 
such as age and birth sex (male; female; intersex). The second section consisted of the 
free-listing task. Participants were asked to provide 10 concepts they thought were 
related to the concept of gender (Il tuo compito ora è quello di scrivere dieci concetti 
che ti vengono in mente in relazione al concetto di genere; ‘Your task is now to type 
ten concepts that come to your mind related to the concept of gender’).  
Finally, in the third section, participants provided additional information about 
their self-identified gender identity, sexual orientation and level of education. Gender 
identity was assessed through forced-choice boxes (woman, man, queer, and 
transgender), in addition to a blank text box labeled “other” that participants could fill 
according to their preferences. Keeping birth sex separate from gender identity allowed 
participants to report their affirmed gender identity, thus avoiding mis-gendering 
practices (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2014). Indeed, inferring gender identity from 
biological sex has been criticized by some scholars, in that self-determined gender 
identity does not always match with the sex assigned at birth. However, we made this 
distinction explicit only in the third section of the questionnaire, to avoid potential 
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demand effects. Sexual orientation was assessed through the Kinsey Scale (Kinsey et 
al., 1948), a self-report measure where participants respond on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from “exclusively heterosexual” to “exclusively homosexual”—hence not considering 
sexual behavior a strict dichotomy (although for criticism see Galupo, Mitchell & 
Davis, 2018, Savin-Williams, 2016).  
 
Results 
 
We sought to provide a sketch of how individuals conceptualize gender, in 
particular in relation to their personal experiences related to gender. As a first step, we 
report the characteristics of our participants. We then focus on the free-listing data and 
aggregate results across all participants to illustrate which words were produced more 
frequently overall. We show how words produced by the full cohort of participants 
tested are clustered together using a measure which accounts for the psychological 
saliency of the produced associates (see the following sections for details). This overall 
analysis is followed by subsidiary analyses zooming in on the free-listing produced by 
different sub-groups.  
3.1. Participant Characteristics 
The total sample of participants was 56.2% female (n=45; age M = 29.5; 
SD=7.7), 43.7% male (n=35; age M = 32.7; SD=10.5), and 0% intersex. Among those 
individuals, 51.2% identified as women (n=41; age M = 29.5; SD=6.8), 40% identified 
themselves as men (n=32; age M = 33.3; SD=11.5), 8.7% identified as queer (n=7; age 
M = 28.1; SD=6.7), and 0% as transgender.  
 Sexual orientation was also assessed using the Kinsey Scale (Kinsey et al., 1948; 
for further details, see Procedure). Among the total sample, 46.2% (n=36) placed their 
sexual behavior at the heterosexual extreme of the Kinsey Scale (points 1 and 2), while 
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47.5% (n=37) considered their sexual behavior as homosexual (points 6 and 7 of the 
Kinsey Scale). 8.9% of participants fell in the middle of the scale (points 3, 4, 5) or 
defined their sexual orientation as bisexual or asexual (n=7). At a more fine-grained 
level, 62.5% of participants reported to be attracted only by one sex (points 1 and 7), 
while 37.5% reported to be attracted to more than one sex to different extents (points 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6). 
In order to explore how these differences relate to the concept of genere 
‘gender’, participants were first divided into two groups according to their affirmed 
gender identity (woman and man). Individuals who identified as queer were excluded 
from the analysis by gender identity because of the small sample size; however, their 
responses were collated in the subsequent analyses by “normativity”, thus partially 
avoiding the potential marginalization of underrepresented gender and sexual 
minorities. 
Second, participants were divided according to their sexual orientation 
according to their ratings on the Kinsey Scale. Participants’ responses followed a 
bimodal distribution. Accordingly, participants who scored 1 or 2 in the Kinsey Scale 
were considered heterosexual, while those who scored 6 or 7 were considered 
homosexual for the purposes of the analyses by sexual orientation. The remaining 
participants who rated their sexual orientation on the Kinsey Scale as 3, 4 or 5, or 
bisexual and asexual were excluded from this analysis, but they were included in the 
subsequent analyses.   
Finally, to distinguish “normative” vs. “non-normative” individuals, we took 
into account participants’ gender identity, sexual orientation, and the correspondence 
between birth sex and affirmed gender identity. “Normative” individuals (n=43) are 
therefore cis-gender monosexual individuals (either exclusively heterosexual or 
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exclusively homosexual; see e.g. Galupo, Lomash & Mitchell, 2017; Jacobson & Joel, 
2019); “non-normative” individuals (n=37) are gender-diverse individuals, individuals 
falling under the umbrella term of transgender, and/or cis-gender individuals who did 
not define their sexual preferences in strictly monosexual terms. We decided to include 
exclusively-homosexual cis-gender individuals in the category of “normative” 
individuals in line with Motschenbacher, (2019), that suggests that  “when certain 
(originally non-normative) sexualities are increasingly enacted as locally valid norms, 
they are likely to become part of what is perceived as “normal” on the social macro-
level.” / “[..] sexualities that have evolved as macro-social discourses tend to be 
associated with powerful identity discourses (such as heterosexual, gay or lesbian 
identities; see Foucault, 1978). Less recognized or non-normative sexualities (such as 
objcetophilia, see next section) generally form marginalized discourses that rarely 
surface in language use.”(p. 9). It is worth noting that we relied on the help of LGBTQI+ 
centers for the recruitment of participants, hence in this specific social setting non-
exclusively monosexual individuals can be considered as “less normative” than cis-
gender exclusively homosexual individuals (see also Hegarty, Ansara & Barker, 2018).    
3.2. Free-listing task 
3.3. How is the Concept of “Gender” Represented Across all Participants? 
Overall, the total sample of 80 participants produced 300 words. There was great 
variation in the responses provided by participants suggesting that, as expected, genere 
‘gender’ is a complex concept incorporating a number of distinct components and 
different experiences. Participants produced a small number of common associates: out 
of 300 words, 64% (n= 192) were produced only once by an individual. The most 
frequently listed word (identity), was produced by 24 out of a total sample of 80 
participants. So there is low overall coherence of this category in this sample. For the 
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overall analysis presented first, we focus on associates produced by at least 5% of all 
participants.  
Words with either a strong physical and perceptual connotation (e.g., sex, 
sexuality, male and female, body), or related to social and cultural experiences (e.g., 
discrimination, stereotype, fluidity, feminism, binarism, queer, rights and role) were the 
most frequently produced. Experiential and personal features appeared too (e.g., 
education, identity, discrimination, identification), as well as linguistic associations 
connected to the term genere in Italian (e.g., music, literature, grammar, type). See 
below for further details. 
3.3.1. Measure of psychological proximity. To analyze the free-listing data in 
more depth, we used a measure developed by Crowe and Prescott (2003). According to 
this measure, similarity between pairs of items in a free-listing task can be calculated 
by considering both the distance of two items produced in a single list (from an 
individual participant), and the distance of the same two items produced across lists 
(across participants). The measure is given by two component measures, namely 𝛼 and 
βw, one based on within-list proximity (𝛼), and the other on across-list item co-
occurrence (βw). These two metrics are combined to form the overall inter-item 
similarity metric (𝛼βw). Matrices of inter-item dissimilarity were computed initially for 
all the participants, and then for all the groups of interest (for further details see Crowe 
& Prescott, 2003). Once the most frequently produced words were identified, both for 
the total sample of participants and for the sub-groups of interest, associate words were 
subjected to cluster analyses based on inter-item dissimilarity matrices described above. 
The data were analyzed using R (version 3.6.0, R-Core Team, 2019) and RStudio 
(version 1.2.1335; RStudio Team, 2018). Hopkins’ statistic test has been performed 
using the package “factoextra” (Kassambara & Mundt, 2017). Clustering indexes have 
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been calculated with the “NbClust” package (Charrad, Ghazzali, Boiteau & Niknafs, 
2014), and dendrograms were produced using “dendextend” package (Galili, 2015).  
3.3.2. Clustering methods and analyses. Before applying specific clustering 
methods, we assessed whether our data could be clustered using Hopkins’ statistic test 
(Lawson and Jurs, 1990), which measures the probability that a given data set is 
generated by a uniform data distribution. Results show our data do not support strong 
clustering but approach a good tendency (H= 0.47). Hierarchical cluster analysis was 
performed based on the dissimilarity matrix using Ward’s method, based on a sum-of-
squares criterion (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014) which minimizes within group 
dispersion (see also Harpaintner et al., 2018). In order to determine the number of 
clusters and assess cluster validity, we relied on indexes that are most frequently used 
in the literature. We thus computed Silhouette Index, C-Index, McClain Index and Dunn 
Index. Two of the aforementioned indices provided a six-cluster solution (SI= 0.3; CI= 
0.3), while the remaining two suggested a two-cluster solution (McClain= 0.3; 
Dunn=0.06). We opted for the six-cluster solution (Figure 1), which better illustrates 
the fine-grained structure of ‘gender’. The outcome is represented in the dendrogram as 
visual proximity of words; namely, words that appear clustered together are words that 
were most frequently produced in succession.  
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Figure 1. Dendrogram representing the six-clusters solution for words produced by at least 5% of participants. 
 
From top to bottom of Figure 1, we find in cluster 1 (violet) and cluster 2 (blue) 
features consistent with the conceptualization of gender as a social construct. These two 
clusters represent the most “abstract” part of the dendrogram, and point to the idea of 
gender as a social construction (Butler, 1990), entrenched in the social structure (power, 
discrimination; Foucault, 1978). 
Cluster 2 specifically includes concepts generally used in philosophical and 
political discourses on gender, and it reveals the most “abstract” component of the term 
derived from a shared knowledge and mediated by cultural and social factors (see Shea, 
2018).  
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In cluster 3 (green) features related to the physical, perceptual, and interoceptive 
characteristics of gender are present. Words in this set refer to the physical display of 
gender attitudes (masculinity and femininity), clustered together with sex; body and 
belonging are linked together. Compared to the first two clusters, this cluster can be 
considered as the most traditionally “concrete” one in the sense that it relies more on 
perceptual and physical properties.  
In cluster 4 (yellow) gender is a specifically cultural and social discourse. This 
is suggested by the presence of sexuality, politics, feminism and queer (e.g., Foucault, 
1978, Motschenbacher, 2019; Butler, 1993b), and by the strong associations of the 
words rights and lgbtq. 
Cluster 5 (orange) is the most heterogeneous cluster. Here, terms relating and 
challenging the normative facet of gender (transgender, fluidity) appear as closely 
linked to socially and culturally connotated terms (culture, education, difference, 
society, and behaviour) and to identifying terms (feminine, masculine and identity). This 
is likely to reflect the relation that exists in people’s minds between education and the 
development of a gendered identity (for a review see e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2012), and 
it is in line with the notion of socialization (e.g., Witt, 1997), according to which parents 
and peers play a fundamental role in the development of gender-stereotyped self-
concepts in children, by reproducing and projecting culturally derived behaviors and 
norms 
In cluster 6 (red) a different meaning of the Italian word genere appears. We 
find words referring to the meaning of ‘genre’ (music), as well as ‘kind’, ‘species’ 
(animal, human) and grammar. In addition, this cluster includes the two Italian 
grammatical genders male and female, likely linguistic associations given that they are 
clustered closely together with the words human and music.  
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Overall, our results suggest the concept of gender cannot be considered either a 
purely abstract or a purely concrete concept. Rather, it encompasses aspects 
traditionally considered to be both abstract and concrete. Linguistic associations (e.g., 
Paivio, 1986) such as literature and animal, experiential and situational features like 
identification and behaviour (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), social and 
contextual features like binarism and queer (Roversi et al., 2013), culturally mediated 
aspects like politics and feminism (Shea, 2018), and bodily or biological properties (e.g., 
body, male and female) appear. This result is in line with recent perspectives on abstract 
conceptual knowledge (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2018; Borghi et al., 2018a) and with 
contemporary debates reconsidering the distinction between the concepts of sex and 
gender (e.g., van Anders, 2015). 
3.4. Does the Concept of “Gender” Vary Across Sub-Groups? 
In the analysis presented so far, we do not distinguish people by gender identity, sexual 
orientation, or according to gender and sexual norms. However, these aspects are likely 
to influence the conceptualization of gender. To assess this, participants were divided 
into three subgroups according to their gender identity (woman, man), sexual 
orientation (heterosexual, homosexual), and “normativity” (“normative”, “non-
normative”) (see section 3.1. Participant Characteristics). For each of these sub-
groups, we examined how people conceptualized genere ‘gender’. Target words that 
entered the cluster analysis were items produced by at least by 10% of participants in 
each sub-group. Given the extreme variability of responses elicited by the concept 
gender (see par. 3.3), in the sub-groups analyses we raised the threshold for inclusion 
from 5% to 10%, as keeping it consistent with the Overall analysis would have led to 
include in the analysis also items produced by only one participant in the sub-samples.  
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3.4.1. The concept of gender as a function of gender identity. Overall, there was 
no significant difference, in the total number of items listed by women (M=8.9; SD=2.7) 
and men (M= 7.8; SD=2.8) , t(71) = -1.61, p > .05, although women showed higher 
agreement in the terms they mentioned, with 29 words overcoming the critical 
threshold, compared to 12 words in the men group. The most frequently produced words 
by women (Panel A) were identity (39% of the sample) and sex (27% of the sample). 
For men (Panel B) masculine was the most frequently produced word (22% of the 
sample), followed by identity (19%). Figure 2 shows the dendrograms resulting from 
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) for each group.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dendrograms of words produced by at least 10% of (A) women and (B) men.  
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Even though some words overlapped between the two groups (n=9), the cluster 
analyses showed interesting differences between men and women. For instance, 
identity—one of the most frequently produced term by both groups—was mentioned by 
men together with feminine, masculine and sex, suggesting a relation between 
perceptual and physical properties and gender identities. For women, however, identity 
appeared as tightly related to social terms (construct, role, freedom) and subsequently 
connected with fluidity, sex, behaviour and society, suggesting a non-deterministic 
perspective on gender identity.  
It is also noteworthy that although traditional bigender terms were mentioned 
by both groups, they are differently positioned in the dendrograms. On the one hand, 
male and female are represented in a small biological cluster, in the women’s 
dendrogram, which in turn is connected to words that seem to challenge a traditional 
dimorphic conception of gender (education, transgender). In the men’s dendrogram, 
however, the clustering of male and female appears as a linguistic association to the 
grammatical category of gender, as indicated by the link between the two terms and the 
word grammar. Masculine and feminine are part of a small linguistic cluster for women 
(indicated by the presence of the word music); for men they are part of a cluster marking 
the identity-laden value of gender, possibly delimited by sexual differences (sex). 
Woman co-occurred with man in the men’s responses, while in the women’s 
dendrogram the word woman was coupled with feminism along with difference and 
queer, whereas man does not appear. Difference and culture are both part of a socio-
cultural cluster in both groups. While women generally associated culture with sexuality 
in a cluster including masculinity and femininity, men often mentioned them together 
with rights and subsequently man and woman.  
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In sum, there are notable differences between the two groups. Although the 
conceptualization of gender by men included social and cultural features (e.g., rights 
was mentioned by men, but not women), terms explicitly challenging a binary and 
heteropatriarchal system were not highly salient: most words referred to the perceptual, 
biological and physical sphere; for women, social, cultural and experiential features 
played a more central role. Women mentioned words with social and political value 
(e.g., queer, feminism, construct, stereotype, fluidity and binarism) consistent perhaps 
with their social experience of being historically considered a subaltern identity. This 
relates to the notion of “androcentrism”, that implies “the privileging of male 
experience and the “otherizing” of female experience’ such that males and male 
experience are treated as a neutral standard or norm ... and females and female 
experience are treated as a sex-specific deviation from that allegedly universal 
standard.” (Bem, 1993; p. 41; for a recent review see Bailey, LaFrance & Dovidio, 
2019) 
3.4.2. The concept of gender as a function of sexual orientation. There was no 
significant difference in the total number of items listed by heterosexual participants 
(M= 8.6; SD=2.8) and homosexual participants (M= 8.3; SD=2.8), t(71)  = .517, p > 
.05, although heterosexual participants showed higher agreement in the terms they 
mentioned, with 22 words overcoming the critical threshold, compared to 12 words in 
the homosexual group. Sex was the most frequently produced word by the heterosexual 
group (Panel C) (30% of the sample), followed by culture (19%). The homosexual 
group (Panel D) produced identity (40%) and masculine (30%) the most frequently. 
Figure 3 shows the dendrograms resulting from HCA performed on target concepts for 
each group. 
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Figure 3. Dendrograms of words produced by at least 10% of (C) heterosexuals and (D) 
homosexuals. 
 
Even though some words overlapped between the two groups (n=9), the cluster 
analyses showed interesting differences. Sexuality forms a separate cluster in both 
groups, but in the heterosexual group is paired with gendered and identifying terms 
(man and woman), while in the homosexual group it forms a separate and distinct cluster 
together with rights and society; culture is instead in a separate cluster connecting 
fluidity and freedom. Masculine and feminine form a separate small cluster in both 
groups but they are associated with linguistic features such as human and music by the 
heterosexual group, and sex by the homosexual group. Sex was instead frequently 
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produced together with masculinity and femininity by the heterosexual group, indicating 
a connection between biological sex and physical appearance.   
The clusters in the heterosexual group’s dendrogram shows a high prevalence 
of linguistic associations, along with an attention to the bipolar structure of the term 
gender (with the addition of transgender). This suggests that one crucial dimension for 
this group is the biological one that includes the female/male distinction, and the social 
roles that this distinction carries. The most abstract cluster in this group can be 
considered a socio-cultural cluster, centered on culture and society, and encompassing 
difference and role. In contrast, for the homosexual group the two most abstract clusters 
specifically address the political and social value of the term gender: we find here terms 
such as rights, fluidity and freedom. Interestingly, these are important instances for the 
LGBTQI community. The fact that they were mainly mentioned by this sub-group 
suggests that personal experiences and different contexts might shape our conceptual 
system.  
3.4.3. The concept of gender as a function of “normativity”. There was no 
significant difference in the total number of items listed by “normative” participants 
(M= 8.7; SD= 2.4) and “non-normative” participants (M= 8.7; SD=3.1), t(78) = .966, p 
> .05. The first two most frequently listed words by the “normative” (Panel E) group 
were identity (30%), and sex (26%). In the “non-normative” group (Panel F), the most 
frequently produced words were identity (30%) and culture (24%). Figure 4 shows the 
dendrograms resulting from HCA performed on target words for each group.  
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Figure 4. Dendrograms of words produced by at least 10% of (E) “normative” and (F) “non-
normative”. 
 
Even though some words overlapped between the two groups (n=10), the cluster 
analyses showed interesting differences. Masculine and feminine formed a separate 
cluster in the “normative” group, suggesting that the two terms represent the crucial 
axes along which the concept of gender is organized; in the “non-normative” group they 
were instead grouped together with the word expression and subsequently sex and 
fluidity, in a cluster evoking the idea of traditional gendered roles as social and cultural 
constructions, and laying forward the idea of femininity and masculinity as 
performative acts (Butler, 1990). Society was mentioned mainly with the word, 
sexuality and education, and then connected to the word identity in the “normative” 
group, in a cluster that can be labeled as socio-cultural. In the “non-normative” group, 
society is also included in a heterogeneous cluster that represents the concept of gender 
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as a social construct. Specifically, the term society is frequently mentioned together 
with discrimination. Sex was produced in association with role and difference in the 
“normative” group, while it is paired with the word fluidity in the “non-normative” 
group. 
The words listed by both groups reveal differences in the conceptual 
representation of gender. The “normative” group frequently mentioned words referring 
to gender as a bipolar dimension (e.g., male/female, woman/man). In the “non-
normative” group, the experiential and personal domain together with social and 
cultural aspects emerges more sharply (e.g., discrimination, expression, construct, 
fluidity, and queer). At the broadest level, two main clusters emerge in the “normative” 
group: one explicitly referring to a binary perspective on gender which can be 
considered a more “concrete” cluster, with the addition of the word transgender. The 
second cluster is a more abstract cluster including words such as sexuality, education, 
society, stereotype and culture. On the other hand, in the “non-normative” group the 
concrete grounding relies mainly on the experiential corporeity of gender (masculinity 
and femininity connected to expression), but it is connected with sex and fluidity. 
Overall, the “normative” group emphasized a bigenderist perspective of gender, while 
the “non-normative” group referred to contextually-dependent and social phenomena 
challenging traditional bigenderist assumptions.  
 
General Discussion 
 
Our results demonstrate that the concept of gender is multilayered. According 
to participants’ responses, biological, perceptual and social aspects converge in the 
conceptual representation of genere. When people are asked to produce free 
associations of the term, both abstract (i.e., social, cultural, and linguistic) and concrete 
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(i.e., physical, biological, and sexual) associations are elicited. Moreover, our findings 
indicate that the concept of gender is flexible: depending on the characteristics of the 
individuals, some features of the concept appear more salient than others.  
The results do not align well with the traditional view that assumes abstract and 
concrete concepts are represented distinctly (e.g., Paivio, 1986, Brysbaert et al., 2014), 
but are more compatible with the idea of a fuzzy boundary between abstract and 
concrete concepts (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2018). The concept of gender is particularly 
illustrative of this haziness. Specifically, experiential, bodily, biological and perceptual 
features (e.g., male, female, body, sex) are combined with social, cultural introspective 
and linguistic features (e.g., queer, binarism, construct, feminism, rights, fluidity, 
discrimination). In this light, the boundaries of the concept gender seem to be also 
delineated by “social metacognition” (Shea, 2018; Borghi et al., 2018c), incorporating 
terms conveyed by specific cultural and social contexts such as academic discussions 
and public debates.  
Our findings also shed light on the debate concerning the distinction between 
sex and gender. Specifically, our results support the claim that sex and gender are 
intrinsically entrenched in social context. People’s conceptual knowledge of gender 
seems to incorporate sexual and biological factors implicated in the distinction between 
genders (e.g., sex, female, male, body), as well as aspects related to the performativity 
of gender (e.g., femininity, masculinity, role, difference, expression) which are 
inevitably embedded in social and cultural norms. As Butler (1993a) has argued the 
very distinction between sex as the corporeal fact of our existence, and gender as the 
social conventions shaping traditional femininity and masculinity is questionable, in 
that the very perception of physical-sexual differences is affected by social conventions. 
Indeed, the very adequacy of a two-sex system has been questioned as a social 
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construction that does not include the full spectrum of human sexual configurations, 
better characterized as lying on a continuum (see e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1993). More 
recently, van Anders (2015) proposed the notion of gender/sex as “an umbrella term for 
both gender (socialization) and sex (biology, evolution) […] reflects social locations or 
identities where gender and sex cannot be easily or at all disentangled.” (p.1181). So 
gender/sex is a multidimensional, dynamic and complex construct, reflecting how sex 
and socio-cultural gender are entwined, and therefore making explicit the “being” and 
the “doing” of gender at the same time.   
According to some proposals conceptual knowledge is affected by cultural, 
linguistic and social factors (e.g. Boroditsky et al., 2011; Majid et al., 2004; Casasanto, 
2009), and different populations may categorize things differently depending on the 
language spoken, and on the experiential and cultural environment they live in 
(Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). In this study we investigated a bigendered language, but 
it would be interesting in the future to assess whether a language with more than two 
genders (e.g., Dutch) or with no grammatical gender (e.g., English) might convey a less 
binary idea of the concept gender (Gabriel & Gygax, 2016). In line with the predictions 
of experiential relativity instead, we hypothesized that individuals conforming to a 
“normative” conception of gender would produce more words related to a bigenderist 
conception, while “non-normative” individuals would rely more on socio-cultural 
aspects of gender and on their personal experiences. A comprehensive categorization 
of gender experiences combining instrumental constructs such as the Kinsey Scale and 
tick-boxes with pre-given answers arguably rely on a cis-genderist and normative 
approach. We attempted to overcome this limitation by allowing participants to produce 
their own label for each variable (assigned birth sex, affirmed gender identity and sexual 
orientation), using a blank text box. In spite of this, we are aware that our 
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operationalization of “normative” and “non-normative” individuals is possibly 
problematic, in that it is not always an explicit assessment of participants’ of 
themselves, but an experimenter’s inference from participants’ answers. Nonetheless, 
in line with recent developments in language and sexuality research (e.g. 
Motschenbacher, 2019), we aimed at representing how normativity plays a pivotal role 
in the discursive construction of gender and sexuality. To avoid misconceptions and 
misgendering phenomena, and to fully account for gender in its full complexity, further 
research could make different choices for categorizing gender and sexuality experiences 
(e.g., see new instruments such as TMF Scale, Kachel et al., 2016; Multi-GIQ 
questionnaire, Joel et al., 2014, or Sexual-Romantic and Gender-Inclusive Scales, 
Galupo et al., 2017b). 
Despite these caveats, we found some interesting differences in how people 
conceptualize gender. “Normative” individuals were more likely to mention 
dichotomous terms, while “non-normative” individuals mentioned words related to the 
social dimension of gender, such as fluidity, construct, and queer, along with terms such 
as expression and discrimination—pointing at specific personal experiences. Recent 
findings investigating gender identity among non-binary transgender individuals 
(Galupo et al., 2017a) showed that one central theme in self-descriptions was the notion 
of fluidity, suggesting that gender identity can fluctuate across time. Our results are in 
line with these findings, showing that the majority of “non-normative” individuals, in 
contrast to “normative” individuals, mentioned the term fluidity in their associations 
with the term gender, along with terms such as construct and queer. In this regard, the 
inclusion of the term queer in the conceptualization of gender of “non-normative” 
individuals fosters the importance of the social context in the embodiment of specific 
experiences. Indeed, over history, the term queer acquired the power to give visibility 
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and legitimization to a community of individuals not conforming to bigenderist and 
heteronormative assumptions. In Butler’s words (1993b, p. 19) the term queer is “a site 
of collective contestation”, hence a term with a high social and political valence but 
rooted in personal experiences. It is also worth noting that, in line with findings coming 
from the analysis of the interaction between gestures and speech in transgender 
individuals (Lederer, 2019) our sample of “non-normative” individuals mentioned 
bipolar terms such as feminine and masculine, like our “normative” sample. In one of 
Lederer’s (2019) example, even when one individual verbally identified as a-gender, 
the gestures accompanying the elucidation of the term a-gender matched with the 
conceptual metaphor of gender as two bounded regions delimiting the boundaries 
between males and females. This suggest that the bipartite model of gender is so 
culturally entrenched that even in individuals questioning, rejecting, or moving across 
a bigendered schema it is likely to endure.  
This experiential relativism emerged also in our data from the other groups of 
interest. For example, homosexual individuals mentioned the word rights near society 
and sexuality, while for the heterosexual group the word rights was not a salient feature 
of the concept of gender. This could be because in Italy LGBTQI rights are still a matter 
of debate, and these kinds of issues are strictly related to gender expressions and/or 
gender identity. On the other hand, cis-gender heterosexual individuals are usually less 
likely to see their rights compromised based on their sexual preferences or gender 
identity/expression.   
To conclude, gender is a complex and multifaceted concept, whose intricacy is 
not exhausted by simplistic dichotomies between biological qualities of the human body 
and cultural or social aspects of sex expressions. These features interact at different 
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levels and to different extents, depending also on specific experiences so as to form the 
representation of the concept of gender.  
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Study 3  
Gender is a flexible concept: A comparison of Italian and Dutch 
 
Introduction 
 
Embodied and grounded perspectives of cognition contend that concepts are the 
re-enactment of sensorimotor, internal, and perceptual experiences connected with their 
referent in the world (Barsalou, 2008). In order to access conceptual content, scholars 
conventionally drew on linguistic descriptions provided by tasks such as property listing 
(Papies, 2013) or free-listing (Van Overschelde, Rawson & Dunlosky, 2004). Thus, a 
large body of evidence has demonstrated concepts vary as a function of, e.g., contexts 
and tasks, (Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2015) frequency of instantiation 
(Barsalou, 1985), and also point of view (Barsalou & Sewell, 1984). This flexibility, 
crucially, allows concepts to represent relevant information about the specific category 
in a specific situation (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013), and encompasses aspects related to 
language, context, and culture. 
While studies traditionally investigated concepts such as time (Boroditsky, 
2001), space (Majid et al., 2004) and colors (Regier & Kay, 2009), the concept of gender 
has mainly been treated in cognitive science in relation to linguistic structures (Corbett, 
1991), and to personality and stereotypical gendered traits (Bem, 1981). Grammatical 
gender, for example, has been widely scrutinized by both linguists and psychologists, 
as a means for revealing conceptual structure in different populations (Boroditsky, 
Schmidt & Phillips, 2003; Cubelli et al., 2011). But what exactly do people think when 
thinking about gender? Examining language diversities and similarities is necessary to 
understand categorization (Malt & Majid, 2013). 
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Philosophical debates historically endeavored to define gender as a social 
category (Risman, 2004; Haslanger, 2017), in order to account for the effects that 
gender produces on society. Today, the traditional dichotomy that sees sex opposed to 
gender (Rubin, 1975)—opposing nature to culture—is less tenable (van Anders, 2015; 
Butler, 1990; Hyde et al., 2019). In this perspective, gender is the result of perceptual, 
physical, social, and cultural features.  
Bearing these considerations in mind, the aim of our study was to examine 
whether the concept of gender varies as a function of language and society. Specifically, 
in line with recent grounded and situated approaches to conceptual knowledge (Borghi 
et al., 2018; Barsalou, Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018), we investigated the “abstract” 
dimension of gender. According to these accounts abstract concepts are not, in fact, a 
unitary entity; they comprise a variety of exemplars with different characteristics (e.g., 
numbers, moral concepts, aesthetic concepts, odors) that may recruit different sources 
of grounding. These sources might be abstract or concrete to different extents, such as 
in the case of gender: we can consider it as a highly concrete concept if related to bodily 
experience and biological features; but it can also be conceptualized as a complex set 
of relations between culture, norms, and society.  
Therefore, we compared two linguistic and social groups, namely Italian 
speakers and Dutch speakers. Given that Dutch and Italian societies vary with respect 
to their social construct of gender, we hypothesized that this may impact individuals’ 
conceptualization of gender. Specifically, while Italian culture still has a rather 
traditional distinction between men and women, Dutch culture is more progressive, 
recognizing, for example, the possibility of a third gender on documents, same sex 
marriages, etc. These differences are likely to affect the way in which different social 
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and linguistic groups represent the concept of gender. If that is the case, we would 
expect to find distinct conceptual representations outlined by each group.  
 
Overview of Methods 
 
To assess participants’ conceptualization of gender, we used a free-listing task. 
Participants were asked to type 10 words that were related to the concept of gender 
(genere in Italian and geslacht in Dutch, see Study 2 for details on the procedure).  
 
Participants  
 
80 Italian native speakers (45 F; M age= 31.1; SD=9.4) and 52 Dutch native 
speakers (28 F; M age=33.5; SD=12.9) were enrolled on-line. Participants were 
recruited with special effort to include individuals from less socially represented sexual 
groups. Invitations were sent to several Italian and Dutch groups and organizations that 
concentrate on LGBTQ issues and posted on the Facebook and Twitter profiles of the 
researchers. The invitation included an explicit request to forward the invitation to as 
many people as possible (see, e.g, Jacobson & Joel, 2018 for a similar procedure).  
 
Materials  
 
Participants were presented with an on-line questionnaire, in their native 
language. In the first section they completed the free-listing task. In the second section 
they were asked to provide demographic information. 
 
Results 
 
Participants’ responses were collated, and words that were produced by at least 
10% of participants in each group were included in the analyses. The list of words 
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produced by participants was analyzed by relying on a dissimilarity measure (𝛼βw) 
developed by Crowe and Prescott (2003), accounting both for within and between 
participants’ word co-occurrences. We subsequently performed cluster analyses of the 
most frequently produced words for each group using R (R-Team Core, 2017).  
Relative frequencies of items that were produced by the 10% of participants in 
each group are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Relative frequencies of items listed by the 10% of participants.  
Dutch words English transl. 
Relative 
freq. 
Italian 
words 
English 
transl. 
Relative 
freq. 
       
man man 0,19  identità identity 0,07 
vrouw woman 0,19  sesso sex 0,06 
gender gender 0,10  maschile masculine 0,05 
identiteit identity 0,06  cultura culture 0,04 
sekse sex 0,06  femminile feminine 0,04 
vagina vagina 0,05  ruolo role 0,04 
voortplanting reproduction 0,05  società society 0,04 
meisje girl 0,05  femmina female 0,03 
transgender transgender 0,05  differenza difference 0,03 
geslachtsdeel genitals 0,04  libertà freedom 0,03 
penis penis 0,04  maschio male 0,03 
jongen boy 0,04  sessualità sexuality 0,03 
geboorte birth 0,03  donna woman 0,03 
seksualiteit sexuality 0,03  fluidità fluidity 0,03 
genderneutraal genderneutral 0,03  
  
 
hormonen hormones 0,03  
  
 
borsten breasts 0,02  
  
 
sex sex1 0,02  
  
 
 
A qualitative inspection of Table 1 reveals that similar features were listed by 
both groups (woman, sex, identity and sexuality), but interestingly it also reveals Italian 
and Dutch participants drew attention to different aspects of the same concept. 
Dendrograms reported in Figure 1 and 2 represent the results of the cluster analyses 
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(Murtagh & Legendre, 2014) performed on the most frequently produced words by the 
two groups.  
 
Figure 1. Cluster analysis of inter-item dissimilarity data using items that were listed by at least 10% of 
Dutch participants. 
 
 
Figure 2. Cluster analysis of inter-item dissimilarity data using items that were listed by at least 10% of 
Italian participants. 
 
In the dendrograms, words that were frequently produced together in the free-
listing task are visually represented as close together, where nearness is depicted by the 
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length of branches connecting words. Thus, in Figure 1 man and woman are depicted 
near each other, but both are further away from sexuality, for example.  
Critically, the Dutch sample produced more perceptual, biological, and physical 
features, whereas the Italian sample evidenced features strongly related to cultural and 
social aspects connected with gender.  
In fact, Dutch participants specifically mentioned physical and biological 
features (hormones, genitalia, secondary sexual characteristics), while Italian 
participants mainly reported social and cultural features (fluidity, society, culture, 
freedom, difference). Interestingly, Italian speakers demonstrated a binary opposition, 
mentioning traditional dichotomous poles such as male/female, masculine/feminine. On 
the other hand, Dutch speakers also included terms beyond the dichotomy, such as 
transgender and gender-neutral. To summarize, in general Dutch participants 
highlighted a more “concrete” dimension of gender, opposed to a more “abstract” 
depiction by the Italian sample.  
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, our results point to the exquisite flexible character of concepts in at 
least two respects. First, in line with studies on conceptual flexibility, different linguistic 
and social groups seem to represent gender in different ways. Dutch participants mainly 
stressed bodily experiences, along with biological features, connected to gender, 
whereas Italian participants stressed social factors and reactions to social norms. Two 
possible interpretations for this difference can be ascribed to the traditional character of 
Italian social environment. Possibly, words specifically referring to sex or bodily parts 
represent a taboo in Italy. Another hypothesis is that LGBTQ Italian participants (who 
are a part of the sample) specifically strive to stress their political stances, by evidencing 
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the social construction of gender. Further studies are needed to disentangle these 
speculations. 
Second, taken together, our results suggest that gender cannot be considered 
either a purely abstract or a purely concrete concept, thus rejecting the traditional 
sex/gender dichotomy (Hyde et al., 2019). We showed how gender encompasses both 
perceptual, concrete and abstract and culturally driven features. This combination of 
findings, while preliminary, illustrates that gender is a flexible and multilayered 
concept, whose grounding is related to both linguistic and social practices and to bodily 
and experiential factors (Borghi et al., 2018).  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
This dissertation had two main topics: concepts and dichotomies. The reason 
inspiring this inquiry is that this couple of theoretical constructs is implicitly 
intertwined. Let’s examine in turn why, starting from the last term of the couple, viz. 
dichotomies. Dichotomy is in the first place a concept–and not surprisingly an “abstract” 
concept–connecting two terms in a very specific way; in the context of this work, we 
dealt precisely with dichotomies where tertium non datur. Differently from other kinds 
of dichotomies, in this case there are mainly two alternative conceptions at stake, and 
the possibility to adopt a third kind of conception is excluded. In this sense, we could 
better characterize this specific kind of dichotomies as binary or oppositional 
dichotomies. Now, what is the place occupied by concepts in this frame? The construct 
of concepts and that of dichotomies were covertly correlated for a long time. In Chapter 
1, for instance, we witnessed how theories of conceptual knowledge were broadly 
conceived as a reaction one to another: concepts are prototypes because they cannot be 
definitions; they are theory-driven constructs because they cannot be exemplars, or they 
are grounded in our bodily states because they cannot be physically detached symbols. 
Clearly, scientific advancement proceeds also in this way, namely by rejecting previous 
theories on the basis of newly acquired knowledge gained from the evolution of 
scientific tools. But I think that our modus operandi as cognitive scientists is never 
completely separated by our specific way of thinking, and the fact that much of the 
scientific literature concerning concepts is developed by oppositions and antinomic 
relations is all but casual.  
The core dichotomous opposition I addressed in this dissertation is the one 
concerning abstract and concrete concepts. Starting from an embodied and grounded 
perspective on conceptual knowledge (Chapter 1, par 1.6), I examined theories of 
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cognition that dealt with abstract concepts. I specifically focused on Multiple 
Representation Views (MRVs, Chapter 2, par 2.9), because they seem to offer an 
account of conceptual representation escaping traditional dichotomies implied in 
monolithic theories of concepts. The point of departure of my analysis is therefore 
constituted by the presentation of some of the most relevant tenets of the WAT theory—
considered as a proposal inscribed in the field of MRVs. A key point of the WAT theory 
is the redefinition of the conditions defining abstract and concrete concepts, not only in 
terms of their referents but also in terms of their grounding sources. Whereas classical 
accounts of concepts defined abstract concepts generally as concepts lacking a physical, 
concrete, and manipulable referent, in the WAT theory there are at least three other 
dimensions to consider when studying abstract concepts. First of all, we ought to 
distinguish two axes of analysis: abstraction and abstractness (Chapter 2, par. 2.1), 
which are related but independent measures. Second, one of the major achievements of 
MRVs and their developments is the acknowledgment that abstract concepts, such as 
concrete ones, might benefit from multiple grounding sources. These sources can be 
aspects previously classified as pertaining to the ‘concrete’ side of the dichotomy, like 
sensorimotor activations (cf. the case of numerical concepts), or they can be more 
‘abstract’ forms of grounding (e.g., linguistic associations). Importantly, in keeping 
with proponents of MRVs, I argued that the modality of acquisition of concepts plays a 
pivotal role in the subsequent consolidation in memory of concepts, even though it is 
not the only factor at stake. In fact, as studies focused on conceptual flexibility 
compellingly demonstrated (Chapter 1, par. 1.6.4), we can re-enact different aspects of 
a concepts depending on situations and contextual constraints. Hence, an insightful 
investigation of abstract concepts revealed that they are dynamical and flexible 
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representations, and suggested a radical rethinking of traditional and dichotomous 
categories such as abstract and concrete.  
In line with these speculations and with the evidence coming from experimental 
investigations of abstract concepts, I claimed that in order to provide an honest sketch 
of abstract concepts, we might need to reconsider the entire category by queering its 
ontological status. The theoretical framework purported by queer studies, in fact, allows 
us to deepen and recognize aspects of phenomena into question within and beyond 
established dichotomies (Chapter 3, par. 3.2.1).  
Against this background, in Chapter 3, I confronted the second dichotomy: the 
one opposing sex and gender. Drawing on the characterization of abstract concepts 
provided in Chapter 2, I argued that gender can be considered as a social abstract 
concept. Indeed, if abstract concepts are to be considered as a heterogenous category, 
couched in multiple cognitive mechanisms, gender can be seen as a social abstract 
concept spanned over a continuum of abstractness. Thus, I tried to unravel possible 
grounding sources of the concept of gender (Chapter 3, par. 3.3). The portrait that 
resulted from this critical analysis highlighted different aspects that concur both to the 
formation and to the representation of the concept. Interestingly, a multitude of features 
appeared to contribute to the conceptual knowledge of gender, suggesting a partial 
reconceptualization as “sex/gender”. Indeed, when dealing with the concept of gender, 
both physical/biological properties and social/cultural factors seem to be implicitly 
involved (par. 3.1.1): ‘concrete’ aspects like perceptual discrimination and neural 
activations (paragraphs 3.4, 3.4.1) interact with more ‘abstract’ features such as cultural 
and social contaminations (paragraphs 3.6.1, 3.6.2) so as to shape the concept of 
sex/gender. In this sense, the binary opposition of sex and gender, just as the one of 
abstract and concrete concepts, resulted to be an artificial distinction. I tried to show 
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how, when considered in a pluralistic, grounded, and queer perspective, gender is a 
queer concept in itself, encompassing aspects historically considered as abstract and 
concrete. In line with recent developments in the study of gender related concepts 
(Chapter 3), thus, a better way to study gender-related issues also in psychological and 
cognitive science might be to abandon the old nature-nurture dichotomy reflected in the 
distinction between sex as the natural, given datum and gender as its cultural and social 
signification. As it was the case for abstract concepts, I suggested that once 
acknowledged the artificial nature of the distinction between the two terms, a possible 
strategy to move forward in the understanding of gender-related issues might be to 
contextually reformulate and apply the concept of sex/gender. For instance, discussing 
specific policies contrasting gender pay gap might still require a distinction based on 
gender (specifically intended as socialization, but importantly conceived as a non-
binary category). On the other hand, physical and biological features specific of the 
sexed embodiment of an individual can be considered as foundational in terms of health, 
once we recognize that there are more than two “sexual” assets.  
The reader might wonder whether and how such an extensive discussion on 
abstract concepts, abstraction, and abstractness might apply to “concrete” 
understandings of the world we live in, our society and ultimately our lives. In the first 
place, as noted by Hegarty (2007) and many others before, “psychology is a site where 
power and knowledge are transformed into each other in particularly dense ways in 
modern worlds” (p. 76). The idea of an objective science, capable of describing natural 
phenomena has long been a matter of debate among philosophers and sociologists of 
science (see Wittig, 1985), and the critical examination of metatheoretical assumptions 
underlying scientific inquiry resulted in the acknowledgment that scientific facts are not 
separable from values. In this framework, it is evident how concepts and scientific 
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concepts play a crucial role in determining which entities come into existence and are 
legitimized, and which are not. This is particularly noticeable in the study of gender, 
and in the constructs that have been put into place in order to explain it. The idea 
according to which gender is rooted in sexual differences (conceived as distinctions on 
a two-based axis, i.e., female and male) has simultaneously contributed to the 
reinforcement of the concept of gender as something exclusively related to biological 
factors and to the stigmatization, medicalization, and historical persecution of all of 
those individuals that did not fit into this sharp categorization. Besides historical 
reflections on e.g., the treatment of intersexed individuals, the attempts to cure 
homosexuality and transvestitism, and the discussion of sexual desires as linked to one’s 
own feminine or masculine core identity, the idea of a neat categorization of human 
beings into two gendered classes has deep implications also from a cognitive point of 
view. A wide body of evidence, in fact, demonstrated that “gender systems are capable 
of grounding new associations even with very abstract categories (e.g., female= second, 
right, and odd, whereas male= first, left, and even)” (Hegarty, Ansara & Barker, 2018, 
p. 62). In this sense, the concept of gender–and specifically the concept of gender as a 
bipartite model of categorization–is pervasive.  
And yet, a bigender system explained by biological constraints and reiterated 
through the means of social roles is not “the norm” everywhere around the world (see 
Hegarty, Ansara & Barker, 2018). Even more importantly, if science and scientific 
advancement is devoted to the improvement of social conditions, the very own 
existence of individuals claiming and reclaiming a different perspective on gender 
needs to be fully incorporated in scientific research (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2014). By 
rethinking the conditions that constitute a concept in a grounded perspective we can 
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therefore account for the fact that sex and gender are but two concepts that must be 
interpreted within a socially constructed system of meanings.    
In conclusion, to give some non-exhaustive and partial answers to the questions 
hastened in the Introduction, according to the discussion developed in this dissertation: 
(a) a concept is a flexible, multimodal and dynamic representation couched in multiple 
embodied and grounded systems; (b) abstract concepts are a complex and multifarious 
set of concepts, that benefit from several grounding sources, depending on the modality 
of acquisition and on contextual constraints; importantly, they encompass both 
sensorimotor/embodied aspects and social and linguistic features, to a different extent 
according to their specific class; (c) gender–or better sex/gender–is a multilayered 
abstract concept, whose representation and usage is bounded to situations and 
experiences.  
Whether traditional dichotomies such as abstract and concrete and sex and 
gender will still be useful in some contexts or not, I suggest to keep in mind that for 
some purposes they can be misleading, concealing important aspects of the phenomena 
we are investigating. For this reason, I proposed a queer re-conceptualization of 
concepts, and specifically of abstract concepts, precisely because they have proven to 
resist any sharp distinction. 
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While Queer Theory may now be recognised by many as 
an academic discipline, it nevertheless continues to struggle 
against the straitjacketing effects of institutionalisation, to resist 
closure and remain in the process of ambiguous (un)becoming. 
Queer Theory does not want to 'straighten up and fly right' to have 
the kinks ironed out of it: it is a discipline that refuses to be 
disciplined, a discipline with a difference, with a twist if you like. 
In saying this, however, I do not mean to endow Queer Theory 
with some sort of 'Tinkerbell effect'; to claim that no matter how 
hard you try you'll never manage to catch it because essentially it 
is ethereal, quixotic, unknowable. Obviously Queer Theory does 
function in specific–albeit complex and somewhat ambiguous–
ways in particular contexts, and in relation to particular issues. 
 
 (Sullivan, 2003, pp. v-vi, italics mine) 
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